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THE "POWER" THING
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I shouted out/ "Who killed the Kennedys?"/ When after all/It was
you and me.1
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This article is dedicated to Joe Hudson, for want of whose diligence and dedication
Willie would surely have been lost. Commitment is an awesome-and awesomely
powerful-thing.
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(Abkco Records 1968).
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I. A PREFACE TO "POWER"
the Office of Strategic Services 2 was formed during
WorId War II, its agents were culled from the ranks of
those already commissioned as officers. One of the tests used in
recruitment involved an unlit room with a bar over a dark pit.
The test was contrived so that the candidate was suspended over
the pit, hanging from the bar. Most candidates assumed the test
was one of strength and endurance. Proving their machismo,
they held onto the bar as long as they could. These failed. A
few spit into the pit beneath them to gauge its depth. They let
go, dropping a few feet to the ground below. These were
selected.
In a commentary on Mary Joe Frug's posthumously published
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto,3 Martha Minow commended Mary Joe for not deconstructing the concept of
subordination:
The manifesto displays a commitment to deconstruct-to take
apart apparent dichotomies and show how apparent polarities
need or complement one another or exclude other important
alternatives.... My question here is why do you not deconstruct the notion of subordination itself? I think I have an
answer; I think that your commitment to deconstruction is not
for its own sake or to produce a mindlessly perpetual analytic
machine that fractures concepts and ideas. I think that you are
a feminist using techniques of postmodernism, just as you are a
WoN

2 The Office of Strategic Services was the forerunner to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
3 Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft),
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1992).

1996]

The "Power" Thing

723

feminist using law... You want to be in control of your postmodernism just as Madonna wants to assert her control over her
dress, her images, her fantasies, and her life.4
What interests me most about this passage is its explicit
justification of the decision not to pursue an obvious line of
analysis: Minow appreciates deconstruction's power to negate
congealed dichotomies and thereby expand alternatives. She
nevertheless applauds Mary Joe's refusal to follow through on
these possibilities because of the perceived need to hang onto a
5
political position.
Consider exactly how and why this is so.
As many
contemporary feminists have emphasized, problems of gender
are less a matter of discrimination and inequality than of power.
Catharine MacKinnon explains that the basic issue is that "men's
position of power over women is a major part of what defines
men as men to themselves, and women as women to
themselves. '6 For these feminist theorists, therefore, the
concepts of domination and subordination are essential to the
understanding and critique of gender relations: "[G]ender
hierarchy. defines sexual politics.
In this view, only a
transformation in the equation of gender (hence gender
difference) with dominance, a delegitimation of the sexual
''7
dynamic of power and powerlessness as such, can alter it.
One can understand, therefore, why Minow might feel
compelled to endorse the decision to withhold the concept of
power from the "mindlessly perpetual analytic machine" that
would annihilate it.8 Without stable normative conceptions like
power, domination, and subordination, the moral challenge to
gender hierarchy seems impossible. Accordingly, Minow warns
that "postmodernism risks a relativism that conflicts with
feminist commitments to political engagement, and with a
4 Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe Frug,

105 Harv. L. Rev. 1096, 1103-04 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
5 Commenting on Mary Joe Frug's postmodern pursuit of multiplicity, Minow suggests that she "may carry that pursuit too far in one instance and stop short,
appropriately, in another." Id. at 1101-02.
6 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 92 (1989).
7 Id. at 41.
8 Minow, supra note 4, at 1103.
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continuing ability to name, authoritatively, and to fight,
effectively, what is oppressive...."9
This aversive politicalresponse to postmodernism is typical of
its reception in the legal academy.10 We can see the strength
and depth of this reaction in Minow's characterization of deconstruction as a "mindlessly perpetual analytic machine."" This
particular description suggests that both the privileging of
politics and the widespread demonization of postmodernism are
prompted by a prior commitment to a conception of the self as
relatively autonomous and self-directing. 2 Deconstruction,
Minow realizes, puts this conception at risk. The palpable, highly specific fear is the loss of control and self-dominion. In this
way, the issue of power is personal as well as political. The
feminist scholar, no less than Madonna, must always "be in
control of [her] postmodernism."' 3 The alternative-and it is
here that the choice of words is particularly telling-is to risk
4
surrender to what Minow describes as a "mindless" machine.'
9 Id. at 1104. In a related vein, Robin West attacks relativism and argues that objectivist forms of evaluative reasoning are necessary to such critical assessments of and
challenges to the status quo as MacKinnon's critique of gender. Robin West,
Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1473,1492-97 (1990) (reviewing Barbara
Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value (1988)).
10See Steven L. Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1115, 1124-32
(1994) (discussing William Simon's misreading of Foucault) [hereinafter Winter,
Darkness]; Steven L. Winter, For What It's Worth, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 789 (1992)
(discussing Joel Handler's and Mark Tushnet's reactions to and misapprehensions of
postmodernism in legal scholarship) [hereinafter Winter, For What It's Worth]. See
also Barbara Herrnstein Smith, The Unquiet Judge: Activism without Objectivism in
Law and Politics, 9 Annals of Scholarship 111, 117 (1992) ("It is possible, of course,
to defend and promote judgments made on behalf of subordinated people with
effective non-objectivist arguments. But that is just the possibility that West, like
many other politically concerned objectivists, fails to grasp.").
1 Minow, supra note 4, at 1103.
12 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1630-31
(1991) ("[I]n their very rhetoric, all of these modes of contemporary legal thought
establish, depend upon, and eclipse a quintessentially liberal individual subject-what
I have elsewhere called the relatively autonomous self .... "); Pierre Schlag, Fish v.
Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 Geo. L.J. 37, 44 (1987)
(describing and critiquing the conceit of the "relatively autonomous twentieth century
self") [hereinafter Schlag, Fish v. Zapp]; Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building
Houses, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1595, 1602-08 (1991) (describing the systematic distortion of
postmodernism in contemporary legal thought as driven by a precommitment to
politics and to the relative autonomy of the self) [hereinafter Winter, Foreword].
13 Minow, supra note 4, at 1104 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 1103 (referring to a "mindlessly perpetual analytic machine"). Ironically, it
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The close interweaving of questions of power and agency is
not fortuitous, of course. Power connotes potency, capacity,
control and, for many, is virtually unthinkable without agency.
To say that A has the power to do something is to say that he
or she is an agent with the capacity to act; to say that A has
power over B is to say that A has the capacity to control B in
some relevant way. But what could "power" possibly mean if A
cannot even control his or her own choices? Thus, power
connotes agency and agency in turn entails accountability. As
Steven Lukes observes: "The point.., of locating power is to fix
responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, or
inaction, of certain specifiable agents."'15 Lukes, as we shall see,
is an important influence on both Minow and MacKinnon. 16 His
self-described "radical" approach to power has been
characterized as "explicitly premised upon an ethically liberal
concept of agency."'17

This way of seeing things will seem self-evident (if not
unchallengeable) to most people, for it is an entrenched part of
both our philosophical tradition and our general world view.'8
From this perspective, men's power is a corollary of their
is this defensive denial of the contingency of her own self-privileging that leads Minow
falsely to polarize the theoretical alternatives: Either one must preserve politics as
usual or succumb to the ceaseless depredations of a senseless automaton. In a

subsequent paper, in contrast, Minow argues that questions of choice and constraint
are better understood as matters of degree than as all-or-nothing phenomena. See
Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 Geo. Li.
2093 (1992).
15Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 56 (1974).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 176-236.
17 Stewart R. Clegg, Frameworks of Power at xvi (1989).
18As Clegg remarks:

In this respect the foundational tradition of power may be said to have framed
the major moves in a game of theorizing power. These moves can be traced
from attempts to specify more precisely the metaphysical concerns in the
'agency view' of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. They lead to major areas of contest
within the game: Is power distributed 'plurally' or held by an 'elite'? Is power
intentional or not intentional? Is power confined to decision making or is it
evident in non-decision making? Is not making a decision an action or a nonaction? Is power a capacity for action or the exercise of action? The questions
spin on as if a conceptual arachnid were endlessly weaving a linguistic funnelweb with which to ensnare our understanding.
Id. at 37. In Part III, I examine in some depth the nature of this language-game and
the ways in which it is structured by a system of highly conventional conceptual
metaphors. See infra text accompanying notes 79-116.
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unfettered agency; men are the paradigmatic subjects. As
MacKinnon explains: "Woman through male eyes is sex object,

that by which man knows himself at once as man and as
subject."' 9 Conversely, women's subordination consists in large
part in their objectification and the concomitant denial of their

agency. We can hear an echo of this view in the previously
quoted passage from Minow. There, the insistent demand to
validate women's power is presented with an ironic double twist:
The challenge of understanding men's domination of women is

subordinated to the need to maintain the feminist's control over
her postmodernism.

Even with so much at stake-or, rather, precisely because so
much is at stake-it may be better to light a candle than curse
the darkness. If deconstruction can engender possibilities, as

Minow seems to acknowledge, 20 then it may well be helpful to
deconstruct concepts such as subordination. In fact, one would
19MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 122. MacKinnon, however, warns against the
simplistic reversal that claims subjectivity on its own (male) terms:
Disaffected from objectivity, having been its prey, but excluded from its world
through relegation to subjective inwardness, women's interest lies in
overthrowing the distinction itself. A feminism that seeks only to affirm
subjectivity as the equal of objectivity, or to create for itself a subject rather
than an object status, seeks to overturn hierarchy while leaving difference, the
difference hierarchy has created, intact.
Id. at 120-21.
20 Minow, supra note 4, at 1103. Judith Butler offers a contrasting approach to the
relations between postmodernism and politics:
[I]t is no longer clear that feminist theory ought to try to settle the questions of
primary identity in order to get on with the task of politics. Instead, we ought
to ask, what political possibilities are the consequence of a radical critique of the
categories of identity? What new shape of politics emerges when identity as a
common ground no longer constrains the discourse on feminist politics? And
to what extent does the effort to locate a common identity as the foundation for
a feminist politics preclude a radical inquiry into the political construction and
regulation of identity itself?
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity at xi (1990).
Cf. Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi"-The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631, 1670-71 (1990) ("[T]he
ideational content of discussion about political or moral values-so-called 'value choice
talk'-is, as a political matter, virtually epiphenomenal .... [What is more important]
is the political constitution of human beings as particular kinds of selves, with
particular kinds of social relations to each other."); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy
and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1472-73 (1990)
(arguing that the reconstructive project requires that we relinquish our unsophisticated
notion of politics).
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have thought that critical analysis of power would be of the
greatest and most immediate importance to those who lack it.
One would have thought that the knowledge gained from decon-

structing power-that is, from taking it apart and seeing how it
is constructed-would actually be empowering.

That is the

conviction of this article; I'm for spitting into the pit. If that
causes us to change our conception of ourselves, perhaps that

too will be useful.21
I intend to explore the concept of power to see what it is, how
it works, and who may be said to "have" it. In doing so, we will
find that we must relinquish our strongest and most cherished
notions of agency and autonomy in favor of a more realistic,
more contingent notion of the self At the same time, however,
we will gain a deeper appreciation of the agency we do have and
the way in which even the putatively disempowered in fact share
it. In short, we will find that a reconceived notion of power may
actually be empowering.
The argument proceeds as follows. First, in Part II, I examine
and deconstruct the conventional conception of power.
Typically, power is viewed either as an irreducible quality
capable of explaining social behavior or it is quickly reduced to
the capacity to wield force. But neither view survives the
recognition that the phenomena described as "power" are
necessarily situated in and conditioned upon a complex, preexisting field of social interactions. Thus, both the reification of
"power" and its (all-too-easy) reduction to force succumb to the
critiques I call "the subjectivization objection" and "the
objection from social contingency," respectively. The insights
that emerge from these critiques yield the framework of an
alternative social understanding of power.
In Part III, I examine the metaphorical structure of the
concept of power to explain how and why it seems to operate so
well as an ultimate explanation of the many complex social
phenomena it is offered to explicate. Part IV returns to the
subjectivization objection and the objection from social
21 Cf. Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction,
and the Law 131 (1991) ("The 'goal' of ethical feminism, which 'sees' the 'should be'

inherent in the feminine viewpoint, is not just power for women, but the redefinition
of all of our fundamental concepts, including power.").
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contingency. I discuss Lukes's "three-dimensional" view of
power, which, to a substantial degree, is embraced by both
Minow and MacKinnon. The significant contribution of this
view is that it introduces notions of social construction into the
analysis of power. This advance, however, turns out to be
equivocal. While the introduction of this insight successfully
preserves some of the political issues elided by more traditional
theories of power, it also exposes the internal inconsistency in all
three-dimensional views.
In the end, it is the reflexive
application of its own premises that causes such views to
succumb to the subjectivization objection.
This discussion will lead directly, in Part V, to a consideration
of the more complex, systemic conception of power developed
in the later work of Michel Foucault. Though Foucault's work
is widely cited and frequently criticized in legal scholarship, it is
rarely dealt with adequately22 One of the distinguishing characteristics of Foucault's approach (and, ironically, what makes it so
impenetrable when read through conventional, conceptual lenses) is that it defies the usual totalizing mistakes: It neither
facilely subjectivizes power nor falsely elides agency. Foucault
is able to avoid these common errors, first, because he
methodically rejects most of the conventional metaphorical
schema for power and, second, because he further radicalizes the
insight about social construction. For Foucault, socio-cultural
construction is an all-pervasive process from which no one
escapes and in which everyone participates. This dynamic view
of power underpins Foucault's claim that power is always
vulnerable to disruption; it is the view that I develop here.
Power as such is neither a "thing" nor a quality, capacity, or
possession of particular people. Rather, power is an emergent
quality that can only take shape through the joint agency of all
those who participate in a given set of social relations.
22 See, e.g., Robert Post, The Relatively Autonomous Discourse of Law, in Law and
the Order of Culture at vii, xiv (Robert Post ed., 1991) (discussed in Winter,
Foreword, supra note 12, at 1602-08, and infra text accompanying notes 382-84);

William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. Miami L. Rev.

1099, 1111-14 (1994) (discussed in Winter, Darkness, supra note 10, at 1124-32); Robin
West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 59, 59-65, 7278 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 286-94).
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Finally, in Part VI, I consider the political implications of this
deconstruction and reconception of power. Reflecting on
George Orwell's Shooting an Elephant3 and a passage from
Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative,24 I focus on how a reconceived notion of power creates possibilities for empowerment.
II. (JUST LIKE) STARTING OVER
Issues of power are issues of politics. That seems clear
enough: Questions of access to, exercise of, and limits on power
are quintessentially the subject of political contestation.25 At the
same time, the formula is reflexive: Issues of politics are issues
of power. Which is to say that, no matter what the ostensible
political issue might be, the ultimate issue is one of power
understood as the ability to satisfy and protect one's interests.
As Jean Bethke Elshtain describes the traditional conception:
"Power is a form of compulsion exerted by the already
(relatively) powerful upon one another within official political
institutions designed to promote the aims and interests of
'26
competing groups. It is of, by, and for elites.
In the next Section, I return to this passage and examine the
nature and the source of the metaphors it employs. Note, in the
meantime, the problem inherent in this apparently axiomatic
definition. If one wants to know what power is, it is circular to
say that "power is a form of compulsion exerted by the already
(relatively) powerful." Of course it is. To say that to exercise
23George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant, in Inside the Whale and Other Essays 91,
91-99 (1962).
24Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 46-47 (1983).
25Cf. Lukes, supra note 15, at 26 ("[T]he concept of power is ...what has been
called an 'essentially contested concept'-one of those concepts which 'inevitably
involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users'. Indeed, to
engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics.") (quoting W.B. Gallie,
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 169 (1955-56)).
26 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Power Trips and Other Journeys: Essays in Feminism as
Civic Discourse 136 (1990) (describing the definition of power in mainstream political
science). Elshtain goes on to criticize this mainstream view for excluding women and
the so-called "private" sphere from the domain of power. She endorses instead an
approach that recognizes as power the ability to control the political agenda. On this
view, the very denomination of a sphere as "private" and of certain concerns as
"nonpolitical" is a (quite effective) exercise of power. Id. at 136-38.
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power is to be powerful and that to be powerful is to have the
ability to exercise power is descriptively (and tautologically)
true. But this is only to say that every exercise of power
(however defined) is the occasion for the ascription that the
actor "has" power; the ascription, moreover, is a reification into
a property or trait of what may only be a temporary ability.27
As Michel Foucault points out, "power as such does not exist. '28
When we use "this all-embracing and reifying term ... an
extremely complex configuration of realities is allowed to
escape. ' 29 The axiomatic definition obscures, rather than
reveals, what power "is"; it tells us nothing about its bases or
derivations.
Much the same problem afflicts MacKinnon's radical feminist
account of power. One implication of the feminist insight that
"the personal is political" is that the same phenomenon which
operates at the level of the so-called "public" and "political"-that is, the exercise of power to secure the interests of
the powerful-also operates at the level of the so-called
"private" and the "personal." Thus, echoing the axiomatic
definition of power, MacKinnon contends that "sex is a
systematic division of social power ... enforced to women's
detriment because it serves the interest of the powerful, that is,
men." 30 MacKinnon, however, goes further than this simple
definition and identifies male power as ontological. "Power to
create the world from one's point of view, particularly from the
point of view of one's pleasure, is power in its male form." 31 At
the same time, MacKinnon asserts that "sex-gender and
27Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn, § 112 (1881), reprinted in On the Genealogy
of Morals and Ecce Homo 189-90 (W. Kaufmann ed., Vintage Books 1989) ("Where
right rules, a state and degree of power is preserved, and a diminution and increase
are resisted. The right of others is the concession of our feeling of power to the
feeling of power among these others. When our power is proved to have been
profoundly shaken and broken, our rights cease....").
2 Michel Foucault, Afterword: The Subject and Power, in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 208, 217 (2d ed.,
1983) [hereinafter Foucault, Subject and Power].
29Id.

30MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 40.

31Id. at 121. To MacKinnon, this particular form of power is epistemological as well.
Id. at 121-22 ("The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it

creates, is objectivity ....What is objectively known corresponds to the world and
can be verified by being pointed to (as science does) . .. ").
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sexuality-is about power ... ,"32 which is to say that "male

power takes the social form of what men as a gender want
sexually, which centers on power itself, as socially defined.

' 33

The circularity here is obvious. As we have already seen, 34
MacKinnon identifies maleness itself with power.35 In short,
power enables men to get what they want and what they want

is power; indeed, power is what men are. Again, putting aside
the tautological truth of this account, it tells us absolutely
nothing about what power is.
There is an obvious rejoinder. Power is grounded in violence

and the ability to inflict it; in MacKinnon's words, "male
dominance is... a one-sided construct imposed by force for the
advantage of a dominant group. ' 36 MacKinnon gives potent
expression to the relationship between male ontology and the
violence that underwrites it: "Difference," she tells us, "is the
velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. ' 37 The aphoristic
32 Id.

at 133.
33Id. at 131. It is worth considering MacKinnon's exposition of this point.
To be clear. what is sexual is what gives a man an erection. Whatever it takes
to make a penis shudder and stiffen with the experience of its potency is what
sexuality means culturally. Whatever else does this, fear does, hostility does,
hatred does, the helplessness of a child or a student or an infantilized or
restrained or vulnerable woman does, revulsion does, death does. Hierarchy,
a constant creation of person/thing, top/bottom, dominance/subordination
relations, does.
Id. at 137. I do not doubt that this description captures important aspects of our social
reality. Cf. Norman Mailer, Why Are We in Vietnam? (1967). Nevertheless, I
daresay that many may have some trouble recognizing in MacKinnon's depiction their
experience of sexuality.
34See supra text accompanying note 6.
35MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 92 ("[M]en's position of power over women is a
major part of what defines men as men.., and women as women ...."); see also id.
at 113 ("Feminism has a theory of power: ...Male and female are created through
the erotization of dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the
dominance/submission dynamic define each other.").
36Id. at 238 (emphasis added); see also id. at 109 ("Beneath each [stereotypical] idea
[about women's nature and behavior] were revealed bare coercion and broad
connections to women's social definition as a sex.").
37Id. at 219. Images of violence are a recurrent trope for MacKinnon. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 45 (1987)
("Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak.");
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev.
11, 28 (1985) (comments of Catharine A. MacKinnon) ("The freedom we have is so
small compared to the kind of freedom that we could have if we transformed this
society, if we were able to get this foot off our necks.").
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form of her statement should not obscure that the violence she
refers to, though sometimes subtle and covert, is certainly very
real. As MacKinnon explains: "Always in the background, often
not very far, is the sanction of physical intimidation, not because
men are stronger'but because they are willing and able to use
their strength with relative social impunity."38
The difficulty with this explanation has nothing to do with its
empirical truth. There is no denying that violence against
women in the form of rape, battering, sexual harassment and
abuse is a fact of life that forms the menacing background
conditions of women's reality.
Even so, MacKinnon's
explanation of male power presents profound theoretical
problems. There is a strong sense in which MacKinnon seems
to view violence as primary and foundational.3 9 But, consistent
with her view that gender is through-and-through a social
construction, MacKinnon cannot mean to assert that male
violence is in any way biological or inherent. 40 Thus, she
acknowledges that male violence is itself a social product, a
consequence of psychological
disposition and social
acquiescence. As she puts it, men dominate "not because [they]
are stronger but because they are willing and able to use their
strength with relative social impunity."41
This careful qualification, however, undermines any attempt
to comprehend power in terms of physical force; indeed, the
statement virtually deconstructs itself When and why are some
people willing to use their strength? When and why is the use
of force given social approbation? I will refer to these problems
as "the subjectivization objection" and "the objection from social
contingency," respectively. As is already implicit in MacKinnon's scrupulously precise formulation 4 2 the two objections
share a common conceptual base in notions of social
38MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 93.

39 See id. at 237 ("The force underpins the legitimacy as the legitimacy conceals the
force.").
40 See, e.g., id. at 114 ("Male is a social and political concept, not a biological
attribute, having nothing whatever to do with inherency, preexistence, nature, essence,
inevitability, or body as such.").
41

Id. at 93.

42 MacKinnon does not say that men are "willing to use their strength and able to

do so with relative social impunity," but rather that they are "willing and able" to do
so with (relative) social impunity.

1996]

The "Power" Thing

733

construction. 43 Thus, the subjectivization objection argues that
the attribution of self-directing agency or "will" is inconsistent
with the recognition that the "self' that wills is itself a product
of social forces, attitudes, understandings and beliefs. Similarly,
the objection from social contingency contends that the concept
of power cannot explain social relations because the phenomena
described as manifestations of "power" are themselves
dependent for their efficacy on collaboration and cooperation.
I develop these points in later Sections, but a few preparatory
observations on the social contingency of force will help pave
the way for the argument to follow.
As MacKinnon herself recognizes, the capacity to use force is
contingent on its social sanction and approval. Hannah Arendt
explains the source of the widespread misapprehension that conflates power with force.
Since ...violence appears as a last resort to keep the power

structure intact..., it looks indeed as though violence were the
prerequisite of power and power nothing but a fagade, the
velvet glove which either conceals the iron hand or will turn out
to belong to a paper tiger. On closer inspection, though, this
notion loses much of its plausibility.44
One need only contrast the events of Tiananmen Square in June
1989 with those in Moscow in August 1991 to illustrate the
point. In an organized society where force is deployed through
a social organization like an army or police force, the effective
use of violence as an instrument of policy is dependent upon the
set of social conventions that constitute a chain of command: If
the soldiers refuse to fire on the people, it's a safe bet that the
generals will soon be headed for the airport. 45
43

Thus, as developed below, MacKinnon's account of power succumbs to the subjectivization objection but not the objection from social contingency. See infra text
accompanying notes 191-236.
44Hannah Arendt, On Violence 47 (1970).
45 See id. at 48 ("In a contest of violence against violence the superiority of the
government has always been absolute; but this superiority lasts only as long as the
power structure of the government is intact-that is, as long as commands are obeyed
and the army or police forces are prepared to use their weapons."); see also Dennis
H. Wrong, Power Its Forms, Bases and Uses 93-99 (1979) (observing that "the
praetorian guard argument" is "generally a valid and compelling one" and concluding
that "[b]ureaucratic organization makes possible much more extensive centralized
power structures, but at the same time the power holder at the centre becomes more
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Of course, we did not need the break-up of the Soviet Union
to make the point. As Bernard Williams observes, the insight is
as old as Plato's Republic:
Thrasymachus says that the conventions that enjoin respect for
others' interests--"justice," as it may be called-are an instrument of the strong to exploit the weak. This immediately raises
the question, what makes these people strong? Thrasymachus
speaks as if political or social power were not itself a matter of
convention, and that is a view barely adequate to the school
playground. His position is rapidly followed in the Republic by
another, which takes this point. According to this, justice is the
product of a convention adopted by a group of people to
protect themselves. It is a contractual device of the weak to
make themselves strong. 6
The point-one might even say the deconstructive point-is that,
once one recognizes the social contingency of force, "power" no
longer works as a foundational explanation for justice, morality,
gender relations, law or anything else.
The conflation of power with force, and its invocation as an
ultimate explanation for complex social phenomena such as the
law, is as much an error of the right as of the left. In
distinguishing law from science, Judge Posner observes that
science is based on convergence of expert opinion, while law is
based on force:
To be blunt, the ultima ratio of law is indeed force ....If

you ask how we know that Venus exerts a gravitational pull on
Mars, the answer is that the people who study these things
agree it does. If you ask how we know that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the states to prohibit certain abortions, the
answer is that the people who have the political power to decide
dependent on subordinate officials in a lengthened and dispersed chain of
command.").
46Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 30-31 (1985) (footnote
omitted). As Arendt elaborates on this classical insight, power is the predictable and
peculiar characteristic of the weak: "The strength of even the strongest individual can
always be overpowered by the many, who often will combine for no other purpose

than to ruin strength precisely because of its peculiar independence.... It is in the
nature of a group and its power to turn against independence ....
" Arendt, supra
note 44, at 44. Thus, although they often appear together, "[p]ower and violence are
opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent." Id. at 56.
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the issue-namely, the Justices of the Supreme Court-have so
determined by majority vote.47

But what this passage actually demonstrates is that law is
necessarily based on convention-both the convention that the

Supreme Court decides by majority vote (and not, say, by the
relative physical strength of the Justices) and the convention that
prompts litigants, states and the other branches of the federal
government to treat the Court's decisions as authoritative.
Indeed, this is precisely why Hamilton referred to the Court as

the "least dangerous" branch.48

The claim that people "with power" get to determine reality
has a certain intuitive appeal. But whether it is Nietzsche on the
genesis of "good and evil,"49 Minow on the etiology of

"difference," 50 or MacKinnon on the construction of "gender
47Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 83 (1990).

48 The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The judiciary... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment

4;See Nietzsche, supra note 27, First Essay "Good and Evil," "Good and Bad" § 2,
at 25-26:
[I]t was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, highstationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions
as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded,
common and plebeian. It was out of this pathosof distance that they first seized
the right to create values and to coin names for values.... (The lordly right of
giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin
of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say
"this is this and this," they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it
were, take possession of it.)
50 See Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and
American Law (1990). In striking parallel to Nietzsche, Minow highlights the intimate
relation between power and naming as well as the pathos of (false) distance between
the powerful and those they name as different. She writes:
The attribution of difference hides the power of those who classify and of the
institutional arrangements that enshrine one type of person as the norm ....A
focus on social relations casts doubt on ... the very claim to knowledge
manifested when public or private actors label any group as different. That
claim disguises the power of the namers, who simultaneously assign names and
deny their relationships with and power over the named .... The social-relations
approach embraces the belief that knowledge is rooted in specific perspectives,
and that "prevailing views" or "consensus approaches" express the perspectives
of those in positions to enforce their points of view in the structure and
governance of society.
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hierarchy,"51 any understanding that echoes Thrasymachus and
employs the concept of power as an irreducible quality with
explanatory capacity only begs the real and difficult questions.
First, it evades the question of how people become powerful to
begin with. Second, it elides the even harder questions
concerning the workings of "power." The intuitive sense that
people in power get to determine various social issues may well
be descriptively accurate-if not, at least, tautologically true.
But it leaves entirely obscure the process of mediation by which
this occurs. As Elaine Scarry remarks: "Each new idiom, each
new metaphorical construction, only reintroduces the same
problem: in the sentence, 'Whoever wins, gets to determine the
issues,' what is it that explains the transition between the second
and third words, that explains the phrase 'wins, gets'?" 52
Martha Minow, for example, explains that debates over the
routinely taken-for-granted structures of social life "produce
competing pictures of reality. The winners secure their picture
of reality as authoritative; their views about what differences
matter, and why, acquire the earmarks of factuality. When a
conception of reality triumphs, it comes to convince even those
''53 But it is not at all clear how this takes place.
injured by it.
Just how do the winners secure their version of reality? How
does a conception of reality triumph? These questions are left
unanswered; the causal connections are simply assumed to be
54
obvious entailments of the fact of "power."

Id. at 111 (citing Lukes, supra note 15) (citation omitted).
51MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 117-18:
[Fleminism sees the male point of view as fundamental to the male power to

create the world in its own image, the image of its desires, not just as its
delusory end product.... [W]hat counts as truth is produced in the interest of
those with power to shape reality ....

52 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 96
(1985).

53Minow, supra note 50, at 237 (citations omitted).
54Thus, Minow continues:
Political and cultural success itself submerges the fact that any conception of
reality represents the perspective of certain groups, not a picture of reality free
from any perspective. Power may be at its peak, then, when it is least visible:
when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges

from either discussion or imagination.
Id. at 237-38 (footnotes omitted) (citing Lukes, supra note 15, at 22-25).
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It is precisely these missing mediations that are supposed to be
supplied by the conflation of power with physical force. The
ability to use violence to enforce one's version of reality would,
if valid, explain the transition between "wins, gets." Consider,
however, what should be the paradigm case: victory by force of
arms as in war. War, it is widely understood, "carries the power
of its own enforcement; the winner may enact its issues because
the loser does not have the power to reinitiate the battle." 55
But, as Elaine Scarry argues, even in this case the "obvious"
explanation proves insupportable upon close examination. 56 For
one thing, it is often the case that the winners suffer greater
casualties than the losers.5 7 For another, war rarely if ever
results in the total annihilation of the opponent.58 So exactly
what is the catalyst that translates victory on the battlefield into
mastery of the hearts and minds of the losers?
If the explanation is obscure in the paradigm case, the
difficulty is yet more formidable when the phenomena to be explained concern everyday interactions that have become routine
dimensions of the social relations within a culture. Still, the
similarities may be greater than appear. After all, MacKinnon
contends that gender hierarchy is maintained via the background
sanction of physical intimidation. This is not so very different
than the conventional view that war carries the power of its own
enforcement, enabling the winner of the armed struggle to
impose its interests on the loser. The inadequacy of the intuitive
view leads Elaine Scarry to argue that: "War is in the massive
fact of itself a huge structure for the derealization of cultural
constructs and, simultaneously, for their eventual reconstitution. ' 59 Not all of Scarry's quite complex account of this process
is pertinent to the kind of intra-cultural phenomena that concern
us here.6° But what is clearly relevant, I think, is Scarry's claim
55Scarry, supra note 52, at 96.
56Id. at 97-108.
57See id. at 97-98.
58Id. at 100-102.
59Id. at 137.
60Central to Scarry's account is the fact that war is a contest between two cultures
and the claim that human embodiment plays a fundamental role in meaning. Id. As
Scarry explains:
[T]he declaration of war is the declaration that "reality" is now officially "up for
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that war itself is at base a social institution whose efficacy rests
not on force, but on interpretation: "[A]ithough the power of
enforcement principle is not at work in the way that it is widely
believed to be, the very fact that it is widely believed to be at
work may be in the end the occurrence that lets it work."' 61
It is this insight about the interpretive basis of power that I

want to explore here. To simplify the inquiry somewhat, let me
present a series of less politically charged (though hardly
apolitical) hypotheticals and ask you to consider both the
inadequacy of the view that reduces "power" to force and the
difficulty of "locating" power in each of these cases.
(1) The leaderof a streetgang threatens the owner of a local store
with physical harm unless he pays "protectionmoney." Here we

have a simple, straightforward case of power as compulsion
grounded in force used by the powerful to promote their
grabs," is now officially not only to be suspended but systematically deconstructed, a deconstruction that will be carried far enough on both sides so that
either one, if designated the loser, will have less difficulty reimagining itself as
"without" its disputed aspect of self-definition than it would immediately prior
to the war. The lies, fictions, falsification, within war... collectively objectify
and extend the formal fact of what war is, the suspension of the reality of
constructs, the systematic retraction of all benign forms of substance from the
artifacts of civilization, and simultaneously,the mining of the ultimate substance,
the ultimate source of substantiation, the extraction of the physical basis of
reality from its dark hiding place in the body out into the light of day, the
making available of the precious ore of confirmation, the interior content of
human bodies, lungs, arteries, blood, brains, the mother lode that will eventually
be reconnected to the winning issue, to which it will lend its radical substance,
its compelling, heartsickening reality, until benign forms of substantiation come
into being.
Id. Injuring plays a somewhat less conspicuous (though, as MacKinnon says, still
important) role in the construction of gender. Nevertheless, embodiment is relevant
to the social construction of gender in at least two ways. First, there is the obvious
sense that physiognomy provides a visible, apparent basis for gender differences.
Second, and more important, the social construction of gender is embodied in the
sense that socialization influences how we comport ourselves as men or women in
terms of body-language, physical posture, grooming, and dress. Compare Michel
Foucault, Two Lectures, in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings 1972-1977, 78, 97 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980) (describing the
operation of power "at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes
which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc.")
[hereinafter Foucault, Two Lectures], with Scarry, supra note 52, at 109 (describing
cultural patterns of bodily comportment and expression learned early in life).
61 Scarry, supra note 52, at 108.
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interests. I will refer to this case as "the prototypical scenario"
because it is by reference to this simple case that most issues of
power are unreflectively understood. 62
(2) The storeowner is threatened by the same street tough. This
time, however, there is no gang. The storeowner doesn't believe
the threats and refuses to pay the "protectionmoney." Nothing

happens. Power is only the product of a credible threat of
physical force. Conversely, if the street tough is bluffing-that
is, if he does not have the ability to carry out his threat-and the
storeowner believes the threat nonetheless, the street tough will
still have power over the storeowner. Part of the built-in difference between this and the previous hypothetical is the difference
between a group and a single actor. It in the second
hypothetical, it is plausible that the storeowner does not believe
the threat, it is because power is typically more effective when
it is articulated by a group. The points revealed here are that
power is a social product and, relatedly, that power lies not in
the threat itself but rather in the fear it creates in the victim.
(3) A street gang threatens a storeowner unless he pays
"protection money." The police are aware of the extortion
attempt and have the capacity to intervene to protect the owner
and the business. The police look the other way. In this case,

still much simplified in its details, the social dimensions are
already complex. The gang has power only because of the
forbearance of the police. Both the police and the gang have a
measure of power based on their ability to use force, but the
power of the police is greater precisely because it carries with it
a social sanction and a degree of legitimacy not ordinarily
available to a street gang.
(4) The storeowner is threatened by the street gang. The
neighbors are aware of the extortion attempt but do not report it
to the police. Unaware of the situation, the police fail to protect
62 Cf. id. at 99 ("[Tjhe widely shared assumption that war carries the power of its

own enforcement arises from the mental reflex of thinking about war by holding
steady the contest activity as injuring but conceiving of that activity as occurring
between two people each working to kill the other.").
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the storeowner. Now it is the street gang that has achieved
(through whatever means) a measure of social approval or
acquiescence. The police, who have access to superior force and
greater social authority, are powerless in this situation. But the
neighbors, who may have little or no effective ability to use
force, are quite "powerful" in this case because it is their
decision to report or remain silent that will determine who wins
and who loses. This is but an instance of the familiar adage:
"Knowledge is power." 63
(5) A storeowner receives an extortion threat. Both the neighbors
and the police are aware of the threat, but they too are afraid of
the street gang, which is known to be particularly vicious.
Undaunted, the storeownergoes to the local newspaper. The press
report of the incident causes a scandalthat forces the hand of the
police. They provide protection to the storeowner.In this final
version, "ultimate" power lies with public opinion. The storeowner's resourcefulness, and her willingness to risk substantial
physical harm, provides her the power to effect the outcome of
her predicament. Everything else is as in hypotheticals (3) and
(4).
Even with these simple hypotheticals, we can see both the
shortcomings of the conventional understanding of power and
the outlines of an alternative interpretive understanding.
"Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps
together."64 While this point has been deployed to justify
political power as democratic and legitimate, 65 we can extract
from this observation several different and more extensive
claims. The basic insight is that power is an aspect of groups,
63Note,

however, that the maxim's validity is not contingent on a threat of force in

the background. Suppose, for example, a person interested in something that is timedependent but unaware of its availability. Someone who knows about this desire and
knows as well about the time-dependent opportunity can use this knowledgedifferential to obtain advantages from the other person.
(AArendt, supra note 44, at 44. As noted above, Arendt distinguishes between
"power" and "violence." See discussion supra note 46.

65See Arendt, supra note 44, at 44. ("When we say of somebody that he is 'in power'
we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their

name.").
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not individuals. The more subtle insight is that power is relational and can only be articulated in a group; it takes at least
two to occasion "power."66 (As we shall see in a moment, this
is true in a nontrivial sense.) Moreover, every organization that
exerts power as a cohesive group is nevertheless a participant in
some larger social system and, therefore, itself subject to the
social processes that enable or disable "power." Thus, the more
profound conclusion is that, as MacKinnon appreciates, all
power is "social power." 67
If all power is social power, however, then its dynamic need
not be expressed through hierarchy. Foucault makes a profound
and important point when he insists that "power relations are
rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted 'above' society
as a supplementary structure."68 The insight that power is a
product of a system or network of social relations means that
people at very different places in the social system may nevertheless be able to activate it. While this tends to democratize
power to a degree, it is not to say that power is evenly or fairly
distributed. To the contrary (and this is a crucially important
caveat), typically there is a substantially different price to pay
depending on one's position within that social system.
Most importantly, to recognize that all power is social power
is to appreciate that power is not an external force that operates
on a passive victim. Power is not a property of an actor who
exercises domination over another; it is the emergent quality of
a reciprocal social relation. Just as its assertion enacts power,
deference can generate or sustain it.69 Power is the product of
6 See Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 217 ("The term 'power'
designates relationships between partners (and by that I am not thinking of a zero-sum
game... )."); see also Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1819, 1851 (1992) (observing that the feminist idea of "power, though considered a
personal attribute, is primarily a capacity or a relation among people and assumes its
full meaning only when it is realized by acting through communities or networks

supporting individuals.") (citation omitted).
67See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 40 ("To radical feminism, sex is a systematic
division of social power.

.

."); cf. id. at 55 (criticizing Simone de Beauvoir's view for

failing to explain social power); id. at 219 (arguing that the liberal model of equality
ignores the fact that difference is a socially constructed perception designed to justify
social power).
68Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 222.

69As expressed in the epigraph to Rainer Werner Fassbinder's film adaptation of
Theodor Fontane's nineteenth-century German novel Effi Briest: "The many people
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an interplay of actions and attitudes between social actors, each

equipped with corresponding or complementary images of a
particular social relation. Thus, what produces "power" must

also be in the head of those who are its subjects. In Stanley
Fish's colorful phrase, "the gun at your head is your head; the
interests that seek to compel you are appealing and therefore
pressuring only to the extent they already live within you, and
indeed are you. '70 This is the more profound reason that power

is relational. The social phenomenon of power is possible only
because it is a shared hermeneutic phenomenon: It is a contin-

gent product of common ways of understanding and living in a
social world, a function of reciprocally enacted roles, routines,

institutions and understandings. 71 This leads to my final claim:
that a deconstruction of "power" is also a deconstruction of the

autonomy and originary capacity of the "self

'72

While this may

politics, 73

seem at first blush to disable
the advantage of this
richer conception is that it reveals the potential fragility of

power and the ways in which it is vulnerable to disruption. 74

who sense their own capabilities and needs and yet acquiesce in the prevailing system
accept it in their minds, by their deeds, and thus confirm and strengthen it." ("Viele,
die eine Ahnung haben von ihren M glichkeiten und ihren Bedtirfnissen und trotzdem
das herrshende System in ihrem Kopf akzeptieren durche ihre Taten und es somit
festigen und durchaus best~tigen.") Effi Briest (New Yorker Video: The Fassbinder
Collection 1974).
70Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice
of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 520 (1989).
71 See Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 224 ("Power relations are
rooted in the system of social networks."). For the parallel and closely related
argument that all forms of normative practice-whether prescriptive or
persuasive-are contingent on shared cognitive understandings, see Steven L. Winter,
Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963 (1991)
[hereinafter Winter, Contingency and Community].
72Hence the subjectivization objection. See Winter, Foreword, supra note 12, at
1616 ("In the end, then, there cannot be a public sphere of autonomous choice any
more than there can be a private sphere of autonomous subjectivity.").
73Indeed, at first blush, this seems as threatening to politics as Minow implies. See
supra text accompanying notes 3-14. And it is-but only to the kind of politics "that
allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power
structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects."
Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801, 805
(1991).
74
Thus, as MacKinnon appreciates, the subordinated are not without power because
"within the necessity of their compliance is a form of power." MacKinnon, supra note
6, at 101.
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Given these insights, the prevailing discourse conventions that
countenance references to "power"--along with correlative allusions to (unspecified) "elites" and (usually obscure) processes of

"hegemony"-as a meaningful causal account of various social
phenomena appear rather strange. 75 (After all, it took little
more than a few simple hypotheticals and a reference to Plato

to show how little is in fact being said.) Indeed, in prevailing
discourse, "power" operates as nothing more than a convenient
stop in the infinite regress; it provides a temporary ground or
foundation necessary to sustain a particular language-game.
"Sure, it's turtles all the way down. But what really sustains []
is power."
Precisely the same shortcomings attend the discourse
fashionable within the legal academy that likes to explain
everything in terms of "politics. ' 76 The parallelism follows from
the recognition that, as noted earlier, the relationship between
power and politics is entirely reflexive. One might even say that
the two conceptions are theoretical twins, resting, as they both

do, on the same liberal concept of agency.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find otherwise sophisticated
scholarship unreflectively drawing a distinction between the

"skeptical nature of truth and knowledge" and the "political

problem of power. ' 77 The separation of these categories cor-

responds with (if it does not, in fact, imply) different intellectual
matrices apropos of different problems. Problems of truth and
knowledge are investigated as epistemological issues; problems

of power are analyzed as political matters. The system, more75A notable exception to this naive approach is William L.F. Felstiner & Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
Interactions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1447 (1992).
76Schlag, supra note 73, at 906 (suggesting that the conventional vision of politics
"seems to be a kind of premature politicization in the sense that it leaps from a
relatively widely shared notion that law is politics to a shallow, yet apparently utterly
definitive, conceptualization of politics").
'n Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After Postmodernism?), 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1549, 1558 (1991) (reviewing Minow, supra note 50) ("In
short, Minow is long on the skeptical nature of truth and knowledge, but short on the
political problem of power ...."). Note that this complaint would work as well if we
reversed the adjectives, remarking on Minow's attention to the political nature of truth
and knowledge and her elision of the skeptical problem of power. But then the
substance of the criticism would be very different; indeed, it would look something like
this Article.

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:721

over, is analytically nested such that the power/politics cluster
lies at its base. Thus, within this conceptual system, it is easy to
think of knowledge as a political issue or a product of power.
But it seems counterintuitive to analyze power as an epistemological question. Notwithstanding the apparent solidity of this
arrangement, it is inherently unstable. Like all such "theoretical
unmentionables,"78 concepts such as politics and power work
only so long as they themselves are not treated as subjects of
truth and knowledge about which we might be skeptical. "Power," in other words, retains its cogency as an explanation of
social phenomena only so long as the concept itself remains
unexamined-which is to say only so long as we don't spit into
the pit.
III. T)HE METAPHORICS OF POWER

A. Movers and Shapers
How is it that we so thoughtlessly deploy the concept of
power as if it had explanatory potency? One way to approach
this question is to scrutinize exactly how we talk about power.
By unpacking the familiar, everyday expressions we use to
communicate about it, we can uncover the shared images that
constitute our unreflective, conventional conception of power.79
We will find that these images comprise a well-organized
conceptual schema that corresponds to the prevailing
understanding of power shown to be so problematic in the last
Section. In other words, the apparent cogency of the claim that
"people with 'power' get to determine reality" is a function of

Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 12, at 42.
Terence Ball, Models of Power: Past and Present, 11 J. Hist. Behav. Sci. 211,
221 (1975):
[I]t is unlikely that concepts such as "power" and "cause" have any single
meaning; more probably they can have no meaning apart from the models in
terms of which we think about them. If that is so, then perhaps we... require,
not that our models be banished, but that they be brought to the level of conscious awareness, criticized and, if need be, supplemented-or even wholly
replaced....
Cf. Clegg, supra note 17, at 21-22 ("In constructing, representing and making sense of
a concept like power we can never be free from the matter of words. Specific
78

79See

conceptions of the world ...

define the nature of reality as we experience it.").
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its profound resonance with our unconscious cognitive model of
power.8 0

Following Ball,8' Stewart Clegg credits Hobbes with founding
"a discursive framework for analysis of power as motion,
causality, agency and action."82 Both Ball and Clegg describe

Hobbes's use of this framework as influenced by the ascendancy

of mechanical science in the seventeenth century.8 3 But an
analysis of the linguistic evidence using the tools of cognitive
theory reveals that this conceptual framework is both more basic
and more extensive than is suggested by Hobbes's mechanical

conception.
Embedded in our most common everyday
expressions about power are four conceptual metaphors-POWER
IS AN OBJECT, POWER IS A LOCATION (OR CONTAINER), POWER
IS A FORCE and CONTROL IS UP. These metaphors, moreover,

are neither isolated nor arbitrary representations peculiar to our
conception of power. Rather, they are either basic conceptual

metaphors, as in the case of CONTROL ISUP,8 4 or special cases of
80As Stanley Fish points out, "an illegitimate appeal can hardly have an effect if
there is nothing to appeal to." Fish, supra note 70, at 517. Mark Johnson makes
much the same point for philosophy generally:
Philosophical theories are, for the most part, attempts to develop internally
consistent systematic accounts of various folk theories that exist within a
culture.... As a result, [philosophers] tend to adopt the same metaphorical
concepts, forms of discourse, modes of argument, and so forth that are
established within the folk theories they articulate. This is what makes it
possible for philosophically sophisticated theories to sometimes seem intuitively
correct to ordinary people.
Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics 64
(1993).
81Ball, supra note 79, at 211 ("[T]he mechanistic-causal model of power is three
centuries old, being traceable to Hobbes, Locke and Hume.").
82Clegg, supra note 17, at 31.
83 See Ball, supra note 79, at 213:
The picture or model of power as cause, where causality is in turn viewed
through the imagery of contiguous motions or pushes and pulls, ... was
spawned in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century---or, perhaps
more accurately, in certain attempts by philosophers to come to terms with the
new science and to extend its models and methods to the study of human
behavior.
See also Clegg, supra note 17, at 6 ("Given the enormous success of the scientific
project, it was hardly surprising that, in conceptualizing power, as in much else, the
early political and social scientists sought to emulate in their principal terms and
metaphors those notions conceived in mechanics by Hobbes' contemporaries.").
84See George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 14-17 (1980).
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basic metaphors that are indispensable aspects of our conceptual
system.
Consider the following familiar expressions:
-The insurgents seized power, taking control of the government.
-She's the titular leader, but he possesses the real power.
-She's making a power-grab.
-How
much power did he have before the new
administration? A lot.
In each of these expressions, power is conceptualized as a
"thing" that can therefore be seized, possessed, or quantified.
This conception can be represented by the generic metaphor
POWER IS AN OBJECT, 85-which can then be filled out with some
more specific item such as food (e.g., "watch out for them; she's
power hungry, but his appetite for power is voracious"), an
instrument such as a weapon (e.g., "she's got power, and she
knows how to use/handle it"; "he wields a lot of power"), or a
commodity (e.g., "she was a major power-broker, until she was
indicted for influence-peddling"). An important variant of this
metaphor, to which we shall return below, conceives power as a
substance that can be amassed (e.g., "he has a lot of power")
until one is powerful (i.e., power-full). A closely related
metaphor conceptualizes power as a resource, which can be
consolidated, conserved, or wasted (e.g., "it takes time and effort
to consolidate one's power" or "he was powerful once, but he
frittered it away").
Conceptual metaphors, such as POWER IS AN OBJECT and its
cognates, are not mere linguistic expressions.
They also
structure how we reason about "power." Consider the sample
sentence given above-"watch out for them; she's power hungry,
but his appetite for power is voracious." The cogency of this
85"Metaphor" here is understood as a matter of thought and not mere language: It
refers to a tightly structured set of conceptual mappings in which a target domain is
understood in terms of a source domain of more readily comprehended, embodied
experience. This conceptual mapping is conventionally represented by means of a
mnemonic of the form TARGET-DOMAIN-IS-SOURCE-DOMAIN; but it is important to
understand that the metaphor is the set of conceptual mappings and not the TARGETDOMAIN-IS-SOURCE-DOMAIN mnemonic, which is only a representation. George
Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought 202,203-09
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993).
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advice hinges on the everyday knowledge that people in the grip
of drives like hunger may act with particular ruthlessness when
required and, therefore, that it is better to get out of the way if
one can. This knowledge is then mapped onto the domain of
political behavior. Similarly, the observation that "it takes time
and effort to consolidate one's power" draws on knowledge from
the domain of physical objects to reason about events in the
social world. If a physical substance or resource is to be
available when needed, one must first expend time and effort to
collect it and then to ensure that it is stored properly. This
knowledge is then mapped onto the social domain to make
judgments about what is required for the secure exercise of
power.
These two illustrations are ordinary, even unremarkable
examples of how we reason in terms of metaphor. Indeed, in
both instances, the mappings and accompanying patterns of
inference are so much a matter of reflex that they hardly seem
like cases of metaphor at all. Below, I examine an extended
passage to demonstrate how a more complex argument rests on
patterns of inference supported almost solely by metaphor. The
point here is simply that conceptions like POWER IS AN OBJECT,
along with their obvious metaphoric entailments, are a
constitutive part of our everyday rationality.
For example, consider what George Lakoff refers to as
"duals. '86 Just as physical objects have locations, OBJECT
metaphors generally entail LOCATION metaphors. 87 One such
case is our conventional conception of events. In one version of
the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, we conceive of states as

objects that we acquire or dispose of. This yields highly conventional expressions such as: "She got sick; he lost his virginity; she
regained her composure." In another version of the EVENT
STRUCTURE metaphor, actions are conceived as motions along
paths and the resulting states, circumstances, and conditions are
understood as locations or bounded regions along those paths. 88
86 Id.

at 218.

87Id.
88 Johnson,

supra note 80, at 36-40; Lakoff, supra note 85, at 219-28. Also related
to this system is the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Examples of the ACTIONS ARE
MOTIONS metaphor include the description of a person active in the community as a
mover and shaker; the description of someone who pulls rank as really throwing his
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metaphors-ACTIONS

LOCATIONS,

ARE MOTIONS,
STATES ARE
STATES ARE CONTAINERS and PURPOSES ARE

DESTINATIONS-yield

such

familiar

expressions

as:

"The

relationship has had its rough spots, but I think we're going to
make it. We're not at the point where we're ready to get
married, but I think we're really in love."
The two versions of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor overlap
with one another in the sense that they share metaphoric
entailments.8 9 One shared entailment is that, in both versions,
movement corresponds with some aspect of causation. In the
OBJECT version, the agent or cause transfers the effect (i.e., the
metaphoric "object") to the affected person. Thus, it is conventional to say that "the noise gave me a headache" or that "the
Harvard piece broughther fame and fortune." In the LOCATION
version, movements into or out of bounded regions correspond
to changes in states (e.g., "he got into trouble") and physical
forces correspond to causes (e.g., "her weak interpersonal skills
held her back").
Power, too, is a dual; like other states, it is conceptualized
both as an object and as a location or container. The POWER IS
A LOCATION (OR CONTAINER) metaphor is what motivates such
common expressions as: "Where does the real power lie?"
(orher) weight around;and the characterization of being too busy to do something as
being all tied up with work. The metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS (OR LOCATIONS)
is what motivates (i.e., makes sense of) familiar expressions like "she is a lawyer in
full-time practice, but she's on vacation right now, .... he's in a foul mood," or "she's
deep in thought."
89 Of course, the OBJECT-LOCATION entailment is the principal one. There is another
such shared entailment that arises from the CONTAINER version of the LOCATION
metaphor. Because a container is also an object, one can both enter and acquire it (at
the same time, as it were). Consider, for example, three expressions describing the
self-same predicament.
(1) His bad temperament always brings him trouble.
(2) With that bad temperament, he's surely headingfor trouble.
(3) His bad temperament is always getting him into trouble.
The first expression uses the OBJECT version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, in
which the state ("trouble") is an object delivered by the character flaw that is the
cause. The second expression conveys much the same information (i.e., the inevitable
link between character flaw and subsequent difficulties) by means of the LOCATION
version of the metaphor. Here, the state is a destination toward which the subject is
travelling. The third expression also uses the LOCATION version. In this last case, the
state is both a container that the subject enters and an object (specifically, a containerobject) that he acquires by reaching-hence, "getting into trouble."
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"She's in control here." "That agency is a bastion of power."
"Before announcing his re-election bid, he made sure to shore
up his power-base." Note that the location/container can be
filled out with a specific such as a fort or other building, as in
the last two sample sentences.
Because power is at base about the ability to "shape" events,
it is not surprising that we also conceptualize power as a force
that can be exercised or exerted to affect others in a variety of
ways. First, power can be the force that enables the powerful to
take those actions (i.e., make the metaphoric "motions")
necessary to reach some desired end. More commonly, power
is the force that compels others to take those actions; thus,
Elshtain describes the formerly dominant conception in political
science that views "[p]ower as a form of direct pressure on a
social actor to take a specific action." 90 Alternatively, power can
be the force that inhibits the actions of others or even, as Lukes
observes, that shapes and governs their desires. 91 Thus, it is
conventional to say that "the powerful committee chair blocked
all efforts at reform" or that "he has the power to bend the
members to his will."
Finally, our intuitive understanding of power incorporates the

basic conceptual metaphor CONTROL IS UP.92

This is what

motivates conventional descriptions of power as a matter of
"having things under control" or "having the upper hand"; it is
why people rise to and fall from power. Minow invokes this
conventional metaphor when she observes that "Madonna wants
to assert her control over her dress, her images, her fantasies,
and her life. ' 93 So, too, MacKinnon's basic claim-that "men's
position of power over women is a major part of what defines
men as men" 94-- draws on the unreflective understanding that
power consists in being "above" or "on top" of what is
90 Elshtain, supra note 26, at 136 (emphasis added).
91"To

put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do
what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing,
shaping or determining his very wants." Lukes, supra note 15, at 23.
92The metaphor is grounded in our embodied experience of being upright in the
world and its relationship both to control over our bodies and the ability to exercise

control over many aspects of our environment. Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 84, at
17-21.
93Minow, supra note 4, at 1104 (emphasis added).
94 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 92 (emphasis added).
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controlled. 95 Thus, MacKinnon understands gender as a matter
of unadorned "[h]ierarchy, a constant creation of person/thing,
top/bottom, dominance/subordination relations. ' 96
Different metaphoric conceptions of the same" domain can
nevertheless work together-i.e., they are metaphorically
coherent and not, as commonly thought, cases of "mixed metaphors"-if they share metaphorical entailments. 97 One example
is the way in which the OBJECT-LOCATION dual operate together
in the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. 98 The four conceptual
metaphors for power provide another example. As we have
already seen, the POWER IS A'LOCATION metaphor can be filled
out with a specific locale premised on the POWER IS A FORCE
metaphor, such as a fort (e.g., "bastion of power"). It can also
be filled out with a setting based on the CONTROL IS UP
metaphor, as in the phrases "she reached the pinnacle of power"
or "he's at the peak of his powers."99
Similarly, the OBJECT metaphor can be instantiated by any
instrument used to transmit force. One example previously
noted represents power as a weapon, as in the expression "she
wields a lot of power." But this is only one case of a more
general conception premised on the metaphors POWER IS AN
OBJECT and POWER IS A FORCE.
Together, they yield a
conventional and highly productive metaphor that conceives of
power as a device for transmitting force. This conception, which
can be represented by the metaphor POWER IS A MACHINE, is the
basis of such familiar expressions as "an apparatusor mechanism
of power" or "the levers of power." The MACHINE metaphor
95Indeed, MacKinnon self-consciously exploits the analogical resemblance between
standard sexual imagery and our conventional metaphorics of power:
[O]ne question that is raised is whether some form of hierarchy.., is currently
essential for male sexuality to experience itself. ...To put it another way,
perhaps gender must be maintained as a social hierarchy so that men will be
able to get erections; or, part of the male interest in keeping women down lies

in the fact that it gets men up.
Id. at 145.
96 Id.

97 See

at 137.

Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 84, at 87-105.
98See supra note 89.
99See, e.g., Minow, supra note 50, at 237-38 ("Power may be at its peak, then, when
it is least visible: when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious
challenges from either discussion or imagination.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
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can be elaborated with any device that transmits or generates
force. Thus, power can be represented as an electrical device as
in Clegg's "circuits of power"' 00 or Elshtain's characterization in
the passage that follows.
These metaphoric coherences allow the four conceptual
metaphors for "power" to function together.
Elshtain's
description of the positivist approach to power once prevalent
among political scientists provides an interesting example. She
writes:
[T]he definition of power developed initially in mainstream
American political science got reduced to the formula: X has
power over Y if he can get Y to do something Y would not
otherwise do. We can observe Y's behavior and assess the
force X brought to bear.... Power is a form of compulsion
exerted by the already (relatively) powerful upon one another
within official political institutions designed to promote the aims
and interests of competing groups....
Power as a form of direct pressure on a social actor to take
a specific action here becomes a thing in itself, measurable like
amps on an electric meter.101
This passage employs virtually every one of the conventional
metaphors we have examined: POWER ISAN OBJECT ("Power...
here becomes a thing in itself'); POWER IS A LOCATIONCONTAINER ("Power is ... exerted ... within official political
institutions"); POWER IS A FORCE ("the force X brought to
bear"); and CONTROL IS UP ("X has power over Y"; "[p]ower is
... exerted by the already (relatively) powerful upon one
another"). Nevertheless, there is nothing awkward or stilted
about the passage. Because of their mutual entailments, the
metaphors work together smoothly, naturally and unobtrusively.

100See Clegg, supra note 17, at 187, 192-93 ("Any superordinate member of a
complex organization will be just one relay in a complex flow of authority... Ideally,
... such relays should be without resistance, offering no impedance whatsoever.")
(emphasis added).
101Elshtain, supra note 26, at 136. Although unidentified, the reference is obviously
to Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 Behav. Sci. 201, 202-03 (1957) ("A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do.").
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Elshtain's passage illustrates something more profound than
the amicable coincidence of these metaphors. The systematicity
of these metaphors enables them to provide a conceptual grid or
schema for understanding, talking and reasoning about power.
They contribute to the passage an internal logic or structure that
provides the positivist view with its sense of coherence and
lucidity. Although ostensibly unexpressed in the background, it
is the LOCATION version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor-in

which

ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS ALONG PATHS,

STATES ARE

LOCATIONS and PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS-that frames the

logic of the passage. Thus, the positivist definition of power
starts from the premise that "the aims and interests of
competing groups" can only be effectuated by the instrument
specifically designed for that purpose-the "official political
institutions." Thus, only the actions "within" such institutions
can move groups toward their desired ends.102 Since POWER IS
A LOCATION, by definition all those within those institutions are,
at the least, "already (relatively) powerful." Some, however, are
more powerful than others and can exert compulsion "upon"5
others by bringing "force... to bear."
How are the "already (relatively) powerful" differentiated
from one another? The answer derives from the internal logic
of the metaphoric system. Those "on top" ("X has power over
Y") get to exert force on the others-which is why "[p]ower is
a form of compulsion exerted by the ... powerful upon one
another." We know from the CONTROL IS UP metaphor that
height correlates with power. Why? Consider the imagistic
coherence between the metaphors CONTROL ISUP and POWER IS
A SUBSTANCE.

The latter metaphor, as we have seen, applies

knowledge from the source domain of physical objects to reason
about actions and events in the target domain of power. Like a
physical substance, power can therefore be metaphorically amassed until one is powerful (i.e., "full" of power). The more one
has of a physical object or substance, the larger and higher the

102Thus, the CONTAINER metaphor frames Elshtain's larger point about the inadequacy of the mainstream approach to studying power. Her critique focuses on the
ways in which this traditional view excludes women from the domains of power and
politics. Elshtain, supra note 26, at 137.
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pile. This yields the generic metaphor MORE IS UP. 10 3 A
powerful person is one with "a lot of" power; she is, therefore,
"up." In other words, the confluence of the metaphors POWER
IS A SUBSTANCE and CONTROL IS UP yields the conclusion that
those with the most power will be "on top." When they exercise
power, they exercise it "over" or "upon" others.
But what is it about being "on top" that particularly enables
them to exert force on others? The POWER IS A RESOURCE
metaphor, noted earlier, expresses the shared entailments of the

metaphors

POWER IS A SUBSTANCE

and

POWER IS A FORCE.

Thus, the "substance" accumulated can be conceptualized as a
kind of fuel or energy "measurable like amps on an electric
meter." To be "powerful" is, then, to have available more than
the usual store of energy; by definition, being "on top" means
having the largest accumulation of available force. These
metaphors yield the inference that those with the most power
are those who have the greatest capacity to exert "direct
pressure on a social actor to take specific action."
To summarize, the four metaphors form a single, coherent
model or schema for conceptualizing power that corresponds
precisely to our conventional, unreflective understanding of the
concept. Power is conceived as a substance like a resource that
can be accumulated and stored, as in a container. The person
who does so "has" a "lot" of power, hence is "powerful." This
buildup of power is what puts a person "on top," at "the height"
of his or her powers. It is also what enables him or her to exert
control "over" others. To be "powerful" is to have sufficient power/energy/force either to take the actions necessary to reach
some desired end, to compel others to take those actions, to
inhibit the actions of others, or to shape their preferences: It is,
in short, to have agency.104 This, then, is the prototypical scenario discussed earlier in which power is understood as
compulsion grounded in force used by the powerful to promote
their interests.
Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 84, at 15-16.
Although it is never explicit, agency is the inescapable entailment of these metaphors: To have sufficient power to move/act or sufficient force to cause others to act
is to be an agent. To put it another way, it is not so much that these metaphors give
rise to a concept of agency as that they are (that is, constitute) our concept of agency.
103
104
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Strikingly, each and every one of the conventional assumptions
about power shown to be so problematic in the previous Section
is an outgrowth of this metaphoric model. All of our most basic,
intuitive assumptions about power-that it is grounded in
violence; that it is an external force that operates on a passive
victim; that it is a property of an actor who exercises domination
over another; that it is expressed through hierarchy; and that
power and agency are synonymous-turn out to be either
entailments or reductive understandings of these metaphors.
Thus, the reification of power-in which what is rarely more
than a temporary ability is treated as a property or trait-is an
unreflective and reductive application of the conceptual
metaphor in which power is understood as an object or
substance. 105 So, too, the widespread conflation of power with
violence is an unsurprising reduction of the metaphor POWER IS
A FORCE, which, after all, plays an essential role in our
conceptual schema for power. The conventional assumption that
power is, by definition, a matter of hierarchy rests on no firmer
foundation. 106 In this case, the unreflective understanding is a
radical prototype effect in which the central or prototypical
case-here, that (POWER) CONTROL IS UP-is taken as true of
the entire category. 07
This conceptual schema is also what supplies the missing mediations in the intuitive but unsupported claim, examined earlier,
that "people with power get to determine reality." In the logic
of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, determination of reality is
the goal-state (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS) that power
(understood as force or energy) enables one to reach. The claim
that "people with power get to determine reality" makes
intuitive sense-and therefore does not seem to need explana105 See Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 745,
765-66 (1992) (reviewing Thomas C. Grey, The Wallace Stevens Case: Law and the
Practice of Poetry (1991)) ("Because we understand abstract concepts by means of the
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS metaphor, the vector of reduction runs in the opposite direction
from abstraction to reification: the reduction of an idea to a thing. This process of

'thingification' conflates one of many possible relations into an identity or equation.").

106See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 242 ("Inequality is about power, its
definition, and its maldistribution. Inequality at root is grasped as a question of

hierarchy....").

107On radical prototype effects, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1386 (1988).
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tion-precisely because we understand the world in terms of the
metaphors POWER IS A FORCE and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS
In this metaphoric understanding, to be
ALONG PATHS. 1°8
powerful is by definition to be able to achieve one's desired ends
or to compel others to do and to see as one dictates.
This conventional conceptual schema plays a decisive role in
structuring how we analyze and reason about power. We have
seen its influence in Minow's and MacKinnon's reductive
understanding of power as hierarchy and their too easy
assumption that power brings with it a kind of inexplicable (or,
at least, unexplained) ontological omnipotence. We see it again
in MacKinnon's indictment of Marxist-influenced theories of the
relations between state and society. For her, such theories do
not adequately specify the identity, nature or source of power:
"As to who or what fundamentally moves and shapes the
realities and instrumentalitiesof domination, and where to go to

do something about it,... is as ambiguous as it is crucial."109 In
making this charge, MacKinnon fully embraces the conventional
metaphoric understandings that ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS, that
POWER IS A FORCE, that POWER IS A MACHINE or instrumentality

for transmitting that force and, finally, that POWER IS A
LOCATION. Her challenge in effect consists of (or, to be more
precise, is structured by) an insistence upon the entailments of
this metaphoric system. Thus, MacKinnon wants to know who
or what activates (i.e, "moves") and designs (i.e., "shapes") the
mechanisms of domination and where one might go to change
it, assuming all the while that there is both a determinate
"someone" and a definite "somewhere" wherein power lies." 0
B. The Social Construction of Boris Yeltsin

If the conventional schema so strongly configures even
sophisticated scholarly efforts, then we can expect it to play a
yet more potent role in structuring our everyday thinking about
108 See also Minow, supra note 50, at 237 ("When a conception of reality triumphs,
it comes to convince even those injured by it.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
109MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 159 (emphasis added). We shall explore this
argument further in Part IV. See infra text accompanying notes 225-36.
110 For examples of the distorting ontological effects of these metaphors on reasoning

within contemporary political science, see Ball, supra note 79, at 216-20.
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public affairs. In this Section, I analyze an example from
relatively recent world events. The purpose of this examination
is twofold: first, to demonstrate the pivotal role of these
metaphors in the construction of our social reality; and, second,
to establish the constitutive relationship between these
metaphors and the agency conception of power.
Consider the remarkable transition that occurs in The New
York Times' front-page account of Boris Yeltsin's role in helping
to thwart the August 1991 coup:
As army tanks were leaving the city today, a triumphant
Boris N. Yeltsin appeared before the Russian Parliament to a
standing ovation. But in a calm and measured speech, the
Russian President shifted credit for the derailment of the coup
S. . to the tens of thousands of Muscovites who rose to the
defense of their elected government, ready to face tanks with
sticks and stones if necessary.
The tribute was a mark of Mr. Yeltsin's sure-footed political
prowess. Once again, he has shown the country and the world
that he can summon the democratic yearnings of the Russian
people, and put their political will into play.
"Yeltsin's style is to create the illusion of power with
willpower," a senior Western diplomat said today, commenting
on the Russian President's extraordinary performance this
week." 1
The passage begins with a report of how, rather than taking
personal credit, Yeltsin attributes the victory over the coup to
the courage and commitment of the Russian people. But his
frank recognition of the social basis of power is quickly supplanted by a version of the events that conforms to the more
conventional agency view. First, Yeltsin's own assessment is
dismissed as so much political posturing-a crowd-pleasing
"tribute" that is proof positive of his "sure-footed political
prowess." Instead, Yeltsin is presented as the active agent able
to "summon the democratic yearnings of the Russian people"
and "put their political will into play." The preeminence of this
111 Celestine Bohlen, Russian Galvanizes People's Will, And Frustration, Over
Democracy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1991, at Al, A9. The banner headline reads:
"Gorbachev Back as Coup Fails, But Yeltsin Gains New Power." Id. at Al.
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agency view is consolidated with the quote from the unnamed
senior diplomat. In this version, Yeltsin is promoted from
decisive catalyst to exclusive author of his nation's fate: Power,
we are told, is an illusion; and Yeltsin is capable of producing it
with willpower alone.
The transformation of responsibility for the defeat of the coup
is astonishing, particularly when one considers that it occurs in
the face of widespread media images that reenforced the sense
of massive popular resistance extending to the army itself112 But
the balance of the article skillfully sustains this revisionist
account by means of a two-part strategy. First, the article places
the events firmly within the conventional conceptual schema for
power. Thus, the article continues:
By the time it was over, [Yeltsin] had established himself as
the force to be reckoned with .... Already, he has pushed all
this to advantage-issuing decrees on the Russian republic's
long-sought sovereignty, pre-empting the signing of the union
treaty that before the coup was to redefine the republics'
relationships with Moscow, redistributing power away from the
Soviet national leadership.
For those who look on his appeal to the masses with trepidation, his moves to take control of central government agencies
... smack of an ominous overextension of his power. But
supporters see these actions as a rightful attempt to defend the
republic's democratic gains against encroachments.

Mr. Yeltsin has repeatedly said he would not run against Mr.
Gorbachev in the national elections foreseen under the union
treaty .... The collapse of the coup that had apparently been
timed to prevent the signing now leaves Mr. Yeltsin in a
stronger position to dictate the terms of the partnership that is
likely to emerge.

For example, the photo immediately above this front page story bears the caption:
"Outside, bystanders applauded a tank officer on a Moscow street." Id. Over the
continuation of the story on an inside page, there is a photo of thousands of
Muscovites standing in the rain listening to Yeltsin's speech. Id. at A9.
112
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The Yeltsin program calls for demolishing central controls over
the economy ....The conspirators, for whom Mr. Yeltsin had
become anathema over the last few years, saw the emerging
cooperation between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin as a threat
to their power base, a sign that the old system, built around the
Communist Party, was on the point of final collapse." 3
Once again, the passage uses virtually every one of the
conventional metaphors we have examined: POWER IS A FORCE
("the force to be reckoned with: ...Already, he has pushed all

this to advantage"); POWER IS AN OBJECT ("redistributingpower
... "); POWER IS A LOCATION ("... away from the Soviet

national leadership"; "a threat to their power base"); ACTIONS
ARE MOTIONS ("his moves to take control"); STATES ARE
LOCATIONS (defending "the republic's democratic gains against
encroachments"); and CONTROL IS UP ("The Yeltsin program

calls for demolishing central controls over the economy"; "the
old system, built around the Communist Party, was on the point
of final collapse").
More importantly, however, the logic of the passage unfolds
from the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. Whatever the real
cause, the failure of the coup establishes Yeltsin "as the force to
be reckoned with." This gives him the immediate wherewithal
to get things done, "pushing" things to his advantage by
"redistributing" formal power from the central government to
the separate republics. This newfound strength also enables
Yeltsin's "moves to take control," which are variously viewed as
an illegitimate "overextension" of power (i.e, that he has gone
too far) or a justified response to the "encroachments" of antidemocratic forces.
Although, at this point, the article has explained-indeed,
established-Yeltsin's agency and demonstrated his power to act,
it has not yet provided an account of that empowerment. The
next two paragraphs begin that undertaking, employing the logic
of the conceptual schema for power that we examined in
connection with Elshtain's description of positivist political
science. As between those within the official political institutions, i.e., "the already (relatively) powerful," those who have
113Id.

at Al, A9.
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amassed the most power are "on top" and, thus, in a position to
compel others. In the internal logic of this metaphoric system,
the downfall of the existing power structure inevitably means
that the next most powerful people will now find themselves "on
top." Thus, the article observes simply that "[t]he collapse of
114
the coup ... leaves Mr. Yeltsin in a stronger position."
We still know nothing about the source of Yeltsin's power,
however, or why it is he rather than Gorbachev who gains most
from the collapse of the coup. To explain that phenomenon, the
article moves to the second stage of its rhetorical strategy. It
builds on inferences from the conventional metaphors we have
discussed and reasons by analogy, using imagistic homologies to
account for Yeltsin's distinctive capacity to obtain and sustain
power. In its key passage, the article reports that:
From the moment he clambered, uninvited but unimpeded,
onto a Soviet Army tank to read his challenge to the new
Kremlin authorities, Mr. Yeltsin tapped into a deep popular
frustrationamong the Russian people, who time and again have
been robbed of a chance to choose their own destiny. In the
past, Mr. Yeltsin has seemed to draw strength from negative
circumstances.... So, perhaps it was to be expected that in the
face of army tanks and an incipient dictatorship, he should rise
to the occasion,and bring a decisive part of the population with
him.115
This imagistically and metaphorically dense paragraph employs
several very interesting analogical arguments. The first is
premised on the LOCATION version of the EVENT STRUCTURE

metaphor in which ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS and PURPOSES ARE
DESTINATIONS. Yeltsin's "sure-footed political prowess" is physically instantiated by his ability to "clamber [ ] uninvited but
unimpeded [ ] onto a Soviet Army tank." In other words,
Yeltsin's ability to act freely in the face of military force demonstrates his ability to act in the political sphere in opposition to
114 Id. at A9. In fact, the article reports that it was just this prospect that the old
power structure most feared, because its leaders identified Yeltsin's program "for
demolishing central controls over the economy" with the demise of their political
power: "The conspirators ...saw the emerging cooperation between Mr. Gorbachev
and Mr. Yeltsin as a threat to their power base, a sign that the old system built around
the Communist Party, was on the point of final collapse." Id. at A9.

115Id. (emphasis added).
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the old power structure. "So, perhaps," the article reasons, "it
was to be expected that... he should rise to the occasion, and
bring a decisive part of the population with him."
The second and closely related analogy is based on the

metaphor CONTROL IS UP.

Yeltsin's potent symbolism in

climbing "onto a Soviet Army tank to read his challenge"-thus
asserting his superiority over the coup-makers and the military
forces ostensibly under their command-corresponds with his
ability metaphorically both to "rise to the occasion" and rise to
power.
The third and final analogy, however, is the most significant
in rationalizing Yeltsin's power. This analogy jointly employs

the metaphors

STATES ARE CONTAINERS

and

POWER IS A

The article infers from past events that Yeltsin
trait that explains his ability to obtain
character
possesses a
power. "In the past," the article observes, "Mr. Yeltsin has
seemed to draw strength from negative circumstances." In this
sentence, the state "negative circumstances" is represented as a
container that-since POWER IS A SUBSTANCE-is understood as
a repository of "power." Yeltsin is observed to have the ability
to obtain strength by extracting the metaphoric contents of this
container-state. So too, the passage reasons, Yeltsin is able to
"tap into" the negative circumstances of the Russian people (i.e.,
their "deep popular frustration" over the thwarting of
democracy), absorb their political energy, and thereby "establish
[ ] himself as the force to be reckoned with." It is, thus,
Yeltsin's particular strength of character-his "willpower"-that
enables him to act as the catalyst who can draw upon and put to
use the dormant power of the Russian people.
In this metaphoric way, the article successfully sustains the
revisionist account presented in its opening paragraphs. In its
ultimate argument, the article does not deny the obvious
conclusion that the people were the source of the power that
defeated the coup. Nevertheless, the article presents a scenario
in which Yeltsin is the active agent responsible for the failure of
the coup: He alone has the ability to "summon the democratic
yearnings of the Russian people" and "put their political will
into play" because he is the one who has the capacity "to draw
strength from negative circumstances." He accomplishes this
SUBSTANCE.
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through a demonstration of his courage, vitality and capacity for

action (that is, his willingness to challenge the power and
authority of the conspirators). Thus, the article concludes that
"[f]rom the moment he clambered, uninvited but unimpeded,
onto a Soviet Army tank to read his challenge to the new
Kremlin authorities, Mr. Yeltsin tapped into a deep popular

frustration among the Russian people."116
Ironically, the article supports the claim that power is an
"illusion" by presenting a version of the events that exploits the
shared metaphors that comprise our conventional conception of
power.

The effect is to constitute Yeltsin as the operative

responsible for the larger events in which he took part. The
effect is to (re)present the events of August 1991 in a way that
confirms our intuitive understanding of power as a matter of
agency. Indeed, the effect is to construct the agency view of

power, and to do so unobserved and unimpeded right in front of
our eyes.
IV. THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL VIEW

MacKinnon's justly influential analysis of gender relations as
a system of power has provoked extensive commentary. Many

have observed that MacKinnon's emphasis on the expropriation
of women's sexuality and on the social construction of women
as objects of male power essentializes women and, thus, washes
out crucial differences of race, class, age and sexual
orientation. 1 7 Others have noted that, because MacKinnon
Id.
See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in
Feminist Thought (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990). For her response to the essentialist critique, see
Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman
Anyway?, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 13, 16 (1991) ("To speak of social treatment 'as a
woman' is thus not to ... posit anything, far less a universal anything, but to refer to
this diverse and pervasive concrete material reality of social meanings and practices
.... "). There is, however, a limited sense in which MacKinnon treats the experiences
of white, middle class women as a prototype for understanding the oppression of all
women. See id. at 21 ("What is done to white women is a kind of floor; it is the best
anyone is treated .... What is done to white women can be done to any woman, and
then some. This does not make white women the essence of womanhood."). She
nevertheless is emphatic in rejecting the idea that there is an inherent or essential
quality to the experiences of white women and women of color that makes them all
116

117
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focuses almost exclusively on what is done to women as the
defining element of what it is to "be" a woman, her critique has
the effect of denying women's agency and eliding the many ways
in which women both are and can be important social actors.118
Although the essentialist critique has had somewhat greater
currency, the agency critique goes to the heart of MacKinnon's
overall theory of power. One very effective way to explicate this
point is to elaborate the converse claim, i.e., that MacKinnon
essentializes men and vastly overstates men's agency. 119 Because

I develop this argument from MacKinnon's own analysis, it
should be clear (I hope) that this is not a "defense" of men but
a theoretical critique of MacKinnon's view of power. Indeed, I
argue that the problems with MacKinnon's theory of power arise
precisely to the degree that she is correct in her overall analysis
of gender relations. In other words, I offer an internal critique

of MacKinnon's position that insists on traversing the entire
course charted by her theoretical approach. Once we have done

so, we will see that the system of gender relations that she
rightly criticizes cannot possibly be explained in terms of "male
power." To the contrary. On her own account, "male power"
can only be understood as the practical effect, rather than the

logical or moral cause, of our system of gender relations.
To make this argument effectively, it will be helpful to review

an antecedent theory of power that, to one degree or another,
the "same." See id. at 22 ("the assumption that all women are the same is part of the
bedrock of sexism that the women's movement is predicated on challenging.").
118See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 21, at 119-23; Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and
Women, in Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 217 (1993) (emphasizing the significance of women's agency in the social
construction of race).
119Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 1559, 1570 (1987) (reviewing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (1987)) (criticizing MacKinnon's totalizing
view of male power and suggesting that we may "want to transform the socially
constructed need of men to feel superior (and the consequent need of women to be
inferior)."). As Karen Engle points out, these mirror-image essentializations are
integrally related: "[I]t is largely because so many ... women's rights advocates
readily accept a stereotypical and essentialist view of men that they are unable to
problematize the female side. Being caught in the male/female dichotomy prevents
further exploration of either 'male' or 'female."' Karen Engle, Female Subjects of
Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, in After
Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture 210, 224-25 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle
eds., 1995).
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both Minow and MacKinnon embrace. In the first Section, I
begin with Steven Lukes's "three-dimensional" view of power.
This self-proclaimed "radical" approach introduces notions of
social construction in order to successfully preserve some of the
political issues elided by more traditional theories of power.
The introduction of this insight also elucidates a theoretical
difficulty that plagues previous views.
Ultimately, however, this recognition of the mechanisms of
social construction raises another, more profound problem. We
have already seen in our earlier discussion of MacKinnon how
this insight leads to the objection from social contingency that
undermines the cogency and usefulness of "power" as an
explanation of the relevant social phenomena.120 Here, the
reflexive application of this insight exposes an internal
inconsistency in the three-dimensional view. To maintain its bite
as political critique, even the sophisticated three-dimensional
view relies on a residual, but logically incompatible,
subjectivization of those who wield power.
In the second Section, I return to the work of feminist
theorists like Minow and MacKinnon. First, I explain why the
three-dimensional view is particularly well-suited to their
concerns; indeed, it seems almost tailor-made for feminist
analysis. I then show that the theoretical approach to power
employed by both Minow and MacKinnon either stems from or
runs parallel to that of Lukes. One consequence of their
adoption of this theoretical framework is that their positions
become vulnerable to the same theoretical difficulties that vex
the three-dimensional view. In Minow's case, reflexive
application of the insight about social construction confounds the
heavily subjectivized view of power that forms the heart of her
"social-relations" approach. MacKinnon, in contrast, understands but ultimately disregards the reflexive force of the insight
because it frustrates the political payoff of her claim that male
power is constitutive of reality. 2' To maintain its bite as
feminist critique, MacKinnon's view is forced to a subjectiviza120See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
121See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 121 ("Power

to create the world from one's
point of view, particularly from the point of view of one's pleasure, is power in its
male form.") (citation omitted).
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tion and reification of "male power" that is unsustainable on her
own, otherwise perceptively put theoretical premises.
First, the background.
A. Subjectivization and Social Contingency
In a famous monograph, Steven Lukes characterized three
conceptual models or "views" of power that he identified as onedimensional, two-dimensional and "radical" or three-dimensional. 122 The one-dimensional view corresponds to the positivist
notion of power discussed earlier. This is the view of the pluralists like Robert Dahl, who offered the classic definition: "A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something
that B would not otherwise do."'123 It is the most easily
understood and most readily accepted view because it fits well
with our intuitive conceptions of power and agency. As
described by Lukes, this "view of power involves a focus on
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there
is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests."'124
The two-dimensional view, articulated initially in an article
entitled Two Faces of Power, 25 arises as a critique of the first.
It argues that power is not merely a matter of control over
active decisionmaking, but is exercised as well -by insuring
inaction on critical issues. 26 Thus, the two-dimensional view
"incorporates into the analysis of power relations the question
of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in
which potential issues are kept out of the political process."' 27
It treats non-decisionmaking as a particularly efficient means of
decisionmaking. 28 Moreover, it recognizes that power may
inhere in institutional procedures that are designed
122Lukes, supra note 15,
123 Dahl, supra note 101,
124Lukes, supra note 15,

at 9-10.
at 202-03, quoted in Lukes, supra note 15, at 11-12.
at 15 (emphasis omitted).
125 Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
947 (1962).
126Lukes, supra note 15, at 16-20.
127Id. at 21; see also Elshtain, supra note 26, at 137 ('Power... is not limited to X
making a decision that compels Y but to X devoting himself to limiting the scope of
political decision making to consideration of only those issues he finds
nonthreatening.").
128 Lukes, supra note 15, at 17-18.

The "Power" Thing

1996]

765

systematically to skew the process to benefit the interests of one
9
group over another. 12
Lukes advanced his three-dimensional view of power as a
response to and critique of these earlier approaches. He
criticized the prior views for "adopting too methodologically
individualist a view of power" and, therefore, for being
insufficiently attuned to "the socially structured and culturally
patterned behaviour of groups."'130 He argued, moreover, that
power may be at work even when there is no overt conflict or
manifest grievance to be kept off the agenda: "To put the matter
sharply, A may exercise power over B by ... influencing,
shaping or determining his very wants." 131 He elaborated with
a rhetorical question:
[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things,
either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or
because they see it as natural and unchangeable ...?132
Lukes offered the following definition: "A exercises power
over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's
interests."'133 The crux of Lukes's redefinition-and what largely
distinguishes his view from its predecessors-lies in his
distinction between preferences (i.e., subjective interests) and
interests (i.e., "real" interests). Even when A obtains the assent
of all the affected Bs, A's action (or inaction) may still be an act
of power if it is against B's interests, objectively viewed.
Accordingly, the three-dimensional view continues to recognize
that power is exercised through overt decisionmaking and
through control over the agenda. But, in incorporating these
first two dimensions in its analysis of power, the threedimensional view disclaims their individualist and conflictoriented assumptions. Instead, the three-dimensional view
129
Id. at 16-17 (citing Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 125).
130Id. at 22. On Lukes's view, the two-dimensional approach "still assumed that
nondecision-making is a form of decision-making." Id. at 20.
131Id. at 23.

132 Id. at 24.
133Id.

at 34.
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considers all the ways in which a system gets people to act
against their real interests, including the operation of social
forces and other more pervasive processes of socialization.

For Lukes, the significant value of the three-dimensional view
is that it "is radical in both the theoretical and political

senses."' 34 It is theoretically radical because it focuses on the

largely invisible ways in which a social and political order may
be systematically biased in favor of certain groups. More than
any other, Lukes's approach offers a "deeper analysis" and a
"serious sociological ... explanation" of "all the complex and
subtle ways in which the inactivity of leaders and the sheer
weight of institutions" operate to perpetuate subordination. 35
The three-dimensional view is politically radical in at least
three ways. First, it avoids the legitimist tendencies of
competing conceptions of power. 136 Because it sees power in the

formation of "perceptions, cognitions and preferences," the
three-dimensional view pretermits any attempt to justify existing
political arrangements by reference either to consensus or to the
absence of articulated grievances.
Second, and correspondingly, the three-dimensional view is

radical in its conception of interests. Lukes explained that "any
134Id.
135 Id.

at 9.

at 38 (emphasis omitted) (contrasting the one-, two- and three-dimensional
views).
136Lukes notes the legitimist tendencies of some of the competing conceptions of
power. With respect to Talcott Parsons, he notes that "the linking of power to
authoritative decisions and collective goals serves to reinforce his theory of social
integration as based on value consensus by concealing from view the whole range of
problems that have concerned so-called 'coercion' theorists, precisely under the rubric
of 'power."' Id. at 29. With respect to Arendt, he observes:
[S]imilarly, the conceptualisation of power plays a persuasive role, in defence of
her conception of'the res publica,the public thing' to which people consent and
'behave nonviolently and argue rationally', and in opposition to the reduction
of 'public affairs to the business of dominion' and to the conceptual linkage of
power with force and violence.
Id. at 30.
The tendency of the one-dimensional view of pluralists like Dahli to find that power
is in fact distributed pluralistically and democratically has been widely noted. See,
e.g., Clegg, supra note 17, at 53 ("As is well known, Dahl's conclusion is that no one
single elite does govern: different actors (people, in fact) prevail over different issues,
producing a 'pluralist' rather than an 'elitist' distribution of power. The methodology,
whether designed to or not, produces a pluralist representation of power."). But see
Lukes, supra note 15, at 11 ("I think that [the pluralists' concepts, approach and
method] are capable of generating non-pluralist conclusions in certain cases.").
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view of power rests on some normatively specific conception of
interests. '137 Liberals, for whom autonomy is the governing

principle, ascertain interests by reference to existing preferences
expressed through participation in (or abstention from) politics
or markets. 138 "The radical, however, maintains that [people's]
wants may themselves be a product of a system which works
against their interests ... .139
Accordingly, Lukes's view
depends on a notion of "real" interests that, he acknowledges,
may be difficult to ascertain.14n Nevertheless, he insisted that
such interests are in principle empirically verifiable. 14'
137Lukes, supra note 15, at 35 (footnote omitted).
138Id. at 34 ("[TIhe liberal takes [people] as they are and applies want-regarding
principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their
policy preferences as manifested by their political participation.") (footnote omitted).
Reformers, according to Lukes, are more or less in the same position: "The reformist,
seeing and deploring that not all [people's] wants are given equal weight by the
political system, also relates their interests to what they want or prefer, but allows that
this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways-in the form of deflected,
submerged or concealed wants and preferences." Id.
139Id.

140Lukes recognized that this "counterfactual," as he called it, generates significant
theoretical difficulties. Id. at 46-48. He invoked Gramsci's argument that, at times
when domination is relaxed, the subordinated may begin to formulate their own view
of their interests. Id. (discussing Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith eds. &
trans., 1971)).
141Lukes, supra note 15, at 25. Like all theories that employ a concept of
"hegemonic power," Lukes's view suffers from the familiar problems of identifying
and justifying its attribution of "false consciousness." See James C. Scott, Domination
and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts 72 (1990) ("Since any theory that
purports to demonstrate a misrepresentation of social reality must, by definition, claim
some superior knowledge of what that social reality is, it must be, in this sense, a
theory of false consciousness.") Thus, Wrong observes that a notion such as
"real" or "objective" interests ... often amounts to little more than the
judgment that the group under consideration ought to give priority to those
interests which the observer would prefer them to pursue ....The arrogance
and implicit authoritarianism of such an outlook, which claims to know better
than other people themselves what is good for them, are unmistakable.
Wrong, supra note 45, at 183. See also infra text accompanying notes 250-51. Lukes
characterizes the radical's conception of interests as what people "would want and
prefer, were they able to make the choice." Lukes, supra note 15, at 34 (footnote
omitted). For this reason, Clegg suggests that Lukes would have done well to work
with a regulative conception like Habermas's "ideal speech situation." Clegg, supra
note 17, at 92-95. Note, however, that Lukes's view of "real interests" remains
dependent on the same notion of autonomy at the heart of the liberal conception. See
Wrong, supra note 45, at 187 (quoting Lukes's acknowledgement of this fact). In that
sense, it is not really radical.
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Third, and most important for our purposes, the threedimensional view is politically radical because it marks out the
most extensive domain of application. As Lukes explained,
every concept of power identifies a different range of behavior
for analysis because every "way of conceiving power (or a way
of defining the concept of power) that will be useful in the
analysis of social relationships must imply an answer to the
question: ... 'what makes A's affecting B significant?" ' 42 The
three-dimensional view is radical in the sense that it includes
within its concept of "significant affecting" aspects of social
relations ordinarily taken for granted. It extends the analysis of
power beyond the domain of conventional politics and official
institutions to areas previously considered apolitical. In this way,
it opens for potential consideration even the most basic terms
and conditions of social life.
Beyond these advantages, the three-dimensional view also
suggests how one might address the theoretical conundrum that,
as discussed previously, afflicts so many other views of power: It
provides a way of explaining the progression from "wins" to
"gets" in the intuitive claim "[w]hoever wins, gets to determine
the issues."' 43
Earlier, we considered war as a paradigm case with which to
test this intuitive claim.144 But take the simplified case in which
someone threatens violence to enforce his or her will, as in the
series of hypotheticals examined previously.145 Even here, it is
not at all clear why the outcome should be submission rather
For an alternative approach which appreciates the ways in which the subordinated
may be perfectly aware of their interests but, nevertheless, opt to accede to the claims
of power, see infra text accompanying notes 281-85, 323-29, & 371-78.
142 Lukes, supra note 15, at 26. Lukes explains that
behind[ ] all talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects B. But, in
applying that ... notion to the analysis of social life, something further is
needed-namely, the notion that A does so in a non-trivial or significant
manner. Clearly, we all affect each other in countless ways all the time: the
concept of power, and the related concepts of coercion, influence, authority, etc.,
pick out ranges of such affecting as being significant in specific ways.
Id. (reference omitted).
143See Scarry, supra note 52, at 96 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-61,
106-108).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
145See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
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than defiance. 146 Why don't all the storeowners decide that it is
in their long-term interests to resist extortionate behavior and
act like the courageous storeowner in hypothetical number five?
Recall Bernard Williams's observation that one lesson of the
Republic is that "justice is the product of a convention adopted
by a group of people to protect themselves."'147 So why should
the outcome be submission rather than defiance? 148
I will refer to this generic difficulty with the intuitive claim as
"the problem of compliance." It appears as soon as one ties the
concept of power to a notion of interests because, in so doing,
one builds into the very definition of "power" the most
compelling reason for its resistance. But the problem arises with
even greater force once one introduces the question of values.
Strange as it may seem to modern sensibilities, historically,
martyrdom has been a frequent result of attempts to achieve
domination by force. The nonviolent protests of the civil rights
movement, which I discuss in Part VI, provide a more
contemporary, sometimes equally lethal example. Indeed, as I
discuss below, the marches and sit-in demonstrations supply a
cogent illustration of Arendt's claim that power and violence are
opposites: "Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but
left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance."' 149
45, at 101-02 (noting that "typologies of the forms of power
asymmetrical in focusing on the motives of the power subject for complying

146 Cf. Wrong, supra note
...are

rather than on those of the power holder for seeking and retaining power" and
suggesting that "this reflects a tendency in Western culture to regard the former as
psychologically more problematical"). There is, of course, an entire range of behavior

between the extremes of submission and defiance. Frequently, people do react with
a mixture of ostensible compliance and quiet, "hidden" resistance. See Scott, supra
note 141, at 136 ("Most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found
neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic
compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites."). But this
only underscores the problem with Lukes's view, because hidden resistance of this sort
indicates that the subordinated are often, in fact, conscious that their interests are
being frustrated by power.
147 Williams, supra note 46, at 30-31.
148 Collective action problems provide only a partial answer; one of the points of
hypothetical five is that the appeal to justice (there effectuated by going to the

newspapers) acts as a kind of coordination device. Cf. Derek Parfit, Reasons and

Persons 56-66 (1984) (explaining why "Contributor's Dilemmas often need moral
solutions").
149 Arendt, supra note 44, at 56.
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Again, it is not clear why the outcome should be submission
rather than defiance.
The problem of compliance corresponds to the second half of
what Foucault identified as the "double 'subjectivisation"' that
follows from a purely "negative" understanding of power.
In the aspect of its exercise, power is conceived as a sort of
great absolute Subject which pronounces the interdict (no
matter whether this Subject is taken as real, imaginary, or
purely juridical) .... [T]he problem is always posed in the same
terms, ... an essentially negative power, presupposing on the
one hand a sovereign whose role is to forbid and on the other
a subject who must somehow effectively say yes to this prohibition.150
In the conventional "negative" understanding, in which power is
conceived as an external force that operates on a passive victim,
the problem of compliance arises precisely because of
foundational assumptions about human agency and subjectivity.
In contrast, a "productive" conception of power resolves this
theoretical difficulty because it reveals how people are constructed to accede to the claims of power. This is the
substantive point behind Fish's spirited epigram, which bears
repeating: "the gun at your head is your head; the interests that
seek to compel you are appealing and therefore pressuring only
to the extent they already live within you, and indeed are
you."' 51 So, too, Lukes argues that power works to shape
people's "perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way
that they accept their role in the existing order of things."' 5 2
The three-dimensional view thus avoids the problem of
compliance by introducing notions of social construction into the
analysis of power.
The difficulty, however, is that this notion also interjects an
especially crippling complication for the three-dimensional view.
As previously noted, Lukes's view also depends upon a traditional conception of agency. 153 Thus, he insisted that
150Foucault, Power and Strategies, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 134, 140
[hereinafter Foucault, Power and Strategies].
151Fish, supra note 70, at 520.
152Lukes, supra note 15, at 24.
153See discussion supra text accompanying notes 15-17. Clegg argues quite persua-
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[t]o use the vocabulary of power in the context of social
relationships is to speak of human agents, separately or together, in groups or organisations, ... significantly affecting the

thoughts or actions of others (specifically, in a manner contrary
to their interests). In speaking thus, one assumes that, although
the agents operate within structurally determined limits, they

none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could have
acted differently.154

Indeed, Lukes maintained that there would be no reason to talk
about power otherwise; for him, the whole point "of locating
power is to fix responsibility for consequences held to flow from
the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable agents."'155 Yet, it
is just this traditional conception of agency that is undermined
by the recognition of the social construction of the subject.
On Lukes's own account, it is difficult to see how these "specifiable agents" could themselves have escaped the processes of
social construction. By hypothesis, these processes are so
powerful that they produce people (the subordinated) who not
only act in ways inimicable to their own real interests, but who
are incapable even of perceiving their real interests. Thus, for
Lukes, the subordinated are so acculturated to "the existing
order of things" that "they can see or imagine no alternative to
sively that this problem arises from Lukes's use of the Hobbesian conception, in which
"A has power to affect B," as the archetype from which he builds his model. See
Clegg, supra note 17, at 91 ("This conception is as much of a primitive for Lukes as
it was for Dahl."). As Clegg explains, this continued dependence commits Lukes to
the traditional conception of agency even as he elaborates his more "radical" threedimensional view that power operates through the processes of social construction:
Perversely, Lukes's book [Lukes, supra note 15] concludes with an instance of
the exercise of power on the part of structural agents but with no conception of
power as a structural property. In large part this must surely be a result of his
having taken the basic A-B episodic conception of power as the foundational
cornerstone for constructing the three-dimensional model ....

Having

developed from a conception which bears all too clearly the traces of its classical
past restriction to a world composed wholly of mechanical movements, the third
dimension does not transcend them .... The focus is still very clearly on As
and Bs involved in concrete exercises of social action.
Id. at 99. Below, I provide a different (though compatible) account of the
fundamental error that commits Lukes to the traditional conceptions of power and
agency and thus disables him from transcending them. See infra text accompanying
notes 159-68.
154 Lukes, supra note 15, at 54.
'5 Id. at 56.
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it" or, indeed, "see it as natural and unchangeable."1 56 Those "in
power," on the other hand, are supposed to have achieved
sufficient autonomy from these same processes of social
construction that they are able to imagine the unimaginable and
act differently-indeed, in ways inimicable to their interests. But
this cannot be; the "powerful" too must have been socialized to
see their interests and privilege as natural. To paraphrase
Lukes, surely the perceptions, cognitions, and preferences of
these "specifiable agents" were shaped in such a way that they
would act in conformity with their role in the existing order of
things. Isn't that how the existing order perpetuates itself?157
In part because of her greater care and precision, 58 these
contradictions will be both more perspicuous and more pressing
when we turn to MacKinnon's view. In the meantime, let me
consolidate the general theoretical point with respect to Lukes
and the three-dimensional view. Perhaps the most effective way
to do so is by unpacking Lukes's use of the spatial metaphor-that is, his characterization of various theoretical views of
power as one-, two- and three-dimensional. His use of this
metaphor places him firmly within the conventional conceptual
schema for power examined in the previous Section. 159 It leads
him, moreover, to reinscribe the two most significant features of
the traditional negative understanding of power: (1) that power
operates as an external force on a passive victim; and (2) that
power is a property or capacity of a self-directing agent. In this
way, Lukes reproduces the very conception of power that his
theory appeared to transcend.
The first thing to notice about his use of the spatial metaphor
is the way in which it helps create that appearance of
156Id. at 24.

157
Cf. Winter, Contingency and Community, supra note 71.
No one rises in a bureaucracy unless she makes it her own (and,

simultaneously, it makes her its own). The efficient manager is one who can
direct the organization's human resources with total commitment and singlemindedness, free of the compromise, doubt, and cynicism that infect the
enactment of a detached role.
Id. at 980-81; Wrong, supra note 45, at 113 ("[T]he power holder too is driven to
legitimate his power, to see it as predicated by the very nature of things, in order to
assuage the guilt created by the use of violence against other human beings.").
158See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
159See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
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transcendence. The spatial metaphor is extremely effective as
a rhetorical matter because it immediately brands the preceding
views as simplistic (i.e., one-dimensional) and flat (i.e., twodimensional). By implication, Lukes's view is better and more
sophisticated because it considers the full range of power
operations and not just the first two of three dimensions. The
second thing to notice about his use of the spatial metaphor is
that it is, in fact, highly conventional. The "three-dimensional"
image thus works to his rhetorical advantage because it
resonates so strongly with our conventional conceptual schema
for power. Given an intuitive understanding of power that is
structured by the metaphors POWER IS AN OBJECT and POWER IS

only a "three-dimensional" view is
likely to seem adequate to its subject. In both these ways,
Lukes's metaphoric characterization lends cogency to his
theoretical view.
At the same time, however, the spatial metaphor comes
As Lukes himself
encumbered with certain liabilities.
recognizes, the use of the vocabulary of power commits one to
speaking in a particular way using particular concepts with all
their ready-made implications. 160 Thus, when Lukes describes
his concept of power as "three-dimensional," we can anticipate
that his view will betray tell-tale traces of the conventional
CONTAINER metaphor. And so it does. One of the most
familiar and powerful entailments of the CONTAINER metaphor
is closure. This is the sense in which "containment" connotes
the success of control, check, inhibition and restraint. It is just
this sense of the metaphor that is manifested in Lukes's
totalizing conception of power. On Lukes's account, the
subordinated are so thoroughly entrapped within the framework
of power that they are unable either to perceive their own
interests or even to imagine alternatives to the existing order.
There is a second way in which Lukes's three-dimensional
view is shaped by the CONTAINER metaphor. Consider Lukes's
argument that, structural limitations notwithstanding, the
powerful should be recognized as morally responsible agents.
He explains that "although the agents operate within structurally
A LOCATION-CONTAINER,

160Lukes, supra note 15, at 54 (quoted supra text accompanying note 154); see also
Clegg, supra note 17, at 21-22 (quoted supra note 79).
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determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative
autonomy."' 6' Here, the effects of the conventional conceptual
schema in which POWER IS A CONTAINER can be seen in Lukes's
static spatialization of power formations. He reduces powerstructures to a set of boundary conditions that confine the
behavior of these "specifiable agents" whom he would hold
accountable. This, in turn, makes use of that portion of the
EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor in which ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS
and, therefore, constraints on action are understood
metaphorically as constraints on motion. 62 The effect, of course,
is simultaneously to reify "power" and reinscribe the agency of
particular social actors.
As in the previous use of the CONTAINER schema, Lukes's
carefully nuanced statement at first affirms the capacity of
structure to shape and control action. But this statement
simultaneously announces its opposite. Even as it acknowledges
that power-structures govern behavior, it denies the practical and
moral relevance of those limits. In doing so, it trades on a
different entailment of the CONTAINER metaphor. Fundamental
to the concept of a container is the distinction between the
receptacle and its contents. In presenting power formations as
a container external to its agents, Lukes effectively detaches
those agents from their determining structures. For Lukes, these
specifiable agents "act within structurally determined limits" but
are not themselves structured by those determinants. Lukes thus
denies the productive conception of power-his "thirddimension"-that was the central innovation of his theoretical
By separating his "specifiable agents" from their
view.
determining structures, Lukes reinstates them as self-directing,
originary actors (even if within limits). Their freedom of action
may be restricted, but their capacity for free choice, and
therefore moral responsibility, is not.
Lukes, supra note 15, at 54 (emphasis added).
See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1214-22 (1989) (discussing the
concepts of "rights" and "law" as structured by means of the metaphors ACTIONS ARE
MOTIONS and CONSTRAINTS ON ACTIONS ARE CONSTRAINTS ON MOTIONS); cf. Johnson,
supra note 80, at 37-38 (elaborating the mappings of the LOCATION version of the
EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor upon which many of the concepts of morality are based).
161
162
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In an important sense, then, Lukes's "radical" view of power
is sabotaged by the limitations of the conventional metaphors he
so unreflectively employs. Notwithstanding his attempt to
integrate notions of social construction into the analysis of
power, Lukes never really advances beyond the traditional
negative conception of power because he is unable to escape the
conceptual entailments of these conventional metaphors.
Indeed, the shortcomings of Lukes's spatial metaphor lead to the
basic inconsistency that plagues the three-dimensional approach.
One of the contributions of relativity theory is the
understanding that time is an essential fourth dimension of even
physical objects. Analogously, Lukes's theoretical approach fails
because it omits this fourth dimension from its analysis of the
social phenomenon of power. As we have just seen, we first
encounter Lukes's agents at the moment of choice and
(in)action. At that moment, all the historical particulars about
those agents that the three-dimensional view should have alerted
us to consider are mysteriously bracketed. Lost is any sense that
their background, their education, their traditions, their past
experiences-in short, who they are and how they came to
be-might in any way influence, govern or impel either their
choices or the "perceptions, cognitions and preferences" that
lead to those decisions.
The omission of time is all the more striking when one
considers Lukes's contention that only his three-dimensional
view adequately accounted for "the sheer weight of
institutions.' 1 63 But what is that "weight" if not the build-up of
institutional practices over time? An institution is neither a
specific place, a particular building, an identifiable group of
individuals, nor a book of behavioral prescriptions. Whether we
are speaking of IBM or the rules of etiquette, an institution is
nothing more (or less) than the practices, reward structure, and
attendant processes of socialization that successfully reproduce
a set of roles, values, and routines in an ever-changing group of
people who constitute the institution's "personnel." (Consider,
for example, the powerful social and psychological dynamics
provoked by the rebuke that so-and-so isn't "a team player.")
163 See Lukes, supra note 15, at 38.
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In short, an institution is the continuation over time of "socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour."164 It is the
amalgamation of the routinized actions of successive groups of
socially constituted individuals. 65
Thus, the three-dimensional view is not nearly the advance
that it sometimes seems. Although Lukes recognizes power in
the formation of perceptions, cognitions and preferences, he
does not follow through on the implications of the insight about
social construction. Because he continues to operate with the
conventional metaphorical schema for power, he continues to
think about power as an external force that operates on a
passive victim in much the same way that a container shapes and
inhibits what is trapped within. And because he fails to see
power as something genuinely internal to the subject, it is easy
for him to miss the obvious conclusion that those who "wield"
it must also be subject to just the same processes of social
formation. As a consequence, Lukes continues to see the
powerful as active agents mysteriously autonomous of these
same hegemonic forces.
In short, Lukes's three-dimensional view ignores the reflexive
power of its own insight. Although it provides a way to think
about the difficult questions concerning the workings of power,
it continues to evade the question of how people become
powerful to start with.166 It elides time and, in so doing, neglects
the social processes of power-that is, the constitution over time
of those social agents who, on any conventional account, would
be identified as "the powerful."
16 Id. at 22.

Here, I am following Berger and Luckmann. As they explain:
Only through such representation in performed roles can the institution
manifest itself in actual experience. The institution, with its assemblage of
"programmed" actions, is like the unwritten libretto of a drama. The realization
of the drama depends upon the reiterated performance of its prescribed roles
by living actors.... Neither drama nor institution exist empirically apart from
this recurrent realization.
Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise
in the Sociology of Knowledge 70 (1966); see also Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of
"Under Color of' Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 323 (1992) (discussing the doctrinal and
conceptual problems that arise from the fact that "the State" is an institution in this
same sense).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
165
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This elision, however, is a political necessity for Lukes. For
him, the entire point of a theory of power is to fix responsibility.
But Lukes preserves his political agenda only at the cost of an
internal contradiction. Because it grants some subjects precisely
the agency necessary to account for the subjection of others, the
three-dimensional view fails in the end to come to grips with a
productive view of power. It continues to operate with a naive
view of social construction as an external process that, precisely
because it is conceptualized as exogenous to the self, remains
open and available to conscious (hence, partisan) control.167
Consequently, the three-dimensional view only appears to avoid
Foucault's "double subjectivization." Ultimately, it betrays its
own insight by subjectivizing those who wield power and
reinscribing the traditional negative conception. 168
B. Naming and Blaming

Everything that makes Lukes's three-dimensional view radical
also makes it particularly useful for feminist theory. What
distinguishes the three-dimensional view is its contention that
the subordinated are socially constructed to accept and take part
in existing arrangements. To the extent it is true, this claim
effectively rebuts any attempt to justify the prevailing system of
gender relations by pointing to women's acquiescence or
participation in that system. Along much the same lines, the
three-dimensional view's radical conception of interests stresses
how those interests are themselves constructed by "power."
This claim is doubly advantageous for feminist theory. On one
hand, it provides a forceful response to any effort to defend
167Post

08.

makes precisely this mistake. See Winter, Foreword, supra note 12, at 1602-

168 Clegg

makes an analogous point with respect to related theories:
Hegemony becomes the metaphorical basis for constituting sovereign dominion
even in the face of individuals who do not act: .... prohibition runs deep into
the consciousness of the possible range of actions that individuals may have.
Order, where it has been achieved, is secured by the sovereign power exerting
dominion over the very ingredients of individual consciousness: the appetites,

passions and especially the interests that these individuals have. Thus, the
supreme prohibitory concept of power comes to hold sway precisely through
constituting individuals in such a way that they are not being actors in particular
scenes of power.
Clegg, supra note 17, at 29.
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existing practices by reference to women's preferences. On the
other, the three-dimensional view's corresponding conception of
"real" interests offers feminist theorists a privileged position
from which to launch their normative critique.
By way of illustration, consider Dennis Wrong's argument in
support of his intentionalist view of power. Wrong contends
that, because "all social interaction produces ... unintended
effects," we cannot avoid "restricting the term power to
intentional and effective acts of influence."' 169 Wrong gives the
example of a woman who does not "mean to arouse a man's
sexual interest by paying polite attention to his conversation at
a cocktail party."'7 0 For Wrong, this is the kind of phenomenon
that cannot be included within a theory of power without
making it all-encompassing.
As Clegg points out, however, the example is particularly illchosen.
The example of sexual etiquette at a cocktail party... implies
a complex set of conventions which ground and pre-figure
power relations: a woman, who out of courtesy pays attention
to another person at a party; a man, for whom polite attention
paid to him by women is sufficient to cause sexual arousal;
cocktail parties as arenas in which this complex game is played
out. This complex game glosses a whole practice of sexual
politics, of male power and female subordination, which Wrong
does not admit to the discourse of power.'7 '
Clegg sees the cocktail party as an institutionalized social
practice that serves as a matrix for power relations. On this
view, the cocktail party consists of a highly structured set of
conventions that authorize some behaviors and discourage
others. Men are permitted-if not, indeed, encouraged-to
initiate conversations with women who interest them sexually.
Women, in turn, are expected to react graciously-if not, in fact,
flirtatiously.

169 Wrong, supra note 45, at 4. Wrong would analyze some of the excluded phenomena under the concept of "social control," within which he includes routinized
interactions by which a group regulates group members. Id. at 3-5.
170Id. at 4.
171Clegg, supra

note 17, at 74 (reference omitted).
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The taken-for-granted quality of these expectations is what
underwrites Wrong's cocktail party example. Because Wrong
understands a woman's polite attention as a commonplace, i.e.,
as the expected baseline behavior, it is easy for him to mistake
it for an "innocent" act with unintended consequences. But, as
Lukes emphasizes, it is exactly when such expectations are so
effectively ingrained that they are neither noticed nor questioned
that we are in the grip of "the supreme and most insidious
exercise of power."' 72 Indeed, on a three-dimensional view, the
very fact that women feel obligated to act courteously by
feigning interest in men's quite often tiresome palaver is
understood as a product of the socialization processes that
constitute our system of gender-power. 73
Wrong not only misses this entire dynamic, he inverts it.
Because he adheres to an agency view of power, Wrong sees the
cocktail party as nothing more than a neutral forum in which
agents act. Consequently, all that he can discern in the cocktail
party example is a potential instance of power being exercised
by the woman on the basis of her unintended effects on the
man. In contrast, a three-dimensional view reveals the cocktail
party as a social institution that enacts an intricate system of
power. Accordingly, it appreciates that the cocktail party is an
instance in which power is being brought to bear on the woman.
The difference could hardly be of greater consequence for
feminist theory. The traditional agency view tends to obscure
the operations of power that lurk beneath the surface of familiar
social relations. The singular advantage of the three-dimensional
view, in contrast, is its ability to break open congealed aspects
of social life and expose them to scrutiny. As Lukes claimed,
one of the strengths of the three-dimensional view is that it
provides the best account of how power is effectuated through

172Lukes, supra note 15, at 24.
173For those who are unconvinced by this characterization, consider the testimony

of a young woman concerning her behavior before and after transferring to Antioch
College with its stringent policy on sexual conduct. Previously, "she 'didn't ever stick
up' for herself. ... 'It was easier to just do it an[d] get it over with then say no, no
no ..... Now I don't feel like I have to capitulate. Now if I say no and a man doesn't
listen ... I have some big clout behind me."' Jane Gross, Combating Rape on
Campus In a Class on Sexual Consent, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1993, at 1, 9.
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"the sheer weight of institutions."' 174 It is easy, therefore, to
understand the appeal that the three-dimensional view has for
feminist theorists. Whether the challenge is to the workings of
settled institutions or to unequal treatment that is justified in
terms of some putatively natural "difference,"' 175 the threedimensional view provides both the most useful analysis and the
most trenchant critique.
The influence of the three-dimensional view is explicit in the
case of Minow, whose "social-relations" approach is premised on
Lukes's view of power. Her central claim is that the "attribution
of difference" used to justify particular social relations merely
hides the power of those who classify and of the institutional
arrangements that enshrine one type of person as the norm, and
then treat classifications of difference as inherent and natural
while debasing those defined as different.... [T]he very claim
to knowledge manifested when public or private actors label any
group as different... disguises the power of the namers, who
simultaneously assign names and deny their relationships with
6
and power over the named. 7
Minow embraces the claim of the three-dimensional view that
power operates most effectively through the creation of
hegemony. Following Lukes, she maintains that "[w]hen a
conception of reality triumphs, it comes to convince even those
injured by it.... Power may be at its peak, then, when it is least
visible: when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and
excludes serious challenges from either discussion or imaginaAccordingly, Minow's social-relations approach
tion.7 7
repudiates claims of legitimacy based on consensus and rejects
any attempt to justify particular social practices by reference to
78
the widespread acceptance of social values.
174 Lukes,

175 Cf.

supra note 15, at 38.

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding no invidious discrimination
violative of the Equal Protection Clause when a state insurance program denies
benefits for disability accompanying normal pregnancy). As MacKinnon explains:
"Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, .. . the distinctions that perception is
socially organized to notice because inequality gives them consequences for social
power." MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 218-19.
176Minow, supra note 50, at 111.
177Id. at 237-38 (footnote omitted) (citing Lukes, supra note 15, at 22-25).
178Id. at 111 ("The social-relations approach embraces the belief that knowledge is

1996]

The "Power" Thing

As noted previously, however, adoption of the threedimensional view also commits one to its weaknesses. Thus,
Minow's position is vulnerable to the difficulty that arises from
the reflexive application of the insight about social construction.
After making the strong hegemonic claim characteristic of the
three-dimensional view,179 Minow signals her awareness of the
problem by dropping a footnote describing two divergent approaches to this claim: "generic views that see society as
oppressing every individual while enlisting the individual in its
service through socialization; and particularized views that
conceive of some winning groups oppressing particular losing
0
groups."' 8
Given the strongly political cast of her position, it comes as no
surprise that hers is, in fact, a particularized view in which
certain winners actively oppress particular losers. Thus, when
she defines the social-relations approach, Minow presents the
processes of power as the doings of specific, active
agents-"those who classify."' 8 ' Difference, according to Minow,
is neither an objective reality nor a culturally structured
perception. It is an attribution. It is the product of particular
agents who act in a self-interested fashion: "The name of
difference is produced by those with the power to name and the
power to treat themselves as the norm."'1 2 Because their
characterizations have hegemonic force, "the namers" (as she
calls them) are able to "treat classifications of difference as
inherent and natural while debasing those defined as
different." 8 3 Thus, "when public or private actors label any
group as different," the extent of their power can be measured
in the hegemonic effect that "disguises the power of the namers,
who simultaneously assign names and deny their relationships
with and power over the named."' 8 4 The resulting "consensus
rooted in specific perspectives, and that 'prevailing views' or 'consensus approaches'
express the perspectives of those in positions to enforce their points of view in the
structure and governance of society.") (citing Lukes, supra note 15).
179See supra text accompanying note 177.
180Minow, supra note 50, at 238 n.35 (discussing Lukes, supra note 15, at 22-25).
181Id. at 111.
182Id.
183Id. (emphasis
184Id. (emphasis

added).
added).
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approaches" or "prevailing views" turn out merely to "express
the perspectives of those in positions to enforce their points of
185
view in the structure and governance of society."'
The moral and political bite of Minow's approach depends on
this subjectivization of those who wield power. Through the
consistent use of the active voice, Minow presents her powerful
"winners" as autonomous actors knowingly engaging in specific
acts of naming, labelling, enforcing and debasing. In this
syntactical way, she reproduces the traditional agency view of
power. As was true of Lukes's "specifiable agents," Minow's
powerful social actors are not themselves the products of social
forces that shape their preferences and perceptions in any
particular way. For Minow, as for Lukes, the processes of social
construction seem somehow to apply only to the subordinated.
But where Lukes at least acknowledges that powerful "agents
operate within structurally determined limits,"'1 86 Minow presents
us with powerful social actors who don't seem to be constrained
at all. For Minow, culture and its institutions at best play a
secondary role in corroborating the originary act of labeling.
"Naming another as different seems natural and obvious when
other professionals, social practices, and communal attitudes
reinforce that view-and yet these sources of confirmation may
merely show how widespread and deep are the prejudice and
mistaken views about the 'different' person."' 8 7 She never
considers whether these "widespread and deep" prejudices might
preexist any particular public or private actor. She never
explores the possibility that the historical predominance of these
mistaken views might have something to do with the perceptions
and cognitions of "those who classify." For Minow, social
practices and communal attitudes serve only as confirmation and
reinforcement of the name of difference produced by the
powerful; the larger social matrices-that is, the historical and
institutional practices, the roles and routines of behavior, the
habits of mind and the resulting conceptual frameworks-in
which the "namers" must themselves have been formed are
185Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lukes, supra note 15). Note the use of the POWER

metaphor.
186 Lukes, supra note 15, at 54.
187Minow, supra note 50, at 111.

IS A LOCATION
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never factored in as a possible basis for, or origin of, those
mistaken views. 188
To put the point strongly: The logical and conceptual flaw of
the social relations approach is that, at base, it isn't very social.
Minow simply credits the autonomous power of the namers with
the capacity to produce "difference."' 189 But, as Pierre Bourdieu
points out, the very perception of difference can only occur to
subjects situated and participating in social practices and
conditions that make those differences relevant. 19° Minow fails
to see that it is only with and through those social matrices that
the powerful can think and act. Accordingly, she does not see
that it is the depth and breadth of these cultural prejudices
which makes the "attribution" of difference seem plausible to
those others who must follow the lead of her powerful "namers."
Thus, Minow runs afoul of both the subjectivization objection
and the objection from social contingency.
MacKinnon, on the other hand, is meticulous about how she
wields the treacherous insight about social construction. While
she is therefore able to elude the social contingency trap, her
political project ultimately locks her into the subjectivization and
reification of "power" characteristic of all three-dimensional
views.
The distinctive element in MacKinnon's theory of power is her
answer to the question of who wields it: Gender hierarchy is a
system of social power "enforced to women's detriment because
188 Cf. Michel Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in
Progress, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, supra note 28, at 229, 250 ("It is not just in the play

of symbols that the subject is constituted.
It is constituted in real
practices-historically analysable practices.") [hereinafter, Foucault, Genealogy of

Ethics].
189In this way, Minow's view is, as noted earlier, more akin to that of Nietzsche. See
supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
190 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, 24 Theory and

Methods 195, 203 (1985):
But the fact remains that socially known and recognized differences only exist
for a subject capable not only of perceiving differences but of recognizing them
as significant, ... i.e. only for a subject endowed with the capacity and
inclination to make the distinctions that are regarded as significant in the social
universe in question.
MacKinnon makes much the same point with respect to putative "differences"
between the genders. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 218-19 (quoted supra note 175).
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it serves the interest of the powerful, that is, men."191 On
virtually every other particular, her theoretical approach to
power tracks Lukes's three-dimensional view. 192 Thus, for
MacKinnon, power functions through control over the
mechanisms of social construction and the hegemony that those
mechanisms make possible: "Power in society includes both
legitimate force and the power to determine decisive
socialization processes and therefore the power to produce reality."' 93 On her view, therefore, male power monopolizes both
force and the ability to produce "truth":
Combining, like any form of power, legitimation with force,
male power extends beneath the representation of reality to its
construction: it makes women (as it were) and so verifies
(makes true) who women "are" in its view, simultaneously
confirming its way of being and its vision of truth, as it creates

the social reality that supports both. 94

So, too, MacKinnon observes that male power decisively
determines every aspect of the social agenda from sports to
health care, work, scholarship, citizenship, history, religion and
sex.195
191 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 40.
192 Although she does not expressly rely on Lukes, it is clear that MacKinnon is
familiar with his work. She discusses it in a long endnote that explains why, under any
theory, the system of gender relations must be understood as a system of power and,
therefore, a system of politicalrelations. Id. at 291-92 n.22. But in referring to Lukes,
MacKinnon actually cites to his description of the two-dimensional view. Id. (citing
Lukes, supra note 15, at 18). Strikingly, she pays scant attention to Lukes's threedimensional view with its uncanny similarity to her own theoretical approach.
(Notably, Lukes's name does not appear in the index.) It is, of course, impossible to
say how much of this apparent correspondence derives from a common grounding in
Marxist theory. See, e.g., id. at 48-49 ("This account of the man/woman division is
much like the marxian account of the class division: a social structural response by
human beings to a material condition that is essential for survival, maintenance of
which is in the interests of those who have the dominant role and against the interests
of those who are dominated."). MacKinnon's contribution-and her distinctive twist
on Marxist theory-is her contention that "[m]en are women's material conditions."
Id. at 137-38.
193

Id. at 230.

Id. at 122; see also id. at 205 ("Pornography can invent women because it has the
power to make its vision into reality, which then passes, objectively, for truth.").
195 See id. at 224.
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance
coverage, their socially designed biographies defined workplace expectations and
194
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Consistent with the three-dimensional view, MacKinnon
maintains that women (i.e., their interests, their identifying
characteristics) are themselves constructed by "power":
Socially, femaleness means femininity, which means attractiveness to men ....Gender socialization is the process through
which women come to identify themselves as... sexual beings
...that exist for men, specifically for male sexual use. It is that
process through which women internalize (make their own) a
male image of their sexuality as their identity as women, and
196
thus make it real in the world.

Famously, MacKinnon's totalizing conception of power is
uncompromising in its insistence on women's complete

construction by male power.197 Just as Lukes's subordinated are
so thoroughly acculturated that they cannot even imagine

alternatives to the existing order,198 MacKinnon maintains that
women are so utterly dominated that their "situation offers no
outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to, too much
urgency to wait, no place else to go, and nothing to use but the
twisted tools that have been shoved down our throats."'199 And,
consistent with the three-dimensional view, MacKinnon deploys
the point to rebut efforts to excuse the status quo by reference
successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with
each other-their wars and rulerships-defines history, their image defines god,
and their genitals define sex.
Id.

196Id. at 110-11. Criticizing Carol Gilligan's thesis in particular, and liberal idealist
feminist works in general, MacKinnon argues:
To the extent materialism means anything at all, it means that what women
have been and thought is what they have been permitted to be and think....
Perhaps women value care because men have valued women according to the
care they give.... Perhaps women think in relational terms because women's
social existence is defined in relation to men. The liberal idealism of [Mary
Daly's, Susan Griffin's and Carol Gilligan's] work[ ] is revealed in the ways they
do not take social determination and the realities of power seriously enough.
Id. at 51-52 (discussing, inter alia, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982)).
197See, e.g., id. at 149 ("what is surprising is that not all women eroticize dominance,
not all love pornography, and many resent rape"); id. at 314 n.63 ("One might ask at
this point, not why some women embrace explicit sado-masochism, but why any
women do not.").
198 See supra text accompanying note 132.
199MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 117.
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to women's collaboration. "Women's complicity in their condition does not contradict its fundamental unacceptability if
women have little choice but to become persons who then freely
0
choose women's roles.'
In one important respect, however, MacKinnon improves on
the standard version of the three-dimensional view. She is
uncommonly sensitive to the implications of the insight about
social construction. Since "sexuality is its social meaning,"2 01 it
follows that maleness, too, must be socially constructed:
"Masculinity precedes male as femininity precedes female, and
male sexual desire defines both."202 At first blush, at least, MacKinnon seems uniquely faithful to the underlying premise of the
three-dimensional view. She breaks with traditional individualist
assumptions and focuses, as Lukes advises, on "the socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups."2 03
Thus, on her view, the structure and pattern that determine both
men and women is a system of gender power whose "defining
theme ... is the male pursuit of control over women's
sexuality-men not as individuals or as biological beings, but as
a gender group characterized by maleness as socially
constructed, of which this pursuit is definitive."204
For MacKinnon, moreover, the hegemony of this system is
total because its constant reproduction by men and women
becomes thoroughly naturalized in the social conditions of the
culture. 205
Thus the perspective from the male standpoint is not always
each man's opinion or even some aggregation or sum of men's
opinions, although most men adhere to it, nonconsciously and
without considering it a point of view, as much because it makes
sense of their experience (the male experience) as because it is
in their interest. It is rational for them.20 6
200Id. at 124.
201 Id. at 151.
202 Id. at 131.
203 Lukes, supra note 15, at 22.
204 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 112.
205 See, e.g., id. at 94 ("Each woman, in her own particular, even chosen, way
reproduces in her most private relations a structure of dominance and submission
which characterizes the entire public order.").
206 Id. at 114.
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The end-product is a social world in which inequality is
institutionalized 20 7 and, therefore, "in which, epistemologically
speaking, most bigots will be sincere."208 As a result, sex
discrimination law "misdiagnoses the stake the dominant have
in maintaining the situation, because neither it nor they know
'209
they are dominant.
Although MacKinnon explicitly recognizes the social
contingency of the system of gender power that she so
trenchantly critiques, she does not follow through on the
implications of her own theoretical approach. For it should
follow from her analysis that men, too, are subjected to the
regulation and control of this system of gender relations
(although, obviously, in very different ways). MacKinnon,
however, balks at this conclusion. Thus, for example, she gives
short shrift to "the phenomena of 'compulsive masculinity."' 210
MacKinnon cannot accept the implications of her own analysis
because it would undermine her critique and disable her political
project.
We can see MacKinnon struggling with the tension between
her theory and her politics when she writes:
Once the veil is lifted, once relations between the sexes are seen
as power relations, it becomes impossible to see as simply
unintended, well-intentioned, or innocent the actions through
which women are told every day what is expected and when
they have crossed some line. From the male point of view, no
injury may be meant. But women develop an incisive eye for
routines, stratagems, denials, and traps that operate to keep
women in place and to obscure the recognition that it is a place
at all. Although these actions may in some real way be
unintentional, they are taken, in some other real way, as
meant. 211
Notwithstanding MacKinnon's artful finesse in the final sentence,
there is a manifest difference between "may" and "are." MacKinnon acknowledges the unintentional quality of the actions of

"IId. at 244 ("Sex
208 Id. at 234.
209 Id. at 231.
210Id.

211Id.

inequality is thus a social and political institution.").

at 281 n.15.
at 94 (footnote omitted).
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the socially constructed male, but only tentatively. Thus, she
observes that, "[f]rom the male point of view, no injury may be
meant" and, therefore, "these actions may in some real way be
unintentional." But, with their more "incisive eye," women
know that these actions are nevertheless to be understood as
intended, that is, "they are taken, in some other real way, as
meant."
MacKinnon's theory of power is, in Minow's classification, a
particularized view in which specific winners oppress particular
losers. 212 Thus, although MacKinnon seems to get it right in her
theoretical description, she is nevertheless forced by her political
position to yield to the now familiar temptation to subjectivize
and reify "male power." It is only in this way that her theory of
power can fix political responsibility for the system of gender
relations she so eloquently censures.
This subjectivization comes out most clearly when MacKinnon
is criticizing some other theory for not adequately accounting for
the reality of male power. For example, she complains that
"[p]ost-Lacan, actually post-Foucault, it has become customary
to affirm that sexuality is socially constructed. Seldom specified
is what, socially, it is constructed otf far less who does the
constructing ... ."213 She criticizes Foucault because his theory
leads to the conclusion that "[p]ower is everywhere therefore
nowhere, diffuse rather than pervasively hegemonic." 21 4 The
obvious problem is that, if power is diffuse, responsibility cannot
be fixed.
Similarly, in a revealing footnote, MacKinnon rejects attempts
to revive Friedrich Engels's account of working-class sexism as
a product of capitalism because it would also follow that

212See supra text accompanying notes 179-80. This is clear in MacKinnon's frequent
criticism of others for lacking the appropriate theory of power. See, e.g., MacKinnon,

supra note 6, at 290 n.18 ("Roberto Unger .... for example, does not advance any
substantive theory of power (class or gender) .... It is entirely unclear, as a result,
just what is at stake in social hierarchy; that is, how and in what way some are
concretely benefited, hence enforce and hold onto their position .... ); id. at 270 n.18
("The work of Berger and Luckmann is very helpful, although it does not go far
enough and does not understand power .... ).
213Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
214

Id.
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ruling-class men, who also learn sex roles, must both be oppressed by them and receive the benefits of them. This seems,
in a feminist view, to be an attempt to define favored male groups
out of the problem, evading the more straightforward and
elegant feminist explanation: male power over women is a
distinctive form of power that interrelates with the class
structure but is neither derivative from nor a side effect of it.
In this view, men oppress women to the extent that they can
because it is in their interest and to their advantage to do so.215

In this passage, MacKinnon candidly acknowledges that the
reflexive application of the insight about social construction
would blunt the force of feminist critique. As a consequence,
she all but abandons her claim about the social construction of
gender in favor of an account that sounds remarkably like the
liberal conception of the individual as a self-interested, rational
16

actor.
Indeed, MacKinnon's flight from her own insight about the
social contingency of the system of gender power is virtually
complete. In three distinct, but deeply problematic moves, she
substantially shifts her theoretical stance from a view of gender
power as a social construction to a quite traditional agency view
of power. First, she essentializes men by reducing them to their
socially constructed need for power/sex: "[M]ale power takes the
social form of what men as a gender want sexually, which
centers on power itself, as socially defined. ' 217 Second, she
subjectivizes men by focusing on their ability to choose to act in
a manner that maximizes their self-interest thus defined.
Accordingly, she asserts that "[i]t is not only that men treat
women badly, although often they do, but that it is their choice
whether or not to do so,'' 218 and that "men oppress women to
the extent that they can because it is in their interest and to
215Id.
216On

at 260 n.65 (emphasis added).

her claim that sexism is "rational" for men, see also supra text accompanying
note 206.
217MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 131.
218Id. at 94 (emphasis added). Significantly, MacKinnon's political critique cannot
recognize for men any of what her theoretical approach tells her must be true for
women. Where "women have little choice but to become persons who then freely
choose women's roles," id. at 124, men do not appear to be constrained or constructed
to choose in any particular way. They just simply choose. That alone is enough.
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their advantage to do so. ' ' 219 Finally, she reifies male power,
declaring:
"Power to create the world from one's point of view,
particularly from the point of view of one's pleasure, is
power in its male form. '220
"[F]eminism sees the male point of view as fundamental
to the male power to create the world in its own image,
the image of its desires, not just as its delusory end product."221
"[M]ale power extends beneath the representation of
reality to its construction ....
"222
In these final quotes, MacKinnon has completed the transition
from her original, sophisticated claim that gender is through-andthrough a social construction to a more conventional, almost
caricatured representation in which male power is the
omnipotent author of all social construction.
The upshot, of course, is the traditional view in which power
is a property of an originary agency-here, "male power"-that
operates as an external force on a passive victim. In fact, all
that separates her from the traditional agency view is the
characteristic three-dimensional claim that male power is
"pervasively hegemonic. 223 Thus, MacKinnon's explanation of
what makes a theory "feminist" is presented in terms of selfdirecting agency and all-encompassing force. "A theory of
sexuality becomes feminist," she explains, "to the extent it treats
sexuality as a social construct of male power: defined by men,
forced on women, and constitutive of the meaning of gender." 224
How can this be? How can MacKinnon square this assertion
of exclusive male agency with her own insight that the system of
gender power is reproduced through the actions of men and
women? 22 5 How can she begin with the conviction that sexuality
is socially constructed-that "[m]asculinity precedes male as
219 Id.

at 260 n.65 (emphasis added).

22oId. at 121 (footnote omitted).
221Id. at 117-18.
2n Id. at 122.

23 Id. at 131.
224Id. at 128.
m See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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femininity precedes female"226-and end with the claim that men
"define" that social construction and "force" it on women? How
can she start with the social contingency of maleness and finish
with the conclusion that the system of male power is a matter of
"choice" on the basis of calculated self-interest?
insuperable
MacKinnon
mediates these otherwise
contradictions by employing a subtle, but undefended distinction
between masculinity and maleness, on one hand, and men and
male power, on the other. This enables her simultaneously to
acknowledge that masculinity is socially constructed and that
men are exercising originary, self-interested control, without
considering whether these claims cohere. They do not. On her
own account, men as a gender group are "characterized by
maleness as socially constructed."22 7 What they "control,"
therefore, is simply the system of gender power that men and
women have both been programmed to reproduce. What they
"control," therefore, is simply the system of gender power that
controls them, makes them who they are and, thus, reproduces
itself.
The distinction seems to work nevertheless for two nested
reasons. At the first level, the distinction works as a rhetorical
matter because it separates men as grammatical and ontological
subjects ("male power") from men as the transitive objects of
By
social construction ("masculinity" and "maleness").
consistently maintaining this usage, MacKinnon is able to deflect
attention away from the conceptual collapse that occurs when
the linkage between the two is made.
At the second level, the distinction works because it is
consistent with the unreflective understanding of and the
conventional metaphoric schema for power that we have
previously examined. Recall that this model employs the
LOCATION version of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, in which
ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS ALONG PATHS, STATES ARE LOCATIONCONTAINERS and PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. 228 Masculinity
-6 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 131. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
.227 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 112.
n8 See supra text accompanying notes 101-04. Thus, for example, MacKinnon
observes that the defining quality of the system of gender power "is the male pursuit
of control over women's sexuality." MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 112 (emphasis
added).
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a

social construction (STATES ARE LOCATIONConsistent with the logic of the CONTAINER
metaphor, "maleness" includes each and every individual male
who would not be "male" but for the endurance of this
particular, contingent, social conception. Male power, too, is a
container (POWER IS A LOCATION-CONTAINER). Moreover, it is
the same container because on her account "male power takes
the socialform" of the sexualization of women's subordination. 229
But this, of course, is none other than the social construction
called masculinity.
We have seen previously how the conventional conceptual
CONTAINERS).

schema in which

POWER IS A CONTAINER

corresponds with the

reification of "power" and the reinscription of the agency of
particular social actors. Just as Lukes's "specifiable agents"
retained "a certain relative autonomy and could have acted
differently" notwithstanding their "structurally determined
limits," 2 30 MacKinnon's men retain the capacity to choose
notwithstanding the fact that their masculine behavior is socially
constituted. So, too, we have already seen how the POWER IS A
LOCATION-CONTAINER metaphor shapes the inference that all
those within the relevant social institution are understood as
"already (relatively) powerful. '231 In MacKinnon's case, this
leads to the inference that all men have power to oppress
women at their whim because all those within the social
institution referred to as male power are, at the least, already
relatively powerful and have the wherewithal to exert compulsion upon others.2 32
In this way, MacKinnon can acknowledge the reflexivity of the
insight about social construction and still claim, without any
apparent contradiction, that male power "create[s] the world in
its own image, the image of its desires."233 Although she
229See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 131 (emphasis added) ("[M]ale power takes the
social form of what men as a gender want sexually, which centers on power itself, as
socially defined.").
230

Lukes, supra note 15, at 54.

See supra text accompanying notes 101-04 (discussing Elshtain, supra note 26, at
136).
232 See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 5 (referring to "the power of all men over all
women").
233 Id. at 118.
23'
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appreciates that maleness is socially constructed, she offers an
account in which what has been constructed is a male agency
understood in the most conventional terms of power and selfdirecting subjectivity.23 4 With this attribution of agency comes
responsibility, notwithstanding the fact that on her account this
agency ("male power") should be seen as one effect of the
system of gender relations rather than its root cause. 235
As with all three-dimensional views, this subjectivization of
"power" is an indispensable element of its preferred political
project. MacKinnon's is an incessant, unrelenting desire to know
"who or what fundamentally moves and shapes the realities and
instrumentalities of domination" so that she will know "where
to go to do something about it. '236 But, in embracing the
conventional metaphors that constitute our intuitive
understanding of power, MacKinnon relinquishes all her hardwon theoretical insight and reinscribes in her radical feminism
the most traditional agency view of power. MacKinnon wants
to know whom to blame for the subordination of women, and
for that she needs responsible agents. Otherwise, she won't
know where one can go to insist that things be changed.
V. POWER, IN ALL FOUR DIMENSIONS
A. Preservingand Transcending

Foucault's work has been characterized as a decisive break
with previous views, particularly those (such as Lukes's approach) that depend upon conceptions of ideology and other
forms of "sovereign" power. The sense of deliberate rupture is
captured in Foucault's famous dictum that "[w]e need to cut off
234 See, e.g., id. at 114 ("The feminist theory of knowledge is inextricable from the
feminist critique of power because the male point of view forces itselfupon the world
as its way of apprehending it.") (emphasis added). At one point, MacKinnon even
seems to abandon entirely the insight about social construction in favor of a
philosophically idealist position attesting to "[m]en's power to force the world to be
any way their mind can invent." Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
235 Cf Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body 38 (1991)
("[T]he process through which male desire has been constructed remains unanalyzed.
We are left to surmise that an unalienated and monolithic male desire is actually
reflected in the current system.").
236 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 159.
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the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done." 237

Consistent with this admonition, Foucault abjured what Minow
would call a "particularized" view in which certain "winners"
oppress particular losers.238

He specifically disclaimed any

intention of constructing the kind of "theory" of power, what
MacKinnon calls a "substantive theory of power," 239 that
explains how it emerged, who "has" it, or how they "got" it.240
Rather, Foucault undertook to develop "a grid of analysis which
makes possible an analytic of relations of power." 241

I shall be arguing that Foucault's theoretical understanding of
power is both less and more of a break with the past than
commonly supposed.
On one hand, Foucault's systemic
approach to power is the logical extension of those that
preceded it. I argue that Foucault is perhaps best understood as
having further radicalized the insight about social construction
that lies at the heart of Lukes's three-dimensional view. On the
other hand, Foucault's methodological statements reveal a
sustained and systematic effort to displace the metaphorical

schema that constitutes our unreflective understanding of
"power." I argue, moreover, that these ostensibly contradictory

characterizations offer the most cogent account of what many
find so obscure in Foucault's sometimes difficult theorizing
about power.242

Indeed, I argue that these two seemingly

237 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 109,
121.
238Minow, supra note 50, at 238 n.35. Foucault, however, did not ignore or deny
that some benefit from particular power relations while others suffer. See infra text
accompanying notes 326-32.
239See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 290 n.18.
240 Michel Foucault, The Confession of the Flesh, in Power/Knowledge, supra note
60, at 194, 199 ("If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to
view it as emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to reconstruct
its genesis.") [hereinafter Foucault, Confession of the Flesh]; see also 1 Michel
Foucault, The History of Sexuality 82 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter
Foucault, History of Sexuality].
241Foucault, Confession of the Flesh, supra note 240, at 199; see also Foucault,
History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 82.
The aim of the inquiries that will follow is to move less toward a "theory"
of power than toward an "analytics" of power: that is, toward a definition of
the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a
determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis.
Id.
242See, e.g., Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive
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disparate conceptual moves are at the heart of his singular
reconception of the nature of power.
Foucault broke with traditional views because he understood
all too well the disabling grip of the conventional representation
of power. He referred to this conventional representation as the
"juridico-discursive" model because it assumes that "power acts
by laying down the rule: power's hold.., is maintained through
language, or rather through the act of discourse that creates,
from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of law. It speaks,
and that is the rule." 243 On this model, power is schematized in

terms of a legislative authority, a negative,
inhibitory or
244
subject.
obedient
an
and
edict,
repressive
Foucault identified four problems with this model. The first

he called "the paradox of its effectiveness." 245 On this model,

power is "poor in resources" and "incapable of invention." 246
Because it "only has the force of the negative on its side," it is

in theory able only to enforce limits on action rather than to
produce effective behavior under variable and contingent

circumstances. 247 The second problem is what we referred to
Theory of Law 277-78 (1993) (discussing Foucault's "radically new, perhaps even
bizarre, conception of 'strategy,"' which Hunt characterizes as both "illusive" and
"deliberately ambiguous"); Simon, supra note 22, at 1114 (describing Foucault's
general theorizing about power as "shallow" and "vacuous").
243Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 82-83.
244See, e.g., id. at 83-85. For Foucault, modes of authority such as law and the state
"are only the terminal forms power takes." Id. at 92.
245Id. at 85.
246 Id.
247 Id. ("[I]t is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates
incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do."). As
Foucault explained:
[P]ower would be a fragile thing if its only function were to repress, if it worked
only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the
manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way. If, on the
contrary, power is strong this is because... it produces effects at the level of
desire-and also at the level of knowledge.
Michel Foucault, Body/Power, in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 55,
59 [hereinafter Foucault, Body/Power].
In his critique of Foucault, Honneth correctly observes that Foucault did not
consider the mechanisms of force and ideology adequate to account for the range of
productive functioning induced by modern power regimes. Axel Honneth, The
Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory 163 (Kenneth Baynes
trans., 1991). Honneth purports to refute Foucault's claim by pointing out that the
"procedures of ideological influence" do not operate as a repressive or inhibitory
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earlier as the problem of compliance.4 "If power were never
anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do
you really think one would be brought to obey it?"249
A productive theory of power such as the three-dimensional
view resolves these problems by recognizing power at work in
the formation of the perceptions, cognitions and preferences of

the subordinated.25 0 But this solution typically comes only at the

cost of another difficulty. As Foucault observed, theories of
power that depend upon notions of hegemony and ideology

presuppose problematically strong notions of both truth and
subjectivity.25' This is the difficulty, for example, with Lukes's
notion of real interests.

On one hand, it requires an

autonomous individual subject that is able at least in principle to
discern its authentic needs. At the same time, that assumption
entangles the three-dimensional view in insuperable contradiction. It commits the three-dimensional view to the idea both

that the subordinated are socially constructed by power and that
they are capable-again, at least in principle-of escaping that
construction to think and act like autonomous subjects who can
discern their "real" interests. In short, the three-dimensional

view supplants the first two problems with a third that we might
call "the authenticity problem."
The fourth and, in some ways, most revealing problem with
the juridico-discursive model is its all-or-nothing quality. This
problem is the most revealing because it is a direct consequence
of the conceptual structure of the model, which is built upon the
dualism of an active agency (the legislative authority) and a
passive subject (the obedient subordinate). Thus, as we have
mechanism and, therefore, do not suffer from the paradox of effectiveness. Id. at 16465. Honneth's unsupported assertion that Foucault assimilated ideological mechanisms
to the repressive model of power is a significant mistake. Indeed, as will appear in a
moment, Foucault raised an entirely different problem with respect to the adequacy
of ideology as an explanation of power. See infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
248See supra text accompanying notes 143-50.
249Foucault, Truth and Power, supra note 237, at 119.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
251"The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of ....[L]ike
it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to
count as truth. .. .The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think
necessarily, to something of the order of a subject." Foucault, Truth and Power, supra
note 237, at 118.
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seen throughout, the three-dimensional view's totalizing conception of power tends both to subjectivize the powerful as originary, self-directing agents and to elide the agency of the
subordinated. Foucault observed a similar totalizing effect with
respect to the contending psychoanalytic accounts of sexuality.
Notwithstanding their very different conceptions "of the nature
and dynamics of the drives," both "the thematics of repression
and the theory of the law as constitutive of desire" employ the
exact same model of power.2 52 Consequently, they lead to one
of two contradictory but equally totalizing results---"either to the
promise of a 'liberation,' if power is seen as having only an
external hold on desire, or, if it is constitutive of desire itself, to
the affirmation: you are always-already trapped."2 53
Foucault's alternative conception of power avoids the
problems of effectiveness and compliance because, as is widely
recognized, it too emphasizes the productive dimension of
power.25 4 What sharply differentiates Foucault's approach from
the others, however, is that it does not understand productive
power as the particular province or tool of dominant groups.
Instead, it sees productive power in the processes that construct
individuals as individuals in the first place. In a widely cited
passage, Foucault advised that we
not ... ask why certain people want to dominate, what they
seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how
things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of
those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our
bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In
other words, ... we should try to discover how it is that
subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially
constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies,
252Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 82-83.
253Id.

254
See, e.g., Honneth, supra note 247, at 165 ("For Foucault the idea that the use of
particular methods of power is able to bring forward productive effects is, to a certain
extent, the key to a historically adequate theory of power."); Charles Taylor, Foucault
on Freedom and Truth, in Foucault: A Critical Reader 69,75-76 (David Couzens Hoy
ed., 1986) ("[W]here the old law/power was concerned with prohibitions.... the new
kind of power is productive. It brings about a new kind of subject and new kinds of
desire and behaviour ....It is concerned to form us as modem individuals.")
(reference omitted).
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materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp
subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.2 55
This broader understanding of productive power in the
antecedent processes of social construction simultaneously builds
on and goes beyond Lukes's three-dimensional view. It builds
on Lukes's view that power is at work in the formation of the
perceptions, cognitions and preferences of its subjects. At the
same time, it goes beyond Lukes's view because it understands
these processes of social construction as all-pervasive, applicable
to all subjects. Which is to say that, once power is recognized
in the very formation of the individual subject, it is no longer
possible to skirt the fact that the powerful, too, are subjects
2 56
produced by the operations of power.
In this sense, Foucault's view can be seen as the logical
extension of its predecessors. The one-dimensional view represents the prototypical scenario of sovereign power understood
as the ability of A (the active agent) to compel B (the passive
subject) to act in ways that promote A's interests rather than
B's. The two-dimensional view extends this model by including
in its analysis of power the ability of the powerful to insure
inaction as, for example, by control over the agenda. Lukes's
three-dimensional view takes this conception of sovereign power
one step further and extends it to the processes of social
construction that define the perceptions, cognitions and
preferences of the subordinated.
Foucault's approach merely follows through on the logical
trajectory of this analysis by recognizing that the insight about
social construction applies reflexively and, thus, is equally
pertinent to those who exercise power. On this point, we might
think of Foucault as Lukes without the internal contradiction.
In effect, Foucault advances a "four-dimensional" view that
radicalizes the insight about social construction and thereby
255
256

Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 97.
Thus, Foucault explained that power is "a machine in which everyone is caught,

those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised." Michel
Foucault, The Eye of Power, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 146, 156
[hereinafter Foucault, Eye of Power]. Note that, here, Foucault employs the
conventional metaphor POWER IS A MACHINE. See also Foucault, Two Lectures, supra
note 60, at 98 ("In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points
of application.").
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avoids the facile subjectivization of those who wield "power."
Of course, this understanding undermines the model of
sovereign power because it subverts the concept of originary,
self-directing agency that underlies the very notion of
sovereignty. But it has the virtue of preserving the most
important insight of the three-dimensional view even as it transcends it. Foucault's productive view of power is, thus, an
Aufhebung of its predecessors.
By embracing the full reflexive force of the insight about
social construction, Foucault's approach also deepens the
productive view in another way. Once the concept of originary,
self-directing agency is undermined in this manner, it becomes
much more difficult to think of "power" as a static property or
"thing" possessed by such an agent. As Stanley Fish observes
with respect to authorial intention, "it is hard to think of
intentions formed in the course of judicial or literary activity as
'one's own,' since any intention one could have will have been
stipulated in advance by the understanding of what activities are
possible to someone working in the enterprise. '257 To recognize
that the powerful are socially constructed is to recognize that the
putative controllers are themselves controlled, that the "creative" author is already authorized by antecedent creators, and
that power (to create, to control, etc.) is not so much a capacity
owned as a process shared. In short, a reflexive application of
the insight about social construction yields a dynamic view of
power.
This dynamic conception is, then, the second major dimension
of Foucault's singular reconception of the nature of power. Foucault's extension of the insight about social construction led him
to reject the conventional metaphoric conception of power as a
"thing" possessed by identifiable individuals (the "sovereign,"
the "powerful," the "winners," etc.). This rejection in turn yields
an understanding of power not as a static property of selfdirecting agents, but rather as the emergent quality of a dynamic
system of performances. 258 Thus, Foucault explained that power
Fish, supra note 70, at 98-99.
See, e.g., Honneth, supra note 247, at 155 ("Strategic action among social actors
is interpreted as the ongoing process in which the formation and exercise of social
power is embedded.") (discussing Foucault).
257

258
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is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And
not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and
exercising this power 5 9
In this way, the first conceptual move (extending the existing
tradition of theorizing about power) entails the second move
(breaking from the conventional metaphorical schema for power). Together, these conceptual moves produce Foucault's
distinctive view of power as productive and dynamic. On this
view, power is everywhere but not all-determining; it is
omnipresent, but not omnipotent. It is everywhere because
every individual is socially constructed by the processes of
power. But it is not all-determining precisely because it is a
process. As such, every individual is a necessary participant in
its construction and perpetuation. As Foucault put it: "The
individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or
precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element
260
of its articulation."
There is more to be said about the content and consequences
of this dynamic understanding of power, to which we shall return
in the next Section. Before doing so, however, it is important to
understand how closely the substance of this view is related to
the metaphors by which power is conceptualized. As we saw
earlier, the failure fully to appreciate the reflexivity of the
insight about social construction follows from the conventional
metaphoric conception of power as a "thing" such as a
CONTAINER-OBJECT. Thus, Lukes's static spatialization of power
relations obscures the antecedent processes of social formation
that construct certain social agents as powerful. 261 Foucault, in
contrast, spurned the static spatialization of power relations
precisely because he understood the way in which the reification
of "power" operates to block both the force of the insight about
social construction and the concomitant understanding of power
as the active dimension of ongoing social relations: "The idea
259
Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 98.
260 Id.
261See supra text accompanying notes 158-65.
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that there is either located at-or emanating from-a given
point something which is a 'power'... [is] based on a misguided
analysis ....

In reality power means relations, a more-or-less

organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations." 262
In elaborating this productive, dynamic conception of power,
Foucault found it necessary to uproot almost the entire
metaphorical schema that constitutes our unreflective understanding of "power." This is clear in his methodological
discussion in The History of Sexuality, where he laid out his

reconception of power in five relatively succinct, if, perhaps,
recondite, propositions.
First, Foucault explained that power is not "something that is
acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or
allows to slip away; power is exercised ...

in the interplay of

nonegalitarian and mobile relations."2 63 Second, he maintained
that power relations are not external to economic, social or
intimate relationships. 264 They are, rather, both immanent to
and productive of those relationships: "Relations of power...
are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely.., the
internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power
are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of
prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive
role .... -"265 Third, it follows from this that "there is no binary
and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled[,]...
no such duality extending from the top down. '266 Indeed,
"[p]ower comes from below ' 267 because, as he elsewhere
explained, "power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus,
not reconstituted 'above' society as a supplementary structure."268

262
Foucault, Confession of The Flesh, supra note 240, at 198.
263 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 94.
2" Id. ("Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other
types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations),
but are immanent in the latter ...
26 Id.
266Id.

267
26 Id.

Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 222.
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Fourth, Foucault maintained that power is intentional but not
subjective. That is, power is the concatenation of myriad tactics
and confrontations pursued for discernable aims that, nevertheless, pervade society without emanating from an identifiable
source: "[I]t is often the case that no one is there to have
invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated
them .
"...1269
Fifth, and finally, he insisted that power always
entails resistance because resistance is internal to power.27 0 As
he elsewhere explained:
there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter
are all the more real and effective because they are formed
right at the point where relations of power are exercised;
resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be
real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot
of power. It exists all the more by being in the same place as
power ....
271
Many find these five propositions Delphic and obscure, if not
downright impenetrable. Little wonder. In these five propositions, Foucault renounced the conventional conceptual schema
that constitutes our unreflective understanding of power. He
insisted that power is not an object (i.e., power is not "something
that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on
to or allows to slip away"); that power is not a location (i.e.,
"The idea that there is either located at-or emanating from-a
given point something which is a 'power' [is] based on a
misguided analysis"); and that power/control is not up (i.e.,
"relations of power are not in superstructural positions," but
rather that "[p]ower comes from below" in the "moving
substrate of force relations" 272).
In rejecting these conventional metaphoric understandings,
moreover, Foucault's analytic effectively eviscerates the
conventional equation of "power" and "agency." For once the
concept of power is de-reified in this way-power being neither
an OBJECT nor a CONTAINER-it can no longer be conceived as
a substance like a resource that can be accumulated, stored and
269
27 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 95.
0Id.at 96 ("Resistances ...are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.").
271 Foucault, Power and Strategies, supra note 150, at 142.
272 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 93-94.
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then invoked at will in order to compel or inhibit the actions of
others. Thus, as we saw above, Foucault cautioned that power
"is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands,
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth." 273
The only part of the conventional conceptual schema that does
survive Foucault's analytic is the POWER IS A FORCE metaphor. 274
But even it does not survive untouched, for it is no longer the
conventional version in which power is conceived as an external
force operating on a passive victim. Rather, Foucault transformed the POWER IS A FORCE metaphor in two novel ways that
correlate with his distinctive view of power as dynamic and
productive. In the first, power is understood as the push and
pull internal to social relationships. Thus, he suggested that
"power must be understood in the first instance as the
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
they operate and ... as the process which, through ceaseless
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses
them. 275 In the second, power is conceived as a life-giving force
that is as constitutive of the subject as the blood that pumps in
one's veins. Thus, he explained that "in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking... of its capillary form..., the
point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals,
touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and
attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday
lives." 276 Here, power is represented as a productive force
internal to the person that animates behavior, perception,
perspective, and knowledge.
At the same time, the metaphor of power in its "capillary
form" works to synthesize the productive and dynamic
dimensions of Foucault's view of power. As noted above,
Foucault rejected the conventional top-down model of power in
273Foucault,

Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 98.
274
Thus, he concluded that "[i]t is in this sphere of force relations that we must try
to analyze the mechanisms of power." Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240,
at 97 (emphasis added).
275Id. at 92.
276 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 60, at 37, 39
[hereinafter Foucault, Prison Talk]. Foucault here employs a variant of the metaphor
POWER IS A RESOURCE.
As noted earlier, this metaphor expresses the shared
entailments of the metaphors POWER IS A SUBSTANCE and POWER IS A FORCE. See
discussion supra text accompanying notes 85-86, 101-04.
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which a sovereign rules the social body (i.e., as the "head" of
state) in favor of a bottom-up model in which power emanates
from the "moving substrate of force relations." 277 He did not,
however, discard the conventional metaphor of the "body
politic," but rather transposed it so as to bring into focus "the
multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function
within the social organism."278

He recommended that the

analysis of power should be "concerned with power at its
extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where
it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms
and institutions."279 In this way, Foucault incorporated the
different dimensions of his analysis in a single image: The productive force that flows through the very grain of individuals
extends throughout the social body to animate even the most
quotidian social relations.
For all his self-conscious effort to displace the conventional
metaphoric schema for "power," even Foucault could not
entirely escape such conventional metaphors as POWER IS A
FORCE and the "body politic."
Foucault recognized the
metaphorical quality of our conceptual schema for "power" and
understood the distortions of thought that arise as a
consequence. But that did not leave him free to transcend the
conceptual schema and simply choose a new way to talk about
things. In an important sense, conceptual metaphors of this sort
are not optional because they are constitutive of reason.28 0
Instead, Foucault sought to reconstitute our understanding by
means of a two-part strategy. First, he labored to make us selfconscious of the metaphorical nature of our assumptions about
power. Second, he reworked some of the conventional
metaphors, elaborating them in ways that express new and
different entailments. In this way, Foucault's remarkable
reconception of power managed simultaneously to preserve and
transcend not only previous theories of power, but also our
conceptually entrenched metaphorical understanding of it.
27
Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 93.
278
Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 96 (emphasis added).
279
Id. (emphasis added).
280 See Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: How the Study of the Mind
Changes Our Understanding of Life and Law (forthcoming 1997).
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B. The Everywhere of "Power" (on MisreadingFoucault)

Foucault's subtle, intellectually sophisticated view of power
often seems to elude the grasp of his critics. Sometimes, this is
because the critic seizes on but one portion of his more complex
theory. Other times, it is because the critic insists on reading
Foucault's unique reconception of power through the lens of
some quite conventional assumptions: Obviously, it will be
difficult to appreciate a theory which emphasizes that power is
a process if one continues to view power as a "thing" under the
control of identifiable agents.
By far, the most important aspect of Foucault's thought-and
the point that defeats several of the most prominent critiques-is
his insistence that power can only be understood as the product
of a dynamic system. It is precisely because it is a dynamic view
that Foucault's approach is able to negotiate without contradiction a series of conclusions that would otherwise be quite
paradoxical: i.e., that power is constitutive but not absolutely
controlling, all-pervasive but not total, and intentional but not
subjective. And it is precisely because they fail fully to
appreciate this point that critics tend to misread Foucault in a
way that reinscribes the usual totalizing mistakes-either
subjectivizing "power" or eliding agency.
Consider Foucault's statement that "[w]e should try to grasp
subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. '' 281 Foucault's play on the terms subject/subjection (in
French, sujet/sujection) is a deliberate double entendre.282 For

Foucault, power is effective "at the level of those continuous and
uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our
gestures, dictate our behaviours etc."8 3 At the same time, this
productive view of power is never absolutely controlling for
Foucault precisely because what it produces are subjects, that is,
281Foucault,

Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 97.
m Not only is the pun just as good in English, but it is remarkable that we have no
word for the individual as originary subject that isn't double-edged in just this way.
Thus, "agent" and "agency" have the same paradoxical double meaning as "subject."
Even the term "actor" carries with it the double connotation of originary agent and
mere performer.
283 Id.
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agents capable of acting in particular ways. Thus, although
power is still a metaphorical FORCE for Foucault, it is not the
force of the imposition, inhibition or constraint but of impetus
to action: "[I]t incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or
more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely;
it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject
....
,284 Consequently, power can be "exercised only over ...
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." 28 5
Take the example of unreconstructed, gender-stereotypical
roles such as wife/mother and father/provider. However much
one thinks that the traditional role of mother is a construct of
the system of gender power, no one supposes that it is merely a
matter of passive compliance with the dictates of patriarchal
authority. As anyone who has cared for a two-year-old knows,
to be a mother requires empathy, dedication, resourcefulness,
patience, and ingenuity. Because roles like wife/mother and
father/provider require a pattern of conduct under shifting and
often challenging circumstances, their existence depends on imaginative enactments by actual subjects.
This is the profound flaw in Robin West's admonition that
feminists not accept Foucault's theoretical approach to power.
West argues that Foucault's notion of productive power is
inapposite to the system of gender power because, in her words,
"patriarchal power is experienced by modern women as intensely
nondiscursive, as utterly unimaginative, as profoundly negating,
and, in short, as frighteningly and pervasively violent. '286 On her
own account, however, mothers' relationships with their
dependent children are anything but unimaginative and selfnegating.2 7 For West, of course, this is just a function of the
"simple, utterly unremarkable physical facts of life."288 But
many would recognize this capacity to care for and nurture
28 9
children as a complex, sometimes fragile social production.
284

Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 220.
221.
supra note 22, at 61 (footnote omitted).
80-81.

M-5Id. at
286 West,
2v Id. at
2s8

Id. at 80.

289 See, e.g., Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and
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Indeed, West's suggestion that this nurturing behavior has a

simple biological basis is undercut by the tragic reality of abuse,
neglect, and exploitation of children by parents of both genders.2 0

The importance of productive power in the construction of the
agency of the subordinated is yet more clear when one considers

such traditionally "feminine" behaviors as lavish concern for
one's appearance and sexual allure toward men. Presumedly,

West would not consider this an innate, biological characteristic
of women. Indeed, in support of the argument that "patriarchy
shatters our will to create," West quotes Tillie Olsen's observation that "[1]ittle has been written on the harms of instilling
constant concern with appearance; the need to please, to
support; the training in acceptance, deferring."291 But this remark

makes clear that patriarchal power is, in fact, quite productive:
It instills compulsive concern with one's attractiveness; it
inculcates a need to please; it instructs in the habits of
deference. One might even say that the whole point of this
aspect of gender power is to produce particular kinds of subjects
capable of acting creatively and vivaciously in exciting, pleasing,
and feeding the egos of men. From the Gothic romance to the

contemporary "bodice-buster," moreover, this social production
of women as sexual subjects29 has been at least as much a matter
of discourse as of violence. 2

the Sociology of Gender 218 (1978); see also Winter, Contingency and Community,
supra note 71, at 977-80, 987-88 (examining the processes by which parental roles are
socially constructed and internalized by individuals such that they become constitutive
of one's sense of identity).
290 Cf. Alice Miller, Thou Shalt Not Be Aware: Society's Betrayal of the Child 161
(H. & H. Hannum trans., 1984) ("One of the simplest and completely unnoticed forms
of perpetuation of [abuse] is abuse of one's children for one's own needs, which are
all the more urgent and uncontrollable the more deeply repressed the original
trauma.").
291 West, supra note 22, at 92-93 (quoting Tillie Olsen, Silences 28 (1978)).
292 As Sandra Lee Bartky points out, even such negative behaviors as the emotional
or sexual "preference" for domination are, at least in part, discursively constructed:
The feminine taste for fantasies of victimization is assumed on virtually every
page of the large pulp literature produced specifically for women. Confession
magazines, Harlequin romances, and that genre of historical romance known in
the publishing trade as the "bodice-ripper" have sales now numbering in the
billions, and they can be bought in most drugstores and supermarkets across the
land. The heroes of these tales turn out to be nice guys in the end, but only in
the end; before that they dominate and humiliate the heroines in small
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This is not to deny the validity of West's point that violence
plays an important role in the perpetuation of male power. To
the contrary, as West points out, even men who would never
employ violence against women nevertheless benefit from the
repercussions of women's experience of violence or the threat of
violence at the hands of other men. 293 It is to say only that this
reduction of power to violence is not tenable. If West were
right and violence were the sole (or even predominant) means
of maintaining male power, patriarchy would long ago have
capitulated to the paradox of its effectiveness. With nothing but
the force of the negative to work with, it would have produced
nothing but the kind of unimaginative, unstimulating, selfabnegating partners described by West.
Foucault, in contrast, insisted on the importance of distinguishing between relations of violence and relations of power:
A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it
forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes
the door on all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be
passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance it has no
other option but to try to minimize it. On the other hand a
power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two
elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a
power relationship: that "the other" (the one over whom power
is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the
very end as a person who acts. .... 294
On Foucault's view, power is a process that is necessarily
participatory because it depends on the actions and reactions of
disparate and-it bears repeating-unequal actors. Power
cannot annihilate agency because it necessarily depends on it.
Thus, Foucault defined "the exercise of power as a way in which
certain actions may structure the field of other possible
actions." 295
"Gestapo-like" ways.

Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of
Oppression 46 (1990).
293Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 81,101-08 (1987); West, supra
note 22, at 63 n.10.

294Foucault, Subject
295Id. at 222.

and Power, supra note 28, at 220.
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This understanding of power as a way of acting upon an acting
subject is what underlies Foucault's observation that "[t]he
individual which power has constituted is at the same time its
vehicle. 296 Only subjects can act on other subjects; yet, in each
and every case, the subject is herself an effect of prior actions.
To return to the example of gender-stereotypical roles, neither
the woman who enacts the traditional wife/mother role nor the
husband who expects it is the author or creator of that role. To
the contrary, they have learned their respective roles through
interactions with their own parents and others in a social context
in which those roles were already endowed with very particular
social meanings. At the same time, however, there is no such
"thing" as a wife/mother or father/provider separate from the
people who enact those roles. When a woman performs the
traditional wife/mother role, she enacts the system of gender
power and becomes a vehicle for the realization of all its
consequences. Thus, to paraphrase Foucault,297 every actual
wife/mother is an effect of the system of gender power, and at
the same time, or precisely to the extent to which she is that
effect, she is also the element of its articulation.
But this dynamic view of power also means that, as a practical
matter, power can never be total. As Foucault explained, the
"strictly relational character of power relationships" presupposes
that there must always be a companion, accomplice, cohort, or
confederate to "play the role of adversary, target, support, or
handle."298 Thus, even the enactment of the wife/mother and
father/provider roles in their most unreconstructed, genderstereotypical form will inevitably entail resistance. This very
traditional configuration of male power can be realized only in
the performance by the subordinated partner of the required
incidents of her role. This means that, as with any form of
social power, its success is contingent on its faithful reenactment.
Yet, it always remains open to the subordinated partner to
couch her performance anywhere along the broad spectrum that
296

Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 98. In the paragraphs that follow, I am

reproducing and condensing an argument that I elaborated initially in Winter,
Contingency and Community, supra note 71, and which also appears in Winter, For
What It's Worth, supra note 10, at 813-14.

297 See supra quoted text accompanying note 260.
298Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 95.
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stretches from deferential compliance through shamming,
grumbling, sulking, footdragging, "working to rule," limit-testing,
and mocking all the way to outright defiance.299 Because the
role must be acted out, it always provides the occasion for
resistance.
The consequences of such resistance, moreover, are never
foreordained in any simple or straightforward way. The
disruption of expected routines-dinner not on the table, the
children not bathed-can be either the occasion for discipline or
the successful expression of defiance. Which it will be in any
given case will depend on a myriad of contingent factors,
including inequalities in wealth, social options, psychological
tenacity, or degree of sentimental attachment. Noncompliance
with the expectations of her role may provoke a disciplinary
response such as anger, scorn, or physical abuse. Or, depending
on context, it may succeed in exposing the inequity of the
arrangement and underscoring the impotence of the ostensibly
dominant partner. In each and every case, however, the
construction of "power" will be something in which both
partners will have participated. How that construction "comes
out" will depend upon the larger social circumstances in which
the drama unfolds as well as the more intimate social and
psychological resources that each partner brings to the table.
In principle, then, power is always open to challenge and
renegotiation. Because the role must be personified in each and
every case, each enactment is also a potential reconstruction.
Thus, as Foucault explained, power is omnipresent "not because
it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its
invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to
the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one
point to another."30° In the very necessity of its continued
performance lies the possibility of power's disruption.
Finally, this dynamic understanding also explains why power
is intentional but not subjective. We have already seen how
recognition of the social construction of the subject undermines
the notion of originary subjectivity. Subjects form intentions;
299 See generally Scott, supra note 141, at 184-201 (discussing developmental
processes of domination and resistance by subordinate groups).
3 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 93.
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but any intentions developed during the course of an established
activity or role are, in an important sense, prescripted by the
purposes and possibilities that constitute that particular endeavor
as an endeavor. In theory, of course, a subject could be
secondary or derivative in this way and still be both self-"
directing and sovereign with respect to others. But Foucault's
dynamic understanding vitiates even this conceit because the
strictly performative and contingent nature of power relations
means that power is necessarily a joint production of the
reciprocal strategic actions of the relevant players. Thus, the
profound implication of his dynamic view of power is that the
intention-forming subject does not "own" his or her own power.
What we refer to as "power" is really the sum of an ongoing
system of performances that include assertions of authority,
resistance, and subsequent adjustments.
More importantly, the outcome of such relational struggles will
be regulated by a variety of situational factors such as social
options, strategic alternatives, potential alliances, and institutional contexts. Consequently, the "tactical productivity" 301 of
any calculated stratagem or maneuver will be a function, not of
the subject's intention, capacity, or resolve, but of the entire
economy of ongoing strategic interactions. 302 To think of power
as the province of the intentional subject is to make the mistake
of equating power with its "internal point of view." 30 3 In
actuality, however, the tactics that work are those that "find[]
their base of support and their condition elsewhere." 30 4 I will
give an example shortly, in response to the aggregation critique
that some more traditional theorists have levelled against
Foucault. In the meantime, we might say that for Foucault a
tactic only matures into a meaningful strategy after it has
connected with other power relations and managed to overcome,
coopt, incorporate, or circumvent its resistance. 305 Even then,
301Id. at 102.

302 Cf. id. ("[1]t is a question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power which
replaces... the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile
field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of
domination are produced.").

303
Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 60, at 97.
m4 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 95.
305 Accordingly, it is not at all clear why Hunt thinks that Foucault "says much less"
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the outcome or effect may be quite unlike what was initially
intended.306 Because efficacy and effect are contingent on a
variety of contextual factors both internal and external to the
power relation, the strategy that emerges may be very different
than the calculated tactic that gave it birth.
Several commentators have argued that, having repudiated the
subjective dimension of power, Foucault "is left with no means
of accounting for the aggregation or globalization of power."30 7
Alan Hunt contends that Foucault's claim that local tactics are
adapted, transformed, and integrated into global strategies of
domination "can only make sense if we reintroduce some
privileged agent" such as "the ruling class. ' 308 In a related vein,
Axel Honneth argues that
[b]ecause he initially supposes an uninterrupted string of
strategic conflicts, Foucault excludes at the conceptual level any
possibility of a mutual overcoming of the struggle in the
provisional state of stabilized power. Thus, there inevitably
remains for him only the possibility of interpreting the
institutionalization of positions of power as a process of the
constant use of force.... [H]e understands relations of social
power as the aggregate states of strategic action obtained
through permanent and technically highly perfected uses of
force. 309

than Poulantzas. Hunt, supra note 242, at 279 (referring to Nicos Poulantzas, State,
Power, Socialism (1978)). Other than the reference to reified entities like social
movements and classes, Hunt's characterization of Poulantzas would seem equally
applicable to Foucault: "Strategy only emerges ex post facto through the collision of
mutually opposed tactics in which the general line of force is conceived as the complex
resultant of the balance of forces involved when the specific tactics ... clash and
compete." Id. (citation omitted).
306Foucault gives the example of the development of modem psychoanalysis:
[W]hereas to begin with the child's sexuality had been problematized within the
relationship established between doctor and parents (in the form of advice, or
recommendations to keep the child under observation, or warnings of future
dangers), ultimately it was in the relationship of the psychiatrist to the child that
the sexuality of adults themselves was called into question.
Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 99.
307Hunt, supra note 242, at 278.
308 Id. Cf. Foucault, Power and Strategies, supra note 150, at 142 (describing power
as "a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible
of integration into overall strategies").
309 Honneth, supra note 247, at 174.
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As we shall see in a moment, however, what Hunt and Honneth
advance as analytical arguments turn out to be nothing more
than assertions of their disagreement.
Although there are important differences between Hunt and
Honneth, what underlies both critiques is the assumption of the
conventional schema for power-in which A (the active agent)
affects B (the passive subject) in ways that serve A's interests-as the elemental unit out of which larger strategies and
condensations of power are developed. In other words, both
assume the conventional model in which power is schematized
in terms of the dualisms of active agency and passive subject, of
a legislative subjectivity and an objective order, or, to put it
more abstractly, of subjects and objects (including, of course,
submissive victims).
This is, perhaps, most clear in Honneth's reasoning. He thinks
that Foucault must reduce power to force because, on Honneth's
account, subjectivity is the only other alternative. Thus, Honneth
claims that "[e]ach social stabilization of a position of
power-that is, each establishing of however limited a relation
of power-presupposes the interruption of the struggle in the
form of a normatively motivated agreement, or of a pragmatically aimed compromise, or of a permanently emplaced use
of force." 310 Honneth recognizes that, for Foucault, power
emerges from an ongoing process, that is, from "an
uninterrupted string of strategic conflicts. '31' But he cannot see
how such a process can yield a stable position of power (POWER
IS A LOCATION), let alone how such an ongoing process can be
aggregated (POWER IS A RESOURCE) into an institution (POWER

ISA CONTAINER). Honneth concludes, therefore, that something
must happen to arrest the struggle if there is to be a moment of
"power." For Honneth, the only two possibilities are reason or
force. The participants can employ reason to reach an
accommodation (however temporary) on the basis of either
communicative action ("a normatively motivated compromise")
or strategic action ("a pragmatically aimed compromise").
Alternatively, one of the partners can resort to force. 312 Clearly,
Id.
Id.
312 See id. ("Whereas the first two ways for the solution of a strategic conflict

310

311
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Foucault does not believe that power is a matter of conscious
agreement and coordination. Honneth concludes, therefore, that
social institutions must appear to Foucault "merely as means of
313
a one-sided rule by force."
Honneth's account, however, bears very little resemblance to
Foucault's actual position. Where Foucault carefully distinguished between power and violence, Honneth reads him as
conflating the two. Where Foucault explained that "power
means relations, '314 Honneth returns to the most conventional
reification of power. Where Foucault argued that much modern
power operates through discursive practices that produce
particular subject-formations, 315 Honneth reads him as claiming
that power is maintained only by specialized uses of force.
Where Foucault insisted that power is a way of acting on an
acting subject, Honneth reduces it to the capacity of a selfdirecting agent (the subject) to impose force on a passive victim
(the object).
In fact, Honneth consistently misreads Foucault as reducing
the individual to the status of an object upon which power acts.
Thus, he attributes to Foucault "a blind automatism," "a crude
behaviorism," and "a fundamentally mechanistic conception" in
which "Foucault is interested not in... [t]he human body...
as a unity of physical and psychical processes, but rather,
following an intentionally physicalist program, ...
as a
mechanically functioning system of energy."316
In short,
Honneth understands Foucault as interested only in the
construction of the modern individual as object. But, as Dreyfus
represent cases of a two-sided stabilization of social power, the third solution
represents the improbable case of a merely one-sided stabilization of a position of
social power.").
313 Id.

314Michel Foucault, Confession of the Flesh, supra note 240, at 198 (emphasis
added).
315 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 17-35, 58-70; see also Michel
Foucault, The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century, in Power/Knowledge,
supra note 60, at 166, 166-82 (discussing politics of health as developed from
fragmentary origins, rather than from vertical imposition) [hereinafter Foucault,
Politics of Health].

316Honneth, supra note 247, at 168, 195; see also id. at 166 (reading Foucault as

describing norms of conduct as nothing more than "rigidly reproduced patterns of

action.").
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and Rabinow explain, this represents only one half of a more
complete theoretical investigation in which Foucault undertook
to examine the construction of the modern individual as both
317
subject and object.
Although it takes a more sophisticated form, essentially the
same problem attends Hunt's objections. Hunt reasons that
"[t]he limitations of Foucault's treatment of 'strategy' stem from
his insistence on the diversity of power relations while, at the
same time, he rejects both structural determination and the logic
of (objective) interests. '318 In other words, Hunt assumes that
Foucault cannot account for the aggregation of tactics into
strategies because he has available neither of the usual alternatives. On one hand, Foucault has no active agent who might be
responsible for coordinating and consolidating local tactics into
global strategies. On the other hand, Foucault denies the
explanatory cogency of such familiar objective determinants as
material conditions or "real" interests. Hunt thinks that this is
a problem because he believes that "[t]o talk of strategy is to
imply some explanatory principle for the historical patterns of
power relations." 3 9 Because Foucault offers no such explanation, Hunt concludes that Foucault's concept of strategy is
reducible to "results" and that Foucault's claim that power is
nonsubjective is reducible to the familiar sociological notion of
'unintended effects.' 320 In short, explanation for Hunt can only
take the form of subjective or objective determinants; otherwise,
it can only be a matter of random events.
Hunt's unreflective adoption of the conventional schema for
power is also what underwrites his confusion concerning tactics
and strategies. Hunt thinks that what Foucault does is "to conflate 'tactics,' the multiple wills and intentions of agents, with the
suggestion that the aggregation of these tactics manifests the
existence of a 'strategy.' ' 321 Moreover, Hunt believes that this
aggregation cannot take place without "some privileged agent"
3

17Dreyfus & Rabinow, supra note 28, at xxvii (Foucault's studies "show us how our
culture attempts to normalize individuals through increasingly rationalized means, by
turning them into meaningful subjects and docile objects."); see also id. at 143-83.
318Hunt, supra note 242, at 278.
319Id.
320See Id. at 278-79.

321Id. at 278.
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because he simply cannot make any sense of "the idea of
strategy without positing the existence of [a] strategist." 322
Behind both these statements is the assumption embedded in the
conventional schema that causal efficacy-that is, power-is a
matter of intentional action by an agent.
Of course, it is just this subjectivist model of power that Foucault so effectively critiqued. Foucault disavowed the idea that
power can be understood as the mere aggregation of intentional
tactics. "I believe that power is not built up out of 'wills'
(individual or collective), nor is it derivable from interests." 323
To the contrary, he understood that the success of localized
tactics is dependent not only on the ongoing play of tactical
maneuver and resistance within each power-relationship, but also
on the larger "strategic envelope that makes them work." 324
This means, as we have seen, that power cannot be subjective
because both the causal efficacy of a tactic and its outcome are
contingent on factors over which no intentional agent could
possibly have control. More importantly, it means that the
aggregation problem is a false one. Since the success of a tactic
is contingent on the way it links up with an entire field of
strategic action, an effective local strategy is, in a critical sense,
already integrated into a larger strategic domain of which it is
both a constituent and a consequence. As Foucault explained,
"every power relation makes a reference, as its effect but also as
its condition of possibility, to a political field of which it forms
a part."325

322Id. (referring to this as a "deliberately ambiguous" concept).
323Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, in Power/Knowledge, supra note 60,

at 183, 188 [hereinafter Foucault, "Short History"]. As he explained:
For a long time, the great problem was how it was possible for the will of

individuals to be represented in or by the general will .... This takes no account
of the complexity of the mechanisms at work, their specificity, nor the effects
of inter-dependence, complementarity, and sometimes of blockage, which this
very diversity produces.
Id.

324Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 100. For Foucault, this is a

reflexive relationship in which the overall strategy is delineated by the specificity of
the localized tactics, and those tactics are enabled by the larger field of strategic
interactions. Id.

32 Foucault, Short History, supra note 323, at 189 (emphasis added).
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To see this point, consider again the example of a genderstereotypical power relation like that of wife/mother and father/provider. Suppose it is 1960. The woman is tired one day,
and she refuses to perform her expected routines: Dinner is not
on the table, and the children are not bathed. What happens?
Perhaps she endures a reprimand-or worse-and it never
happens again. Or, maybe, it matures into an act of defiance
that precipitates a confrontation. Whether this boycott will
succeed as resistance or succumb to discipline will depend on the
attributes of the players and the social ambience of the play.
One important determinant will be the relative wealth and
status of the players. Clearly, the woman is in a weaker position
if she is economically dependent on the man. She may not be
able to compete in the job market to support herself because her
parents thought that it made no sense to send a daughter to
college. The only job open to her may be as a secretary for
some male executive who, equally used to being catered to at
home, will expect her to bring his coffee or pick up his laundry.
Perhaps she has professional training and is already working in
some "pink collar" ghetto such as nursing. Once again, she will
be taking orders from mostly male doctors. Typically, she will
be earning less than her husband who, as the family's primary
breadwinner, is also likely to have a job that places more
onerous demands on his time. In any of these cases, the woman
is apt to be at a serious disadvantage in the conflict precipitated
by her act of defiance. Dominance in the local power relation
will therefore be conditioned by the surrounding social circumstances, which is to say, by the net effects of all these other
power relations.
This analysis leads to two separate conclusions. First, there
simply is no "problem" of aggregation for Foucault. As he
explained:
[T]he manifold relationships of force that take shape and come
into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited
groups, and institutions ... form a general line of force that
traverses the local oppositions and links them together ....
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Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained
6
by all these confrontations. 32

Hunt dismisses this statement as nothing more than a skillful use
of the conventional mechanical metaphor for power to make it
appear that intentional tactics can be aggregated without any
supervening subjective agency.32 7 But Foucault's understanding

of power as a product of ongoing strategic relations provides a
sophisticated alternative explanation of this linkage. Like all
dynamic systems, the various elements feed back on one

another. Consequently, different power relations need not be
directed by an overall logic or organizing principle in order to
function together. Rather, heterogenous relations-in the home,
the workplace-affect one another such that, even without a
controlling subjectivity, "the rationality of power is characterized
by ... tactics which, becoming connected to one another,
attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of

support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming
328

comprehensive systems.
Second, because systems of power relations have such

ecological properties, a dynamic view does not necessarily yield
an understanding of power as endlessly mutable or ephemeral.
It is one thing to recognize that power is neither a "thing" nor

the static property of particular actors, but rather that it is an
326Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at
327 Hunt, supra note 242, at 276-77.
328 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240,

94.

at 95. Thus, at the outset,
Foucault explained that
power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate ...; as the process
which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens,
or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another,
thus forming a chain or a system... ; and lastly, as the strategies in which they
take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in
the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social
hegemonies.
Id. at 92-93. Hunt remains skeptical as to whether Foucault's approach can actually
provide such an account of the consolidation of power into the more concentrated
sites of power such as the state, the military and economic institutions. Hunt, supra
note 242, at 276, 278. But this does not present a conceptual problem as long as one
understands that Foucault's genealogical method implies that such institutions must
be understood as contingent historical products rather than inevitable or intentional
productions. For one such sketch of the development of the modern nation-state, see
Clegg, supra note 17, at 241-72.
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ongoing interplay of strategic maneuvering between partners.
But it is quite another to conclude that power is precarious and
to assume, therefore, that things could easily be different. The
various situational factors that influence and condition power
relations will frequently interlock so as to render power
relatively secure. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that,
notwithstanding dramatic changes in the consciously-held values
concerning gender relations, there is much greater persistence
with respect to the underlying practices that constitute our
contemporary system of gender power.329
Thus, although power may be everywhere, it does not follow
that everyone is equally situated. "Certainly everyone doesn't
occupy the same position; certain positions preponderate and
permit an effect of supremacy to be produced. ' '330 True, power
is vulnerable to disruption because it "is produced from one
moment to the next." 33 But this does not mean that social
transformation is in any sense easy. Foucault cautioned that,
although "the moving substrate of force relations" is in principle
always "local and unstable," it is nevertheless true that "power"
as an overall effect of those mobilities can appear "permanent,
repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing." 332 Part of the problem
is that, because power is everywhere, it must be confronted and
reconstructed everywhere.
VI. CONSTRUCTION AND COMMITMENT

In the previous Section, I tried to present a relatively faithful
reading of Foucault. Here, I return to the objection from social
contingency to develop some of the practical and political
implications of this deconstruction and reconception of power.
Although I will be building on several of Foucault's insights, I
will be diverging from Foucault's views as he articulated them.
329 See Lisa Belkin, Bars to Equality of Sexes Seen as Eroding, Slowly, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1989, at 1 ("Men, while generally expressing support for women's pursuit of
equality, said there had been more changes than women saw, with less cost to women

than women reported. They suggested they had overcome sexism more thoroughly
than women acknowledged, and they saw less need for further changes than women
did.").

330
Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 256, at 156.
331
Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 93.
332Id.
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I argue that power should be understood as the product of an
interplay of actions and attitudes between social actors, each
equipped with corresponding or complementary images of a
particular social relation. 333 This claim about the interpretive
basis of power forms the cornerstone of my argument that the
deconstruction of the traditional conceptions of power and
agency offers new possibilities for empowerment.
To start, what might it mean to say that power comes from
below?
Earlier, we examined the unreflective assumption that power
is a matter of hierarchy and located its source in the
conventional metaphorical schema for power. 334 In contrast to
this conventional wisdom, I argued that all power is social power
and, therefore, that it can be activated by people at very
different positions within the social system. 335 Indeed, as
Foucault maintained, this is true even within explicitly
hierarchical organizations.
It's obvious that in an apparatus like an army or a factory, or
some other such type of institution, the system of power takes
a pyramidical form. Hence there is an apex. But even so, even
in such a simple case, this summit doesn't form the 'source' or
'principle' from which all power derives .... The summit and
the lower elements of the hierarchy stand in a relationship of
mutual support and conditioning, a mutual 'hold' (power as a
mutual and indefinite 'blackmail'). 336
Consider the case of the factory. Since management must rely
on line personnel to perform their tasks, the success of the
enterprise is dependent on the continued compliance by the
subordinates with the designated routine. This compliance can
always be compelled through disciplinary measures, of course.
333In contrast, Foucault argued that, at least with respect to what he called "biopower," "[i]f power takes hold on the body, this isn't through its having first to be
interiorised in people's consciousnesses." Foucault, "Short History," supra note 323,

at 186. But this putative difference should not be overstated. I do not doubt that
these actions, images, and attitudes are deeply inscribed in our physical habits (such
as posture and comportment). Nor do I doubt that the greater part of this process
occurs without the conscious awareness of the subject. See supra note 60.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
335 See supra text accompanying notes 59-74.
336Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 256, at 159.
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But even the successful use of discipline comes only at a
price-at a minimum, the marginal cost in time and energy
diverted from the business at hand. Excessive discipline or
discipline that is perceived as unfair may also lead to
resentment, undermining morale and efficiency. At the least,
then, the subordinates in an explicitly hierarchical organization
have power up to their ability to exact such costs. And that cost
may not be marginal at all, since it increases with the level of
disruption.
Subordinates, however, exercise more profound and directly
constitutive power than suggested by this rudimentary economic
model. Consider the cold reception typically faced by the newly
promoted foreman who, having just come from the shoproom
floor, tries to continue his or her previous relationship as "one
of the guys." Much the same thing occurs when research
assistants or law review editors insist on calling you "Professor"
even though you have repeatedly asked them to use your first
name. In each of these cases, the subordinate is actively
engaged in the social construction of authority. In each of these
cases, the subordinate is both an effect of a system of power and
a vehicle of its reproduction.
Still, these phenomena only scratch the surface of the
constitutive power that subordinates can exercise with respect to
their lawful superiors. George Orwell presents a poignant
illustration in his elegantly concise essay, Shooting an
Elephant.337 Orwell depicts an incident from his service as a
subdivisional police officer in Burma during the 1920s, doing, in
his own words, "the dirty work of Empire." 338 An elephant in
heat was running amok in the bazaar. When Orwell arrived to
investigate, he found that the elephant had killed a man, "an
Indian, a black Dravidian coolie." 339 Orwell sent for an elephant

337Orwell, supra note 23. This essay is rich in psychological detail and insight; not
surprisingly, it has been used as text in examinations of power by other scholars. See

Scott, supra note 141, at 10-16 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 347-359). In
fact, however, the essay is believed to be an artful mixture of fact and fiction.
Bernard Crick, Introduction to Audrey Coppard & Bernard Crick, Orwell

Remembered 9, 18 (1984).

338 Orwell, supra note 23, at 91.
339 Id. at 93.
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gun, though he "had no intention of shooting the elephant."34
As he proceeded to a nearby rice paddy where the elephant had
come to rest, Orwell was followed by "practically the whole
population of the quarter ... 34 all shouting excitedly that I was
going to shoot the elephant." 1
Orwell found the elephant peacefully eating grass, "no more
dangerous than a cow."3 42

Since the elephant's heat had

obviously passed, Orwell decided that it was quite unnecessary
to shoot it.
But at that moment I glanced round at the crowd that had
followed me. It was an immense crowd, two thousand at the
least and growing every minute.... I looked at the sea of
yellow faces above the garish clothes .... And suddenly I

realized that I should have to shoot the elephant after all. The
people expected it of me and I had got to do it; I could feel
their two thousand wills pressing me forward, irresistibly....
Here was I, the white man with his gun, . . . seemingly the

leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd
puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces
behind. I perceived in this moment that when the white man
turns tyrant... [h]e becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy,
the conventionalized figure of a sahib.... He wears a mask,
and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant. I
had committed myself to doing it when I sent for the rifle. A
sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute,
to know his own mind and do definite things.343
Orwell did not hear the gun when he fired, just "the devilish
roar of glee that went up from the crowd." 344
It is rare to have a storyteller of Orwell's acuity. But what
Orwell portrays with such keen insight is precisely what a postmodernist would refer to as the decentering of the subject. In
Orwell's account, the ostensibly dominant official is constrained
to act out a script not of his choosing. He finds himself a stock
character, "the conventionalized figure of a sahib." What
governs his actions is neither his own will nor his own best
340 Id. at 94.
34 Id.
342Id.

at 95.
at 95-96.
Id. at 97.

343Id.
3"
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judgment, but rather the demands of this character as enforced
through the expectations of his audience, the crowd of colonial
subjects.345 This leads Orwell to describe himself as "an absurd

puppet" and a "hollow, posing dummy," when he had thought
of himself as the "the leading actor of the piece."

But, of

course, he is the leading actor. It is just that, like most actors,
he is performing in someone else's theatrical346production. Orwell
feels as if he's in a play, and he is anyway.
In Orwell's essay, the power-subject is unmasked as the
contingent incident of the ongoing practices of colonialism rather
than the self-directing author of those practices. At the same
time, the colonial subjects are revealed as active agents in the

construction of their own masters. As James Scott observes,
"Orwell is no more free to be himself, to break convention, than

a slave would be in the presence of a tyrannical master."347
Commenting on Orwell's explanation of the decision to shoot,

Scott emphasizes the way in which the public transcript demands

"a credible performance of haughtiness and mastery" from the

dominant no less than it compels "a credible performance of
humility and deference" from the subordinate.34 Scott, however,
draws two distinctions between these performances. First, he
notes that the subordinate must perform out of weakness, while
345Orwell's account thus presents the flip side of Alasdair MacIntyre's description
of the function of a cultural character in constructing and decoding social meaning.
Such characters partially define the possibilities of plot and action. To
understand them is to be provided with a means of interpreting the behavior of
the actors who play them, just because a similar understanding informs the
intentions of the actors themselves; and other actors may define their parts with
special reference to these central characters. So it is also with certain kinds of
social role[s] .... They furnish recognizable characters and the ability to
recognize them is socially crucial because a knowledge of the character provides
an interpretation of the actions of those individuals who have assumed the
character. It does so precisely because those individuals have used the very
same knowledge to guide and to structure their behavior.
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 27 (2d ed. 1984).
346At various points in the story, Orwell is quite conscious of this. As he takes aim
at the elephant, he hears "a deep, low, happy sigh, as of people who see the theatre
curtain go up at last." Orwell, supra note 23, at 97. And, no doubt aware of Chekhov's famous dictum that a gun on the wall in the first act must be fired in the last,
Orwell realizes that "I had committed myself to doing it when I sent for the rifle."
Id. at 95.
347Scott, supra note 141, at 11.
348 Id.
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"the necessary posing of the dominant derives not from
weaknesses but from the ideas behind their rule, the kinds of
claims they make to legitimacy."349 Second, he points out that
the subordinate who fails to perform risks retribution.3 0 In
contrast, Scott accepts at face value Orwell's explanation that, at
the moment of truth, he realized that "[t]o come all that way,
rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my heels,
and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing-no, that was
impossible. The crowd would laugh at me." 351 Scott concludes
352
that the dominant who fail to perform risk only ridicule.
Both distinctions seem quite wrong, however. Like the
subordinated, the dominant too perform out of weakness. For
when the powerful fail to fulfill their role, a great deal more
than ridicule is at stake. Derision of this sort may only mask
fear; but it may also mask a concomitant rage that needs only a
moment of weakness to erupt into violence. Indeed, Scott notes
that a few years after Orwell's tour of duty an enormous revolt
took the English by surprise.353 Those in power may, like the
colonial English in Burma, understand this dynamic only dimly.
But what the dominant fear most is not that they might get
caught in a contradiction and suffer ridicule; what they fear most
are the awful consequences of weakness. As George Bernard
Shaw wryly observed: "The most anxious man in a prison is the
governor. ' 354

It is not incidental, therefore, that Orwell opens his narrative
with a harsh description of the hatred he felt from the Burmese.
He recounts in detail their constant jeering and baiting
"whenever it seemed safe to do so.' ' 3-1 Slowly but surely, this
humiliation by one's putative subordinates takes its toll. Orwell
says that it all "got badly on my nerves. The young Buddhist
priests were the worst of all. ' 356 And, so, before beginning the
349Id.
350 Id.

351Orwell, supra note 23, at 96.
352Scott, supra note 141, at 11.
353Id. at 15.

354
George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman, in Seven Plays by Bernard Shaw 735
(1951).
355
Orwell, supra note 23, at 91.
356Id.
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story proper, Orwell discloses the terrible conflict engendered by
all this hatred: "With one part of my mind I thought of the
British Raj as an unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped
down... upon the will of prostrate peoples; with another part
I thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a
bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts. '357 Consequently, it comes
as no surprise when we learn from Scott both that the revolt was
led by a Buddhist monk and that it "was crushed with a good
8
deal of gratuitous brutality."35
Scott's reading of Orwell is shaped, in large part, by the
conventional understanding in which power constructs meaning359
and maintains its rule through brutal force. But a closer
examination of Orwell's essay suggests just the opposite: Power
maintains its rule through meaning, and even the brutal force of
the oppressor is socially constructed. Thus, Orwell is candid
about the need to affect a demeanor of potency and control if
he is to maintain his authority:
For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend his life in
trying to impress the 'natives', and so in every crisis he has got
to do what the 'natives' expect of him.... A sahib has got to
act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to know his own
mind and do definite things.3 60
At the same time, Orwell's frank disclosure of the grislier
feelings experienced by the colonial officer reveals some of the
ways in which even power's violence is socially constructed.
Orwell describes the psychological capacity for cruelty as a
product of his "rage against the evil-spirited little beasts who
tried to make my job impossible. ' 361 The power of these humiliations is so great that these social interactions can transform an
anti-imperialist like Orwell into a potentially vicious oppressor.
357 Id. at 92.
358 Scott, supra note 141, at 15.
359See id. at 14 ("The capacity of dominant groups to prevail-though never
totally-in defining and constituting what counts as the public transcript... is... no
small measure of their power.").
W Orwell, supra note 23, at 95-96.
361 Id. at 92. Later in the story, Orwell attests that "with the crowd watching me, I
was not afraid in the ordinary sense, as I would have been if I had been alone. A
white man mustn't be frightened in front of 'natives'; and so, in general, he isn't
frightened." Id. at 96.
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This process of social construction is not unilateral, of course.
When the white man's face grows to fit the mask he wears, his
racial attitudes also have something to do with it. Thus, Orwell
recounts that the younger Europeans chided him for killing the
elephant "because an elephant was worth more than any damn
Coringhee coolie." 362 And Orwell himself refers to the native
363
Burmese as "little beasts" and "sneering yellow faces."
Orwell's sensitive, insightful narrative reveals how power is
produced in the play of meaning in which both oppressor and
victim are deeply complicitous. Power, including the willingness
to use force, is not only socially contingent, it is a matter of
meaning all the way down.
This insight has profound implications, as Robert Cover
explains. "The uncontrolled character of meaning exercises a
destabilizing influence upon power." 364 Cover gives the powerful
example of the civil rights sit-ins of the early 1960s. He writes:
In the face of official interpretations of the Constitution that
permitted continued discriminatory practices in public accommodations, the movement had this choice: it could conform its
public behavior to the official "law" while protesting that the
law was "wrong," or it could conform its public behavior to its
own interpretation of the Constitution.
There is both
"disobedience" and "obedience" in either case. But only
obedience to the movement's own interpretation of the
Constitution was fidelity to the understanding of law by which
the movement's members would live uncoerced. Thus. in acting
out their own, "free" interpretation of the Constitution, protesters say, "We do mean this in the medium of blood" (or in
the medium of time in jail) ....
By provoking the response of the state's courts, the act of
civil disobedience changes the meaning of the law articulated by
officialdom. For the courts, too, may or may not speak in
blood. To be sure, judges characteristically do not have to use
their own blood to create meaning; like most power wielders,
they usually write their bloodier texts in the bodies of the
inmates of the penal colony. But the fact that all judges are in
362
363
3"

Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 92, 91.
Cover, supra note 24, at 18.
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some way people of violence does not mean they rejoice in that
quality or write their texts lightly.
A community that acquiesces in the injustice of official law
has created no law of its own.... The community that disobeys
the criminal law upon the authority of its own constitutional
interpretation, however, forces the judge to choose between
affirming his interpretation of the official law through violence
against the protesters and permitting the polynomia of legal

meaning to extend to the domain of social practice and control.
The judge's commitment is tested .... 365
On its face, this passage is about the role played by committed
groups of non-governmental actors in the creation of legal
meaning. It reflects Cover's pluralist understanding of law as an
ongoing cultural production of human communities, rather than
an artifact of formal lawmaking.366 For all its anti-statism,
however, Cover's legalism still sits uncomfortably with Foucault's
rejection of the juridico-discursive model. Yet, it requires no
great stretch of the imagination to see the parallels between
them. Cover's account of the implicit negotiation that takes
place between the protesters and the judge is remarkably similar
to Foucault's understanding of power as an ongoing process of
social construction in which dominant and subordinate both
participate. Like Orwell's account of the mutually constitutive
relations of meaning between colonial subject and oppressor,
Cover provides a window on the way in which power is
mediated and constructed through strategic maneuvering over
the direction that social meaning will take.
Consider Cover's explication of the options facing the movement. It could accept the legality of the discriminatory
provisions and simply protest their injustice. But to do so,
Cover observes, would be to accept subordination and submit to
coercion. 367 It would be, in effect, to confirm both the authority
365Id. at 47-48.
366See id. at 11 ("the creation of legal meaning-'jurisgenesis'-takes place always
through an essentially cultural medium.") (footnote omitted); Robert M. Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 Yale LJ.1601, 1602 n.2 (1986) ("[T]he thrust of Nomos

[i]s that the creation of legal meaning is an essentially cultural activity which takes
place (or best takes place) among smallish groups.").
37

Cover, supra note 24, at 47 ("[O]nly obedience to the movement's own interpre-
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of those laws and the power of those responsible for their
enactment and enforcement. Instead, the movement could elect
to challenge the legal status of those discriminatory acts, defy
them openly, and put its members at risk of physical violence at
the hands of state officials. By choosing that option, it agrees to
pay a potentially high price for its normative commitments. 368
The decision publicly to assume that risk, however, has two
very immediate and dramatic payoffs.
First, it abruptly
transforms the nature and significance of the events that follow.
The burglar who rationalizes his actions with the slogan
"property is theft" does not thereby challenge the hegemony of
the private property regime. To the contrary. The fact that he
acts surreptitiously or otherwise tries to elude apprehension
tends to confirm-at least, for everyone else-the illicit quality
of his actions. Public disobedience of the property laws, on the
other hand, has a different meaning altogether. As Scott
explains, there is an important distinction between the failure to
comply and a declared refusal to do so. "The former does not
necessarily breach the normative order of domination; the latter
almost always does." 369 He elaborates: "The open refusal to
comply with a hegemonic performance is ... a particularly
dangerous form of insubordination ... because any particular
refusal to comply is not merely a tiny breach in a symbolic wall;
it necessarily calls into question all the other acts that this form
of subordination entails. '370 Thus, a public act of defiance by
the movement, let alone an act of defiance that claims warrant
in the supreme law, is a direct challenge to the hegemony of the
system of segregation.
The second payoff is that the decision to defy the law and
accept the consequences dramatically changes the stakes for the
officials charged with its enforcement. In the crucially important
sense identified by Foucault, it is an act of power. Remember,
Foucault defined "the exercise of power as a way in which
tation of the Constitution was fidelity to the understanding of law by which the

movement's members would live uncoerced.").
368 "Just as living in the economic world entails an understanding of price, so living
in the normative world entails an understanding of the measures of commitment to
norms in the face of contrary commitments of others." Id. at 53.
369 Scott, supra note 141, at 203.
370Id. at 205.
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certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions."371 As long as the movement conforms to the law while

merely protesting its legitimacy, the dominant majority and its
officials are free to act as they please. By openly challenging the
hegemony of the segregation laws, however, the sit-in movement
forces those officials to what Cover correctly identifies as a very
uncomfortable choice: Either the judge brooks defiance, calling
into question the law's privilege and, in effect, conceding the
legitimacy of the challenge; or he enforces the law, obliging him
to affirm the authority of this unjust law or otherwise take
responsibility for the violence he authorizes in its name. In
either event, the authority of both the judge and the law has
been put at risk by the actions of the protesters. If the judge
allows defiance to succeed, it may spark more general rebellion.
But if the judge authorizes force to compel compliance, the
danger is every bit as great. For what the judge sees as lawful
force may appear to others as nothing more than a naked act of
violence. Indeed, this was precisely the effect of television news
broadcasts of official violence against black protesters in
Birmingham in May of 1963 and at the Edmund Pettus Bridge,
March 7, 1965, during the march from Selma to Montgomery.372
If Cover's account highlights the power of the subordinated to
affect-sometimes, even, determine-the course of social meaning, he certainly does not gloss over the brutal realities of power.
He is unusually forthright in emphasizing that the implicit
negotiation between dominant and subordinate takes place "in
the medium of blood."373 Cover, moreover, fully appreciates
that the dominant and subordinate bring very different resources
to the process. Where the subordinate wager their own lives
and well-being, the dominant typically expend the blood of
others (whether soldiers or prisoners) rather than their own. 374
Though both parties exercise power in the struggle over
meaning, they do not (at least typically) have to pay anything
like the same price for their participation. On this view, what

371
Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28, at 222.
372 The same was true later during the protests against the Vietnam War.
373Cover, supra note 24, at 47.
374 Id.
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we commonly refer to as "having" or "being in power" is in
actuality the differential ability to inflict costs.
These reflections on Cover help flesh out several of Foucault's
important claims. For Foucault, the exercise of power lies in the
ability to structure the field of other possible actions. The
differential ability to inflict costs is a primary, if highly
conventional way in which power operates to channel the
behavior of others. This can take the obvious form of formal
legal sanctions in the hands of the state. But much the same
process occurs in other, less formalized social relations. To
return to the example of a gender-stereotypical power relation,
the performance of the traditional wife/mother role can be
regulated by an array of power-mechanisms ranging from
physical abuse to positive inducements in the form of lavish gifts
or displays of affection. And, because these power relations do
not exist in isolation, they are equally likely to be supported by
a variety of disciplinary mechanisms from outside the
relationship. These may include discrimination in the job
market or intense social disapproval of any conduct deemed
deviant (such as working outside the home or raising children on
one's own).
Precisely because these are power relations,though, the ability
to inflict costs-and, thus, channel behavior-is never unilateral.
This dynamic can take many different forms, as illustrated in
Cover's examination of the intense struggle over meaning in the
exchange between the protesters and the judge. In this way,
Cover's discussion elucidates and extends Foucault's point that
"[r]elations of power ... are the immediate effects of the

divisions, inequalities, and disequiibriums" within social
relationships. 375 It is not just inequalities in power or material
conditions that can "engender states of power. ' 376 Relations of
power can arise from inequalities in access to the resources of
meaning and legitimacy, and these discrepancies do not always
favor those in power. This is why so much more than ridicule
is at stake when the powerful act in ways which contradict the
375 Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 94.

accompanying notes 263-65.
376Foucault,

History of Sexuality, supra note 240, at 93.
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public professions that justify their rule, a point that Scott
himself appreciates.

377

Inequalities in psychological and emotional states can have
much the same effect. This is easy to see within more intimate
relations, where states of dependency can be and frequently are
very powerful positions. This is one point of the co-dependency
movement, of course. But any devoted parent can tell you firsthand that the helpless infant is the most powerful person in the
household precisely because of the parents' total commitment to
the baby's welfare. Much the same is true at the other extreme
of the power spectrum. This is why the side that has suffered
fewer casualties can still be the one that loses the war. The
difference between victory and defeat can be a matter of whether those losses exceed the level that is socially tolerable. In
the final analysis, then, the social contingency of power means
that "power" is a matter of relative interpretive conclusions.
Counterintuitive as it may seem, "power" is at base a hermeneutic phenomenon.
This does not mean that power is in any sense imaginary. To
say that power is a matter of interpretation is not to say that one
can make it disappear merely by thinking it away. Power is
quite real as a social fact. It is real precisely to the extent that
it is based on cultural meanings that people internalize and act
on. To be more precise, power is an interpretive institution.

Like all social institutions, it exists only so long as the actors
who constitute it continue to reproduce their respective roles
and routines. This social contingency makes power vulnerable
to disruption, as we have seen, because the "powerless" always
have the power to withhold or vary their performance. But
power is a social phenomenon, not a subjective individual
invention. When some actors withhold their performance, the
reaction of the others can be quite real indeed.
Still, this understanding of power as an interpretive institution
has direct and immediate consequences for empowerment.

377See Scott, supra note 141, at 11 ("[A]n elected head of a republic must appear to
respect the citizenry and their opinions; a judge must seem to venerate the law.
Actions by elites that publicly contradict the basis of a claim to power are

threatening.").
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Because it is a matter of meaning all the way down, even the
most pervasive system of power can never be all-powerful.
Those "in" power may achieve an effective monopoly on force
and, with it, the capacity to impose terrible costs on those who
resist. But they can never fully control the resources of meaning-Lukes, Minow, and other theorists of hegemony, notwithstanding. Thus, Cover's profound point is that even the ability
to inflict costs is secondary to the power to control meaning.
The uncontrolled character of meaning destabilizes power
because no one can dictate the valuation or meaning of those
"costs" or the interpretation that others will put on the decision
to incur them. This is why martyrdom, civil disobedience, and
other forms of sacrifice are such powerful weapons.
It remains true, of course, that any individual who elects to
pay the cost may turn out to be a fool rather than a martyr.
Whether the sacrifice succeeds will depend both on how others
interpret it and, even more crucially, on whether they are willing
to act on that interpretation. But, as Scott notes: "Massive
desertion by serf or peasant conscripts has helped bring down
more than one ancien regime.
Under the appropriate
conditions, the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like
378
snowflakes on a steep mountainside, set off an avalanche."
The onus of commitment is that the act of sacrifice necessarily
precedes the knowledge of its consequences. But the power of
commitment is that, if enough others elect to follow the example
of committed action and risk the consequences, it can create the
very real possibility that no one at all need pay the price.
VII. OBJECT LESSONS

Why deconstruct the notion of power? Why risk destabilizing
conceptions like domination and subordination upon which so
much of feminist theory seems to depend? Even if the critique
of these subjectivized views of power is right, might it not be the
case that the identification of a responsible party is a strategic
necessity of effective political action?
To these questions there are two answers, one idealistic, the
other pragmatic. When I declared myself in favor of spitting
378 Id.

at 192 (footnote omitted).
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into the pit, I meant in part to challenge the unwritten rule that
every scholarly venture must be preceded by a careful (if silent)
calculus in which one gauges the normative or political
consequences of one's intended analysis. Sometimes, knowledge
may be valuable for its own sake. But, even within the
normative paradigm that dominates the academy, it is surely
common ground that an analysis held hostage to a normative
and political agenda courts serious distortion. 379 That, in any
event, was part of what I tried to demonstrate in Part IV.
The second answer is more pragmatic. Consider what might
happen if a political movement strives for power on the basis of
some version of the conventional understanding. Suppose it
manages to achieve many or all of its stated objectives,
implementing a variety of laws or policies designed to end
subordination. One unhappy possibility is that the movement
finds to its surprise that it has come to the wrong place and
seized the wrong levers.380 Worse yet, the movement might in
fact succeed and find that it has managed only to reshuffle the
players. 381 In either event, "power" will have remained intact
precisely because it never was a location or an apparatus in the
first place. "Power" will have endured precisely because it was
never anything more than the actions, practices, and institutions
that we have been engaged in all along.
And that,
unfortunately, would mean that power would still be busily at
work constructing those new players as the same old subjectformations.
Many people find Foucault's approach distressing because it
seems to mean that power is everywhere and inescapable. Thus,
Robert Post worries that:
379 Indeed, a politics-driven theory may be every bit as problematic as a theorydriven politics.
3

Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 159 ("As to who or what fundamentally moves

and shapes the realities and instrumentalities of domination, and where to go to do

something about it,... is as ambiguous as it is crucial.").
381Cf. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 256, at 164-65 ("Do you think it would be
much better to have the prisoners operating the Panoptic apparatus and sitting in the
central tower, instead of the guards?"); MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 121 ("A feminism
that seeks only to affirm subjectivity as the equal of objectivity, or to create for itself
a subject rather than an object status, seeks to overturn hierarchy while leaving
difference, the difference hierarchy has created, intact.")
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If "power," to use Foucault's words, "makes individual subjects," then ... [t]he issue is not merely one of historical
determinism and consequent political passivity, but, more
deeply, of the possible meaning of politics.... It would seem
that any potential political outcome would merely reinscribe
initial conditions of deprivation. 382
Others find Foucault's approach disheartening because it means
that there is no Archimedean point from which to act to
transform the world. Thus, MacKinnon expresses her concern
that Foucault's theory leads to the conclusion that "[p]ower is
everywhere therefore nowhere, diffuse rather than pervasively
hegemonic." 3s3 For both sorts of critics, it is not much solace to
be told that power must be confronted and reconstructed everywhere.
Foucault's own response to such concerns was that his
"position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic
activism." 384 In contrast, I want to suggest that there is
something encouraging, even affirming about Foucault's
reconception of power. The conventional understanding of
power as a quality or "thing" possessed by the dominant can
have implications quite as bleak as suggested by Post. If power
is some "thing" that the powerful "have," then how are the
subordinated to remedy their situation? This predicament
appears in its worst form in three-dimensional theories of power,
where power is supposed to construct so absolutely that the
subordinated are unable either to perceive their own interests or
even to imagine alternatives to the existing order.
In
consolation, the three-dimensional view offers to identify those
agents who may be held responsible. Even if this view were
correct, it would tell us only where to go to do something about
it. But it would tell nothing about how we might get those "in"
power to listen.
By comparison, Foucault's understanding of power as an
attribute of a system of relations is, for an anti-humanist like
Foucault, surprisingly humane and "liberating." Many find
382Post,

supra note 22, at xiii (quoting Foucault, Subject and Power, supra note 28,
at 221-22) (citations omitted).
383 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 131.
n4 Foucault, Genealogy of Ethics, supra note 188, at 232.
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politics impossible or futile without the identification of some
villain who can serve as a focal point for mobilization. This is
perhaps acceptable when the villain is someone to be vanquished
and then relegated to the proverbial dust-bin of history. But it
is quite another matter when the demonized foe is someone with
whom one is deeply enmeshed on a day-to-day, even intimate
basis. The first advantage of this systemic understanding of
power is that it suggests an alternative to the cycle of naming
and blaming that so often polarizes rather than helps in the struggle to rectify the very real problems of inequality and
subordination.
The second advantage of this reconception of power is that it
is, in a profound sense, empowering. To understand power as
a property of a social system of relations is to see power as a
shared resource that can be activated from many different
positions within that system. Once power is understood as relational, it becomes apparent that at least some of what the dominant "have" must already be available to the subordinated.
Indeed, there is an important sense in which this second point is
the same as the first. The deconstruction of power is also the
deconstruction of the agency and autonomy of the traditional
liberal subject. This means that responsibility for subordination
and inequality cannot be localized in certain identifiable agents;
it is widely distributed throughout the social network. To the
exact degree that this understanding of power diminishes the
agency of the dominant, it amplifies the agency of the subordinated. What it subtracts from one part of the network, it
necessarily redistributes to the other.
Still, transformation is not going to be easy. And those who
try to effect change will almost certainly pay the price. But at
least we know why.

